

Preliminary Findings

Small Steps and Grand Illusions

Governance and Disaster in Pakistan 2005-2015



Released on the Occasion of the
10th Anniversary of 2005 Earthquake



The Asia Foundation
Pakistan



Introduction


This report presents a summary of the preliminary findings of the pre-focus group opinions on statements and focus group discussions held by Pattan Development Organisation in various districts as part of the governance and disaster study. It presents the opinions of various stakeholders having substantial experience in disaster management in their respective regions. A section discussing the methodology follows this section, presenting details on how the FGD was conducted followed by a section presenting the findings of the research. The findings section also incorporates visual presentation of responses within all the statements.

Methodology

This section presents the process of data collection pursued for the purpose of this study. In order to obtain maximum amount of information over a broad category of participants in multiple district, this study conducted pre-focus group opinions on statements and focus group discussions. The overall time period for data collection was from August to September. It is imperative to note here that this report is part of a bigger study in which a survey with affectees of Earthquake 2005 and Floods 2010 was also conducted. Through this survey, structured interviews were conducted with 392 affectees of the earthquake in Battagram and Mansehra. Pattan team was unable to conduct its survey in Muzaffarabad because they were asked to leave by Pakistan Intelligence agencies. In addition to this, through this survey, structured interviews were conducted with 1013 flood affectees in Nowshera, Swat, Layyah, Muzaffargarh, Kashmore and Thatta.


Pre-Focus Group Opinions on Statements

The methodology adopted initially involved structured statements asking for responses, for this purpose 26 statements were formulated. There was a range of five responses that the interviewees could pick: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, and not sure. Participants were required to fill in their responses either on paper or register their responses via email. The idea was to gauge the stakeholders' position on various issues. This method was rigorous as it helped us go beyond the binaries; there were five options to capture opinions instead of basic yes or no answers. Further, it helped generate good quantitative results. The responses were collected from stakeholders working in 12 districts of Pakistan; Islamabad, Nowshera, Swat, Layyah, Muzaffargarh, Kashmore, Thatta, Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi, Hyderabad, Muzaffarabad, and Mansehra. All in all, 90 stakeholders were interviewed: 7 academics, 29 officials, 14 INGO representatives, 13 Media representatives, and 27 NGO representatives.



Focus Group Discussion

Before commencing the discussion, all participants were welcomed and the purpose of the study was discussed. This was followed by a discussion on the methodology for the FGD. The FGD questionnaire contained 27 statements followed by a pre-FGD and post-FGD column. The statement was read out by the moderator followed by a minute for the participants to fill out the pre-FGD column as per the scoring schedule determined in the FGD. Once the participants had completed filling out the score, the responses were recorded. This was followed by a discussion and in light of this discussion if any participant(s) wanted to change their scoring, it was recorded on the post-FGD column. The FGDs took place in four districts: Islamabad, Lahore, Multan and Peshawar. A total of 66 participants took part in the discussions: 3 academics, 13 officials, 3 INGO representatives, 13 Media representatives, 34 NGO representatives,




Presentation of the Report

As mentioned earlier, this report constitutes the responses and discussions of the pre-focus group opinion on statements and focus group discussions. The main text represents the discussions emerging from the FGDs and their visual presentation. While the text box on the right-hand side presents the opinions emerging from the pre-focus group opinion on statements, complemented by their visual presentation

Findings

Statement 1: Hazards may be natural but disasters are not. All disasters are result of human action or inaction.

A large majority of the participants were in agreement, with 36% strongly agreeing and 42% agreeing to the statement. Only 18% of the participants were in disagreement.



Islamabad FGD: Participants generally agreed that disasters are man-made. Human action or inaction, in the form of bad-governance, ill planning, corruption and kickbacks, has a huge role in converting a hazard into a disaster.


Further, one participant noted that it is impossible to make remote areas in Pakistan model cities. In that case when hazards affect these areas, the damage cannot be attributed to human inaction, as human intervention is almost impossible.

Lahore FGD: One of the participants, citing the Head Muhammadwala example states, *'Sometimes it is not inaction rather an incorrect action that can contribute to problems, this can be mitigated by incorporating the local knowledge of the communities'*.

Multan FGD: The responses to this statement brought to fore the confusion over terminology with majority unclear on the meaning and differentiation between hazard and disaster. This resulted in quite an extensive debate among participants about the classification of earthquakes and floods as either disasters or hazards.

Peshawar FGD: According to one of the participants, *'Inaction around the management of water systems can result in catastrophic disasters. For example, River Kabul used to be at a distance of approximately 10 KM from Grand Trunk Road; however, today this distance has reduced to approximately 5 KM. There has been no action to manage this situation and its results will be catastrophic'*.



Another added, *'The case of River Swat is similar. Due to soil erosion the river has shifted its course and with out the installation of proper water management mechanisms, the river continues to destroy dozens of villages'*.



44% of the respondents agreed, 35% strongly agreed. 15% of the interviewees disagreed. 4% of them strongly disagreed and 2 % of them were not sure. Majority respondents agreed with the statement.

Statement 2: Vulnerability and poverty have close relationship and both are result of certain processes.

Majority of the participants were in disagreement with 33% strongly agreeing and 62% agreeing with the statement. A small minority of 5% disagreed with the statement.



49% of the respondents agreed and 41% of them strongly agreed. 9% of the respondents disagreed. 1% were not sure. A clear majority of the respondents agreed

Islamabad FGD: A rescue 1122 representative shared, *‘The vulnerable areas are affected by disasters more and this is apparent in how areas like Javed Colony are inundated as soon as it rains’.*

Lahore FGD: One participant said, *‘State policies exacerbate people’s experience of poverty rather than relieving them which renders them vulnerable to disasters’.*

Multan FGD: One of the participants shared, *‘Exacerbated vulnerability of poor people forced them to leave behind their children in most instances in floods of 2010’.*

‘All the participants concluded on the note that ‘our state is continually failing us’, South Punjab FGD participants



In light of this discussion participants shared how people did not move into model villages built for them after the floods of 2010. They shared that the government may have provided some affectees with alternative houses but it failed to provide them with the agrarian livelihood opportunities available to them at their previous locations.

In addition to this lists for model village allotments were highly politicized as one participant shared her experience *‘I was in one such allotment of model houses, and asked one of the occupants what their future plans are with regards to the house, he simply said “we will sit here for a month, then sell it and go back home”’.*

Peshawar FGD: The participants shared, *‘Poverty forces people to live on riverine belts which exacerbates their vulnerability to disasters’.* One participant added, *‘This vulnerability is a result of how people living in poverty are at the behest of the corruption and mismanagement perpetuated by MNAs and MPAs’.*

Statement 3: No project should be finalized without conducting risk assessment by experts and would-be-affected through public hearing.

A vociferous majority of participants agreed with the statement, with 64% strongly agreeing and 34% agreeing.



55% of the total respondents strongly agreed and 36% of them agreed. Only 8% of the total interviewees disagreed and 1% strongly disagreed. A very clear majority of respondents agreed.

Islamabad FGD: A rescue 1122 representative strongly believed that that affectees need to be involved. *‘Office mein beth ke nabeen decide ho sakta ke logon ko kya chahye (What people want, cannot be decided in offices)’.*

Those who disagreed did so because they believed that not all projects need a public hearing. Public hearing can be damaging because the public does not make decisions solely on the basis of merits. There are other factors involved like likes, dislikes and popularity. Further, they may not be equipped to understand the long run benefits of some projects.

Lahore FGD: Participants insisted that the inclusion of would-be-affected is imperative, however, they also cautioned that there is a need to focus on transparency in these processes to ensure all voices are heard and incorporated.

Multan FGD: All the participants also highlighted that the term ‘experts’ is quite contentious. Expanding on this reservation they shared that experts should not only be those who are technical experts related to a particular project but they should also be ‘social experts’ to ensure that assessments are not politicized or biased.

One CSO participant shared her experience:



‘I was working with UNFPA. Experts predicted that the flood-affected area in Sindh in 2011 would be similar to that of the flood of 2010. All efforts for preparation and relief were directed by this prediction. However, in reality the flood had its own different course and due to these preconceived and determined opinions numerous lives were lost’.

Peshawar FGD: Participants shared, *‘It is true that an engineer’s opinion and expertise is essential in the construction of a bridge or road but these decisions are not made by the expert, they are made by MNAs and MPAs who have no knowledge’.*

Moreover, they shared, *‘Involvement of local community in risk assessments results in their ownership of various projects’.*

Statement 4: Multiple laws (Calamities Act 1958, National Disaster Management Act 2010, NDMA, Civil Defence Act 1952) and multiple structures govern disasters in the country. This causes overlapping, lack of coordination and confusion. Resultantly negatively affects disaster management.

A majority of 89% was in agreement while 7% disagreed with the statement.



Out of all the respondents, 40% agreed and 31% strongly agreed. 11% of them disagreed, 1% strongly disagreed, and 17% of them were not sure. Overall, a sizable majority agreed.

Islamabad FGD: There was a consensus that the state institutions are facing this issue. Parallel institutions with similar aims are created thus creating confusion and inefficiency. Rather than enriching and empowering existing institutions, new structures are created causing inefficiency and rivalry between different institutions. A journalist noted that, *'Aek time mein aek hi gaon mein farak institutions sab hi child welfare pe kaam ker rahi hoti hein (At one time, in one village, multiple organisations are working on the same issue of child welfare)'*.

Moreover the participants added that instead of empowering a well functioning institution, a new structure, the Riverine Amphibian Police Force (RAPF) is being created to assist along rivers. This force has been given 700 boats and 14 divers. This new department is created rather than empowering existing rescue 1122. There is also the Dolphin Force and Anti terrorism force causing confusion as to jurisdiction and tasks

Lahore FGD: PDMA consultant from UNICEF stressed on an increased coordination between the NDMA Act 2010 and the Local Government Act.

Multan FGD: One of the participants shared that, *'Four years ago boats were under the authority the Civil Defense, now the boats are under Rescue 1122. However, there is no clarity over who will provide the budget for the repair and maintenance of the boats to Rescue 1122'*.



Moreover, most participants also identified that there is a disjuncture in the household/affectees' mapping and cash disbursement in recovery activities. Those at the forefront of relief activities are not consulted in the cash disbursement processes, which create a gap in those, that are affected by the disaster and those that are compensated. Furthermore, there is a continual delay in the creation of local governments despite their essentiality in ensuring governance and disaster management at the local level.

Peshawar FGD: One of the participants shared an incident, *‘During the recent Floods in Chitral, I asked a senior official of PDMA “You must be very busy these days?” He replied, “No why should I be busy, my work is that of a post office, just a post office’.*

An example of mismanagement was quoted by a respondent who was involved in a study in Charsadda and Nowshera, he shared, *‘During my study I visited different government offices to establish which department was responsible for early warnings. I visited MET office, PDMA, DCO office and police; each of these departments refuted that it was not their responsibility to issue early warning’.*

Statement 5: Frequency and intensity of water related disasters have gone up since 2010 because of poor management of dams, head works and embankments.

Majority of the participants were in agreement with 28% strongly agreeing and 44% agreeing. The statement was met with disagreement by 24% of the participants.



Out of all the respondents, 46% agreed, 28% strongly agreed. 21% disagreed, 2% strongly disagreed and 3% were not sure. Although as quarter of the respondents disagreed but the majority agreed with the statement.

Islamabad FGD: A TDEA representative said that, *‘How much water to let out, where to let it out, which direction to let it out; all these decisions have crucial impact on peoples’ lives’.* Further when roads are ill planned floods are diverted as the course of rivers changes; often to poor peoples’ land.

A representative took a positive position on state’s role in disasters. He claimed that *‘The state is setting up these all things especially in Sindh and this is apparent in how this time water was released from the dams sensibly’.*

Lahore FGD: One participant said, *‘The head works and embankments are not constructed in a way that can combat disaster so when something happens these structures collapse’.* Another added, *‘We can’t save Pakistan from floods but we can save it from the devastating impact of these disasters through proper management of dams, head works and embankments’.* Moreover participants also cautioned that climate change is not being factored in when construction plans are drafted.

Another participant highlights, *‘Tarbela dam has been incapacitated and can no longer manage the rising water levels’.*

Representative from the flood division said, *‘Dams are being maintained but there is significant room for improvement’.*

A participant from WHO added, *‘Continual monitoring of these infrastructural elements and their quality is essential in ensuring optimal performance’.*

Multan FGD: Participants in agreement with the statement shared the example of Head Mohammad Wala, sharing how the government boasted that this bridge could bear the flow of one million cusecs of water while it became apparent that it could only bear 0.4 million cusecs of water destroying the villages around it. They also highlighted that the NDMA Act 2010 comprehensively discusses the management of infrastructure however, due to a lag in its implementation these issues are not being resolved. After the discussion two of the participants disagreeing with the statement changed their responses to agreement.


Statement 6: In spite of heavy spending, the enactment of disaster management act and establishment of DMAs at national and provincial level, disaster management has not improved in the country.

74% of the participants were in agreement while 24% of them disagreed with the statement.


Islamabad FGD: The participants shared that, *Disaster management needs to be as decentralized and close to the communities as possible. Since there is no governing body at the district level, there is no way to streamline disaster management*.

Lahore FGD: One of the participants stated, *Improved disaster management is only visible because the disaster intensity is reduced in comparison to floods of 2010*. The participants highlighted that, *Absence of local government structures impedes on the progress of disaster management*. They added, *Even this year district disaster plans were formulated but they were not context-specific rather they were a product of copy and paste*.

Multan FGD: The participants shared that the placement of the army at the forefront of disaster relief and rescue also demotivates government departments created for this specific purpose and quashes their ability to functions. Participants asserted that rather than diverting resources towards the army for relief and rescue, government departments of disaster management need to be strengthened and provided their due budget.



Out of all the respondents, 47% agreed and 26% strongly agreed. 23% disagreed, 1% strongly disagreed and 3% were not sure. Although the majority of respondents agreed with the statement, roughly a quarter of overall respondents also disagreed with it.




Statement 7: National Disaster Management Act 2010 (NDMA) is silent about the frequency of meetings of National Disaster Management Commission and Provincial Disaster Management Commissions. As a result, these governing bodies have failed to reduce disaster risks, to improve planning, early warning system, preparedness and response.

This statement garnered a majority of affirmative responses, with 12% strongly agreeing and 49% agreeing with the statement. A minority of 20% disagreed with the statement.


Islamabad FGD: The participants highlighted that overall disaster management has not improved in the country in spite of huge spending and they attribute this to the lack of meetings between NDMA and different PDMA. One participant added, *‘The Chairman of NDMA needs to convene these meetings as because of lack of meetings, roles and responsibilities are not defined clearly, causing and perpetuating confusion’.*

Lahore FGD: One CSO participant shared, *‘The lack of meeting is not a policy gap rather it is a procedural problem. The meetings do not occur frequently because NDMA is located in the Prime Minister Secretariat’.*

Multan FGD: A majority of the participants agreed with this statement while those disagreeing with the statement stated that the NDMA Act 2010 is a comprehensive law that highlights all these provisions but this is not apparent because of the lack of implementation rather than a fault at the level of the law. Most participants could not make distinction between DMCs and DMAs. This also shows that NGOs workers too are not fully aware of public policy and law on disaster management.



Out of all the respondents 31% agreed, 29% strongly agreed. 18% disagreed, 2% of them strongly disagreed. 20% of them were not sure. A very narrow majority of overall respondents agreed. A sizable proportion was not sure about the statement.



Statement 8: While National Disaster Management Act seeks to establish Disaster Management Commission at national and provincial levels, it is silent about creating governing body for the district disaster management units. Because of this, disaster management has not improved at local level



Majority of the participants were in agreement, with 16% strongly agreeing and 48% agreeing. On the other hand, 26% of the contributors disagreed with the statement.

Islamabad FGD: One participant raised an important point, *'The people sitting at the national level do not want to give resources to the districts and this power relation explains the absence of DDMAs. There will be a need to give a portion of the budget to the DDMAs which the authorities are not ready to do so right now'*.

Another participant stated that *'Disaster management is simply not the state's priority at the moment hence we see the absence of DDMAs'*. Another participant adds to this saying, *'Public policy focus is still on relief rather than mitigation so there isn't a move towards creating a proper system'*.

Lahore FGD: All the participants stated, *'The provisions for local level departments exists in the Act but the government has failed to prioritize this provision and take it seriously'*.



Multan FGD: One of the participants highlighting the inefficiency of NDMA states *'NDMA acts like a donor agency, blindly doling out funds rather than implementing the law'*. One CSO participant shared that, *'The provision for district bodies is there in the law, however, what blunts the law is a lack of implementation'*. Another CSO participant further asserted that, *'The law comprehensively defines the structure of these bodies however, NDMA Act 2010 and the Local Government Act are contradicting each other rather than working in harmony'*.



Statement 9: While NDMA seeks to establish District Disaster Management Units, local government acts of all provinces and ICT are silent about it. Without fixing this lacuna disaster management will remain problematic at local level.

Majority of the participants were in agreement, with 21% strongly agreeing and 69% agreeing with the statement.



Multan FGD: All the participants were of the opinion that the contradiction between the laws hampers disaster management efforts and proves problematic for coordination at the local level.



Out of all the respondents interviewed, 43% of them agreed while 37% of them strongly agreed. 10% disagreed, 1% strongly disagreed and 9% of them were not sure. A very clear majority of respondents agreed with the statement.

Statement 10: Despite public policy shift to disaster risk reduction (DRR), in practice relief operation remains the heart of disaster management.

A majority of 92% of respondents agreed with this statement, while a small minority of 6% disagreed with the statement.



Lahore FGD: One of the participants said, 'Relief remains at the heart because it allows for an easy photo session for the government officials'.

54% of the total respondents agreed with the statement, 31% of them strongly agreed. 8% of them disagreed, 1% strongly agreed and 6% were not sure. Therefore, the majority of respondents agreed.


Multan FGD: The participants were in agreement sharing that there is no focus on disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction. Expanding on this, they shared that action plans are drafted every year without any focus on implementation. Moreover, contingency plans are never drafted as part of a preparedness strategy. Furthermore, all these failures are never held to account with a continuance in *'business as usual'*.

Statement 11: Successive governments since the enactment of National Disaster Management Act failed to allocate 2% funds for DRR, to establish DDMUs, to show progress on HFA 2005-2015.


A majority of the participants were in agreement with 55% in strong agreement and 9% in agreement, while a small minority of 10% disagreed with the statement.

Islamabad FGD: It was discussed that the billions of dollars allocated for DRR were not spent on risk reduction. In spite of donations of billions as it could not be used for politics if spent on risk reduction.

Lahore FGD: A member of the Punjab assembly asserting the importance of sensitizing parliamentarians stated, *'It is important to engage with parliamentarians to help build their understanding regarding DRR so they are able to comprehend why an allocation of funds is imperative'*.





Out of all the respondents 36% strongly agreed, 30% agreed, 28% were not sure, 4% disagreed and 2% strongly disagreed. Even though over



Statement 12: No administration could perform better during emergencies if she does not perform efficiently during normal times.

All the participants were in agreement with 64% were in strong agreement and 36% were in agreement.

Islamabad FGD: A respondent stated, *Preparation for war is made during peacetime, if institutions aren't prepared in normal times how will they respond in times if crisis?*



49% of the overall respondents agreed with the statement. 45% of them agreed and 6% of them disagreed. Majority of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement.

Statement 13: Political interference in planning and construction of bridges, embankments, roads, buildings, breaches of embankments, relief distribution and compensations to affected people is wide spread.

Majority of the participants were in agreement, with 69% strongly agreeing and 23% agreeing with the statement. A small minority of 8% expressed their disagreement.


Islamabad FGD: Participant shared that politicians directly approach ambassadors for funds for their villages. Citing an example for this, a participant quoted an ambassador saying that *'The former Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani requested him to distribute the money in her area'*. Such corruption is a huge bottleneck to disaster management. There is an overall lack of political commitment.

Another participant highlighted, *'Jamshed Dasti also breached an embankment for political benefit, diverting the flow of water to an opponent politician's village'*. Moreover, the participants added that, *'Political interference battles with unfair decisions like whether breaching a waterway will be done to save constituency or local landlord's own land'*.


Lahore FGD: One of the MPA's shared, *'Politicians do interfere in relief distribution to appease their vote bank'*. However participants insisted that, *'Political interference is only justified when a politician is justifiably looking out for his/her constituency'*.

Multan FGD: All the participants shared, *'It is imperative to bring politicians within the ambit of DRR, ensuring they are trained in the disaster planning, preparedness and mitigation as they are key players in decision making'*.

Peshawar FGD: One of the participants shared experience of the floods of 2010 to highlight the detrimental nature of political interference, *'In Mohib Banda village, all the households were affected by the flood however, compensation through Watan Cards was distributed in the unaffected, billy area of Mannke Sharif'*. Moreover, one participant highlighted the corruption of Patwaris by saying, *'When a disaster occurs, it brings with itself another disaster in the shape of a Patwari imposed on the affectees by the government'*.





46% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, 37% agreed. 8% of them disagreed and 1% of them strongly disagreed. 8% of them were not sure. Majority of the respondents agree or strongly agree with the statement.



Statement 14: In order to implement Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) the federal and provincial governments should start rigorous consultation with stakeholders to set year wise targets for disaster prone areas.



The participants were in vociferously voiced their agreement, with 58% strongly agreeing and 40% agreeing with the statement, highlighting that the government at all levels needs to incorporate targets and goals as per its international commitments.



Out of all the respondents, 43% strongly agreed, 38% agreed, 18% were not sure and 1% disagreed. The majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.

Statement 15: Despite creation of humanitarian and DRR networks, CSOs are failing in making corrupt and inept officials accountable.

The statement was met with resounding agreement with 23% participants in strong agreement and 56% in agreement. A small minority of 12% disagreed with the statement.



36% of all the respondents agreed, 35% of them strongly agreed. 13% of them were not sure. 9% of them disagreed and 7% of them strongly disagreed. Majority of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.

Islamabad FGD: A participant pointed out that *'State officials have control over NOCs, so there is pressure over CSOs to not question the status quo, and the CSOs that do raise questions of accountability tend to be sanctioned'*.

Lahore FGD: One participant shared that, *'CSOs fail in holding officials accountable because there are no accountability mechanisms'*. Another participant shared that, *'The data or information*

needed to gauge the performance of officials and their departments is inaccessible to CSOs, resultantly, this hampers any attempts to hold these officials accountable’.

Multan FGD: A journalist participant sharing that, *‘If we (CSOs) try to hold the officials accountable, the state and these officials leave no stone unturned to term us as corrupt. Despite these allegations, if we still continue voicing our concerns, our work is curtailed through various, unnecessary bureaucratic regulations’*. This was met by adamant agreement by other South Punjab FGD participants who proclaimed *‘the government has one slogan: shut these NGOs down’*.

Statement 16: Federal and provincial governments instead of creating enabling environment for CSOs to work with disaster-hit people have caused restrictions (for instance NOC has been made mandatory to work in emergencies) and launched a negative campaign against NGOs.


The majority of participants agreed with the statement, with 35% strongly agreeing and 42% agreeing. A small minority disagreed with the statement at 12%.

Islamabad FGD: The participants shared that *‘If any one disrupts the status quo, they are sanctioned and alienated’*.


Lahore FGD: Participants said, *‘State agencies harass NGOs’*. One CSO participant shared, *‘The work of NGOs is not only inhibited by NOCs, it is also curtailed through negative state-run propagandas’*. Another participant added, *‘Religious organisations are free to do whatever they want, however, NGOs are subjected to unnecessary regulations’*. The participants also added, *‘It is the responsibility of NGOs to hold state machinery and government officials to account, however, the government does not want our reports to reflect its inefficiencies and corruption and in this case insurmountable impediments are created in the path of NGOs’*. Finally, one CSO participant added, *‘The government should divert its energies towards working with us not to working against us’*.

Multan FGD: One participant from Rescue 112 also shared that, *‘the district-level bureaucracy considers NGOs inadequate fools who are unaware of community needs. Due to this perception, the bureaucracy rather than working in partnership with NGOs creates hurdles for them’*.

Moreover, one CSO participant shared that, *‘I just got a message telling me that one of the activities for our project in Layyah has been suspended because we were not given a NOC. How is an organisation supposed to work in these autocratic conditions?’*





34% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement. 31% agreed and 17% disagreed. 10% of them were not sure and 8% strongly agreed. Majority of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.



Statement 17: Union council is the closest elected institution to people; therefore it should be empowered and trained to take decisions regarding DRR, maintenance of embankments, disaster preparedness and response to emergencies.



An overwhelming majority of 92% agreed with the statement while only 8% expressed their disagreement.

Lahore FGD: A media representative shared, *'This is the only way to ensure community-based disaster management'*.



Statement 18: A special CSS cadre for disaster management should be created, trained and deployed in each district.

A total of 64% of the participants agreed with the statement while 34% disagreed with the statement.



Islamabad FGD: The discussion was quite animated around this statement as one of the participants said that *'this is a very creative idea'*.

However, participants expressed their concerns regarding the possibility of problematic attitudes of bureaucrats. One participant observed that, *'relief work is a thing of passion and everybody will not be suitable for the task'* also highlighting *'we do not need more bureaucrats for this job'*.

Another participant supported this by saying that *'Shahi mizaaj se kaam nai hote (Royal attitudes don't get the job done)'*. Another respondent appreciated the thought but questioned, *'Would the CSS Officers want to really go to disaster-hit areas?'*


Lahore FGD: Two participants shared, *'This cadre is as important and pertinent as the others already present'*.

Multan FGD: The participants in agreement with this statement considered this as a step to institutionalize disaster management in the bureaucracy; however, they also recommended that CSS should also include subjects focusing on disaster management. Participants in disagreement with the statement highlighted that disaster management needs to be included as a study course at university level in renowned public and private universities to ensure that the subject is studied researched. One participant in this regard stated that, *'we do not only need more bureaucrats but also those who are fully trained in disaster management. We need planners, experts and institutes'*.

Peshawar: Respondents expressed their reservations by saying, *'DMG group is a tool of the past with a very dangerous mindset and these officers need to be replaced with specialists'*.

Statement 19: Flood forecasting and early warning has improved since 2005.

60% of the participants agreed with the statement (15% strongly agreed and 45% agreed), while 32% disagreed with the statement (28% disagreed and 4% strongly disagreed).





Islamabad FGD: A MET office representative shared, *'The MET office informs NDMA, PDMAs and DCOs about the weather updates. It is their job to disseminate the information. The MET office has no channel, radio or otherwise, to reach the citizens directly. Dissemination of information is problematic because these institutions are weak'*.

Multan FGD: The responses for this statement were quite mixed. Some of the participants agreed that the forecasting and warning has improved while others disagreed. However, they also pointed out that even if the *'warning may have improved, the dissemination still remains problematic'*. For example, *'if radios and televisions are used for dissemination, the state and relevant authorities also need to be mindful that in instances of floods, the electric power is usually suspended and some villages might not even have access to electric power in the first place'*. Moreover, it is also imperative to have a physical presence of rescue and relief operatives, as you need to reassure individuals to leave the area. This is especially necessary in light of how individuals are not willing to vacate their houses in rural areas out of fear of not being able to return to their homes. One of the participants agreeing with statement before the discussion changed her score to strong disagreement in the post-FGD.

Statement 20: Rescue and evacuation has improved since 2005.

Majority of the participants agreed with the statement (19% strongly agreed and 58% agreed with the statement). On the other hand, 11% of the participants strongly disagreed with the statement while 6% disagreed.



45% of the total respondents agreed, 17% of them strongly agreed. 21% of them disagreed and 8% of them strongly disagreed. 9% of the respondents were not sure. While more than a quarter of the respondents were in disagreement, majority of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.



Islamabad FGD: The majority agreed that evacuation and rescue has improved. However, they cautioned that this can be attributed to the fact that the government is still focused on response rather than improving preparedness.

Lahore FGD: Participants said, *Their maybe national level improvements in MET and NDMA offices but there is still no concrete institutionalization or improvement and district and union council level.*

Multan FGD: Participants commended the performance of rescue 1122 in relief and rescue operations while, also identifying the pertinent role played by NGOs. They highlighted that the participation of NGOs in rescue and evacuation operations is also one of the reasons for the improvement in rescue and evacuation.

Statement 21: Relief camp management has improved since 2005.

The majority was in agreement, with the 60% agreeing, maintaining that camps had improved, however, they are yet to be ideal. However, 29% of the participants expressed their disagreement with the statement.



Islamabad FGD: Despite the majority of the participants agreeing with the statement, one participant stated that, *'In a lot of cases the relief kits were ill-planned and it was apparent that someone who did not understand the context and needs to of the affectees designed them'*.

Lahore FGD: A WHO representative shared, *'There are three distinct elements of relief camp management: placement of the camp, accurate mapping of the beneficiaries and proper camp management; there is a significant room for improvement in all these elements'*.

Multan FGD: The participants highlighted that, previously, there were no camps however, after the floods in 2010, camps have improved with more facilities equipped with sanitation through the provision of separate toilets for men and women. Along with this the participants highlighted that camps now also have space for animals. A participant in disagreement with the statement shared that out door camps do not have adequate facilities especially for the old, women, disabled and children.

It is interesting to note that participants highlighted how camps have improved after the floods of 2010, indicating that the five-year period between the Earthquake in 2005 and said floods conditions were still abysmal.

Peshawar FGD: The participants of the Peshawar FGD highlighted that, *'Security of women and girls within relief camps has been a much more precarious issue than the provision of food an shelter, as a lot trafficking of women and girls occurred in relief camps in the earthquake of 2005'*.


Statement 22: Officials’ capacity to understand disasters has improved since 2005.

Majority of the participants were in agreement, with 4% strongly agreeing and 53% agreeing with the statement. A total of 30% disagreed with the statement.


Islamabad FGD: Majority seemed to acknowledge that officials’ capacity to understand disasters has improved. This can be attributed to the training officials receive. They are sent to undertake courses in disaster management abroad.

Lahore FGD: Participants shared that there has been an improvement in the understanding around disasters, however, this understanding should continue into translating into action. In regards with this they shared that, *‘The government should encourage the concerned departments to meet before the beginning of the monsoon to ensure that planning is also at par with understanding’.*

Multan FGD: Those in agreement posited that officials understand disasters but are not pushed to concretize this understanding into formidable measures to manage disasters. On the other hand, those in disagreement stated that officials did not understand the basic elements of disaster occurrence and disaster management.





43% of the total respondents agreed with the statement. 32% of them disagreed. 7% of them strongly agreed and 7% of them strongly disagreed. 11% of them were not sure. Although more than a third of the respondents are in disagreement, majority of the respondents agreed with the statement.



Statement 23: Officials’ capacity to manage disasters has improved since 2005.

Majority of the participants were in agreement with 62% participants expressing their agreement and 2% strongly agreeing with the statement. However, 34% participants were in disagreement (28% disagree and 6% strongly disagree).



45% of the respondents agreed with the statement. 32% of them disagreed. 7% of the respondents strongly disagreed with the statement and 6% strongly agreed. 10% of the respondents were not sure. A narrow majority of the respondents were in



Islamabad FGD: One participant said that, *‘Pakistan has a good canal system including flood canals and these have not been utilized’.*

Lahore FGD: Participants shared that there is a dearth of sensitization and understanding of officials in the line departments at the local level. This is coupled with a lack of any institutionalized structure to enhance capacity at the district level. A PDMA consultant shared, *‘In recent times, mapping exercises to enhance capacity were done with 19 DCOs in Punjab while leaving out officials in line departments. Therefore, these consultations do not prove to be fruitful as they are not with the people on the ground’.*

Multan FGD: One participant shared *‘state’s inefficiencies are a thorny challenge for disaster management’.*

Statement 24: Disasters create opportunity to ‘Build-Back-Better’. In Pakistan governments and their institutions have learnt lessons from past disasters and improved their planning, preparedness and working.

The opinions on this statement were somewhat split, with 53% participants sharing their agreement with the statement (51% agreeing and 2% strongly agreeing), while 47% of the participants shared their disagreement (32% disagreed and 15% strongly disagreed).



54% of the respondents agreed with the statement. 26% of them disagreed with it. 11% of them strongly agreed and 8% strongly disagreed. 1%, or one participant, were not sure. While one third of the participants were in disagreement, majority of the participants agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.

Those in agreement:

Islamabad FGD: The discussion brought to the fore that, some participants believed that the state has improved its planning mechanisms. They supported this by highlighting that the government structures have improved overall and the state has invested in earthquake resistant housing for citizens. Moreover, they also shared that large state hospitals have also improved their building structures to ensure their resilience and safety.

Lahore FGD: The participants expressed that the governments has improved their planning around disasters. Moreover, they shared that the Chief Minister office of Punjab has strengthened its accountability of government officials.

Those in disagreement, vehemently expressed the government’s inability to learn from past mistakes:



Islamabad FGD: A respondent highlighting the fact that there have only been cosmetic changes in the state’s disaster management institutions stated that ‘government has just invested in new shoes without any substantial change’. Moreover, the participants from this FGD shared a lot of examples of inefficiency on the part of state-led endeavors. They highlighted how the Turkey Housing Society in Thatta continues to remain empty. Moreover they also highlighted the failure of the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA), which, was supposed to finish its targets by 2007, but it still continues to exist. It has failed to achieve its targets also due to the fact that 10 billion PKR are allocated to it annually. A participant also shared that 0.7 million are also taken by NESPAK every month from ERRA to construct its own lavish buildings in Lahore and Islamabad.

Multan FGD: The participants shared that in flood prone areas the government built structures that still poses risks and vulnerable to future floods. They cited the example of the construction of a bridge in Head

Muhammad wala, where width of Chenab River is 11 Km while the bridge is only 1.2 KM long. This caused alarmed bells in 2014 when 600,000 cusecs of water could not pass through it, while the declared capacity was 1 million cusecs. As a result the road leading to bridge was blown up to release the pressure on embankments and the bridge. In spite of protests of flood prone communities, no improvement was made during the repair of the bridge road. In this regard, a CSO participant said, *'The danger has been reconstructed'*.

Statement 25: Disasters create opportunity to 'Build-Back-Better'. The disaster-affected communities have learnt lessons from past disasters and improved their attitudes, houses and local structures.

Overall, the majority disagreed with the statement with 45% disagreed and 12% strongly disagreed. Different opinions were generated in this regard among the FGD groups.



40% of the respondents agreed with the statement, 34% disagreed, 10% strongly agreed, 13% were not sure and 3% strongly disagreed with the statement. While more than a third of the respondents are in disagreement with the statement, majority of the respondents agree or strongly agree with the statement.

The participants of the Peshawar and Lahore FGDs pointed to the increase in aid-dependency amongst disaster-affected communities due to the increased level of handouts being doled out by donors. One of the participants from the Peshawar FGD shared that, *'The hand-outs doled out by the donors has incapacitated communities by forcing them to turn into beggars'*.



In addition to this, participants of the Lahore FGD also cautioned to how the government's inability to address the increase in the poverty of the disaster-affectedees allows for an increase in crime. With regards to this, a participant from the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan shared, *'Exacerbated poverty among disaster affectees has also become a breeding ground for crimes and the government has continually ignored this issue'*. This statement brings to fore the need for the government to own its responsibility towards adopting a nuanced strategy to rehabilitate disaster-affectedees through not only compensations but also increased livelihood opportunities.

Despite these disagreements, the discussions in the FGDs also resulted in 28% participants agreeing with the statement and 2% strongly agreeing, claiming that communities have learnt lessons.

This agreement was observed in the Multan FGD: One CSO participant working closely with flood-affected communities in South Punjab, expressed his agreement sharing that, *'After the flood in 2010, the affectees have begun taking warnings seriously'*. Additionally, another CSO participant expressing his agreement with the statement shared that, *'The affectees have also improved construction of their houses and raised their levels. Local affectees are now more able to collectivise there is higher level of activism'*.

Statement 26: The government has fulfilled all its promises about rehabilitation of quake-affected people in 2005.

The majority of the participants were in consensus that the government did not fulfill its promises in the rehabilitation of quake-affected people in 2005. This was apparent in the participants' disagreement with the statement, with 56% disagreeing and 25% strongly disagreeing.





39% of the respondents disagreed with the statement and 23% of them strongly disagreed with it. 24% of them were not sure and 14% of them agreed. Majority of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.

Public officials participating in the **Peshawar FGD** expressed that, *'It is disheartening and shameful to see how the government has failed the affectees of the quake-affected people. This failure is apparent in how, even after ten years, numerous affectees of the quake are awaiting some form of compensation.'*

Statement 27: The government has fulfilled all its promises made for the rehabilitation of the 2010 flood-affected people.

More than two-third of the participants disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, while only 12% agreed or strongly agreed. Moreover, 16% shared that they were not sure if the government had fulfilled all of its promises. This reflects the fact that most affected people did not receive the entire amount that was promised under the Watan Card Scheme.



41% of the respondents disagreed with the statement. 22% of them strongly disagreed with it. 26% of the respondents were not sure. 9% of them agreed and 2% strongly agreed. Most of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.

