Breach of trust
People’s experiences of the Pakistan floods and their aftermath, July 2010 – July 2011

Michael Semple
Dedicated to

growing awakening of flood affected
women and men against tyranny and injustices
and their untiring resilience to rebuild their lives.
“Our starving children are crying, flood has punished us rigorously, Deaf are our rulers, they do not listen flood-ravaged cries”

Riaz Ahmad Waqif (Muzaffargarh)
Flood Affected Areas

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Both the Pakistani state and its political leadership appear to be suffering from chronic ‘boiling frog syndrome’. In 2005 when a massive earthquake hit the country, many of us who have been working with disasters for many years, thought Pakistan has awoken - as we witnessed an unprecedented and overwhelming response from the public, from civil society organisations and from media houses. The government created the National Disaster Management Authority and Earthquake Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Authority. Elaborate plans were made to rehabilitate the damaged infrastructure and community facilities. Six years later, only 35% damaged schools were rebuilt, while new Balakot city remains a distant dream. Four years later, in 2009, the military launched an unprecedented operation in Malakand division to weed out its own seeded Taliban. Nearly 3 million people had to flee their homes in search of safe places. Fourteen months later, in July 2010, the country was hit yet again with an unprecedented, massive disaster – ‘larger than 2008 Tsunami, Haiti earthquake and 2005 Pakistan earthquake put together’ said the UN Secretary General. Despite many differences, displacement and rehabilitation were the common themes.

So we were wrong. Lessons were neither learnt nor harvested from previous disasters. Each time, like the boiling frog, we failed to realise rising vulnerabilities. Hence, the country has always been caught by surprise. Some countries convert disasters into opportunities. Our successive governments have excelled in creating hazards (Jihadists and Taliban) and converting hazards (floods) into disasters as their priorities clash with peoples’ needs and aspirations. A government, which fails to provide good governance in normal times, cannot be expected to manage disaster effectively.

The 2010-flood disaster has exposed the tall claims of the ruling parties. Allah Buksh, a resident of one of the worst hit villages of Muzaffargarh, exposed the disillusionment with the ruling feudal elite in a profound way: “I lost everything that I had – my belongings, my house, my cattle, my bedding, important documents. Yet, I think the 2010 flood was a great blessing as it has taught me who are my friends and my enemies. I shall never vote again for the feudal lords. Our MPs, those who we gave our votes to, never came to see us after the flood.” These words resonate in almost all flood-affected communities. In a recently held convention of flood affectees, one man said, “We will come out of the losses of the flood but the greatest challenge is how to prevent the perpetual tyranny of the feudal lords.” Local poets are articulating the best form of people’s anger. The content of the poetry is more than rebellious. Should the trend continue, might it affect the voting behaviour of the flood affected communities against the incumbent MPs?

The people’s narrative is based on sound ground realities. Representatives of the international humanitarian community echoed the feelings of the flood affectees. Mr. Rauf Engin Soysal, the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction said on the 1st anniversary of the 2010 floods that Pakistan was still lagging behind in the early phase of recovery. Another well-known UK based humanitarian agency estimated that there were more than 800,000 families without proper shelter. The main reason, in our view, is the non-payment of the 2nd installment of the Watan Card. However, the narrative of the ruling parties is unfortunately contrary. For them, as always, the case is that recovery and rehabilitation are going well. Therefore, it is imperative to have a dialogue between the two narratives.

In order to enhance the confidence of people and of civil society, government must remove discrepancies and overlapping in the law/acts and structures of the government.
disaster management system. The policy framework must shift from response to disaster risk reduction and preparedness in the light of the Hyogo Framework for Action.

This report is primarily based on experiences and opinions of affectees that they have shared with Michael Semple and the Pattan field teams during and after the floods. The report argues that peoples’ vulnerabilities are a creation of the failure of successive governments including the current one. What the flood affectees and we as humanitarian actors, witnessed during the last 12 months and in previous disasters was extreme politicisation of humanitarian work by most MPs. Many sitting MPs were seen violating the UN Guiding Principles on Displaced Persons, the Shpere Standards and constitutional (1973) clauses. Trust and mutual respect are the main pillars of any relationship.

The ruling elites have breached the trust and violated the dignity of the affected communities at a time when they were struggling for sheer survival. In fact the elites exploited this flood as an opportunity to consolidate their vote bank. Therefore it may be argued that the root cause of the boiling frog syndrome in Pakistan is the elite’s blindness to the rising temperature of the anger of the poor. Many a time in history ruling elites have failed, like the boiling frog, to realise their imminent end. Often, they were caught by surprise. This report is a wake up call.

Sarwar Bari
National Coordinator
Pattan Development Organisation
Documenting the voices of flood affected people living across the 2500 KM long devastated stretch along the Indus River was a huge challenge. Capturing the nature of this disaster, its differential impact on the varied populations, depending on their poverty, their vulnerabilities and their resilience, was not possible without visiting them in their own environment. There was nobody else but Michael Semple who could do real justice to this task.

Michael has always loved being with the people. When the flood hit Nowshera and Charsadda on 29th July 2010 he was right there, caught in the middle of it all, he spent the night with all the other people taking refuge from the flood on the motorway and seamlessly then continued working with these and other flood-affected people through Pattan and other local contacts.

In order to fully understand the situation one year on, in 2011, in the scorching heat of June, he travelled along the Indus from Nowshera to Thatta and beyond. Along the left and right banks of the river he visited many of the affected communities and interviewed many poor but resilient men and women.

Michael and I have worked together in flood-affected areas since the floods in 1992. Michael has always cherished this partnership and remained keen to undertake any challenge in this area. When I asked him to write this report, he most enthusiastically accepted the responsibility despite being busy both with his fellowship at Harvard and his peace building efforts on the Afghanistan conflict. Pattan and I are deeply indebted to him for this valuable report.

I am grateful to all those people affected by these floods, who participated in the research and the focus group discussions. It is their opinions that make this report a wake-up call for the rulers of our country.

I am also grateful to Yameema Mitha for compiling a content analysis of opinion articles and editorials of English newspapers regarding the floods and for editing the report.

My gratitude to an old comrade, Nasir Zaidi, for providing us newspaper archives on floods.

My deepest gratitude must go to all members of the Pattan team. In particular; I would like to note the contribution of Benjamin Barkat who accompanied Michael Semple throughout his journey and Alyia Bano, who supervised the opinion poll.

My best thanks also to William J Pervez for composing the layout and the design of this report. My affectionate thanks too, to Aimen Bucha for making the report attractive and fine tuning tables and graphs.

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Last, but never the least, my deepest thanks to Anja Minnaert, Country Representative of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung for financing the research, printing and launch of the report.

Sarwar Bari
سائزہ بھرے کثر و افراد ہے جنہاں نے محض سے تحقیق جہان ہے
مزیدے نال ہنگامہ بنے ول تحقیق کرنے تیار ہوئے کہہ جہان آنتیا ہے
نواب مظفر (یاریورد)
On the 30th of July 2010 an old man clad just in a waist cloth whistled and waved from the stone-pitched embankment of the Islamabad – Peshawar motorway. This newly constructed road had become the sole piece of dry land visible in a watery landscape, where only tall eucalyptus trees protruded above the surface. The old man was encouraging his farm dog, which was braving the flood waters to herd swimming cows and buffaloes to safety. At the time it seemed like an individual experience of a local disaster, a man struggling to protect his source of livelihood so that he would still be able to support himself and his family after flood waters receded from the Peshawar Valley. Instead the old man and his animals came to represent the experience of millions of Pakistanis as the monsoon season produced the worst flooding the country had ever seen. The floods turned into the worst humanitarian disaster on the planet, with a raft of statistics to show how the numbers left homeless dwarfed any disaster of modern times. After a few glitches while people absorbed just how momentous the flooding was, all Pakistani institutions and the international humanitarian community mobilised to help people survive and recover from the floods. But behind the headlines generated by politicians or aid agencies claiming credit for delivering vast quantities of essential supplies, were millions of Pakistanis living out their survival strategies like the old man and his animals. This short book is an attempt to tell something of the experience of those who survived the flood and the community activists who led the response on the ground. As far as possible the book draws upon the words of these survivors and activists, one year on from the 2010 floods, quoting extensively from interviews the author has conducted with a selection of them.

This short book is an attempt to tell something of the experience of those who survived the flood and the community activists who led the response on the ground. As far as possible the book draws upon the words of these survivors and activists, one year on from the 2010 floods, quoting extensively from interviews the author has conducted with a selection of them. Although many of the themes addressed and questions asked (Why did the flood happen? Where did people go first for assistance? What has changed about their lives one year on?) crop up in the government and aid agency reports, the book tries to approach them from a community-based perspectives – from the perspective of the old man and his so many peers the length of the country.

Pakistan has a long history of coping with man-made and natural disasters. The state was founded in the midst of mass population transfer, with refugees crossing the new Indo-Pak border. This was also one of the first disasters to which the newly formed United Nations Organisation dispatched a team. The country is known to be prone to disaster because of its susceptibility to “extreme seismic and meteorological events”. The standard list of hazards recognized in Pakistan includes earthquakes, floods, droughts, cyclones and storms, tsunamis, landslides, avalanches, glacial lake outbursts, industrial accidents and civil conflict. There is a range of vulnerabilities, including poor quality of housing, population pressure and poor management of the watersheds, which make it more likely that an event such as flood will impact on the population. Furthermore the vulnerabilities seem to be getting worse over time, as environmental degradation proceeds and population pressure increases without any corresponding planning response.

Unsurprisingly, in the light of the prevalent hazards and vulnerabilities, there is a long and growing list of recent disasters in Pakistan. During the 1990’s there was a series of riverine floods, the most severe of which occurred in 1992. Although seismic events are commonplace, the 2005 Kashmir and NWFP earthquake stands out as the most de-
structive in modern times and was recognized as a major international disaster. Intensified conflict in the north of the country, including FATA and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) has caused a crisis of internal displacement since 2009. The displacement of 2,000,000 people during the Swat operation of that year was only the most extreme episode in this protracted humanitarian crisis.

Whereas the Kashmir earthquake, Swat operation and 2010 floods all attracted attention at the international level, more localized disasters have impacted hard on one or two districts at a time, while staying below the international radar. Local institutions, both governmental and private, have had to deal with these lower profile disasters. One such example is the July 2003 flood in District Badin. The disaster was precipitated by intense rainfall in lower Sindh, combined with breaches in the canals taking off from the Kotri Barrage and passing through Badin and the failure of the LBOD drain in the district. The episode resulted in some 46 deaths and destruction of some 80% of the standing crop in the district, an effect severe enough to constitute a local disaster. The key points emerging from the detailed study of this disaster indicated that the whole episode was intensely political. In the first place the original vulnerability related to failure of management of the infrastructure in the district – the most severe flooding of villages and destruction of crops occurred where the canals and drain breached. Secondly, once a relief operation commenced it became the focus for intense political competition. In 2003 a newly elected local government system was operating throughout Pakistan. In Sindh the district-level elected bodies were dominated by local politicians affiliated to the Pakistan People’s Party. The provincial government was dominated by the Pakistan Muslim League. In between was a district level bureaucratic structure which was newly learning how to cope with a government system in which power was divided. A post mortem of the relief effort showed that the political leadership had vied for control of assistance, a struggle which the provincial level (Muslim League) figures largely won. Flood affectees reported that only assistance delivered by NGOs reached eligible beneficiaries, while the politicization of government assistance rendered it largely irrelevant to the needs of those actually affected by the flood. Instead the Muslim League politicians intervened to direct assistance towards their supporters, regardless of whether they really counted as flood affectees.

The current report is a reflection on the 2010 floods, in the light of the experiences of affected communities and grassroots civil society in coping with the aftermath. The report seeks to explain the floods from the perspective of the affectees. It considers what happened in the floods, why so much damage was done, how people coped, who helped them, what the lingering consequences are and what were the politics underlying the process. To address these questions the report draws upon four main sources. Firstly the report draws upon a set of forty “flood narratives”, the results of detailed interviews conducted by the author with flood affectees and community activists in flood affected areas, ten months after the flood. These interviews were conducted through Urdu in six districts of three provinces, in communities selected to cover the range of main types of flood, including the rapid onset floods of the Peshawar Valley and the breach floods and kacha floods of Punjab and Sindh. In the journey to reach all these flood affected communi-
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ties the author clocked up over 2,000 kilometres. Respondents were asked to describe what were for them the most significant aspects of their experience of the flood and its aftermath and were given a series of prompts to ensure that they covered a core set of topics concerning flood impact and response. The second main source was a small sample survey of 150 affectees in Muzaffargarh, conducted six months after the flood. The small sample provides proximate quantitative indicators of the range of community attitudes to the floods and the performance of actors involved in the response. The third main source was a media database of coverage of floods, consisting of 27,000 pages of reports on the floods between May and October 2010, drawn from the range of English language papers. A formal content analysis, tabulating the treatment of different themes in the press is presented in the appendix. There is a relatively good match between the survivor and community activist narratives and the treatment in the press, indicating that Pakistani journalists managed to capture much of the popular sentiment during the floods. However the survivor narratives add some of the detail and granularity that short news items could not. The fourth main source was a selection of assessment reports and civil society and official publications on the floods.
Risk = Hazard + Vulnerability
2.1 The master narrative

The proximate cause of the floods which ravaged Pakistan from late July through to mid-September was the unusually heavy monsoon rain. However other than the fact that the rain had fallen from the sky, there was little natural or inevitable about the disaster which followed. The Indus Valley is one of the world’s great river basins in which the passage of water up to three thousand one hundred and eighty kilometres from the catchment areas to the ocean has been most profoundly shaped by human intervention. Human agency in channelling the rain and river water and in developing settlements across the catchment areas and river plain set the scene for the floods. The vulnerability analysis used by the humanitarian community to understand disasters sees a disaster as the combination of hazard and vulnerability. Hazards are external and often natural phenomena, such as earthquakes. Vulnerabilities are social and express the way in which communities are resilient to or apt to be affected by the hazards.

In this case it was the patterns of water management and settlement which determined people’s vulnerability in the face of the monsoon rains and which helped turn a hazard into a disaster.

The largest scale attempts at management of water in Pakistan take place within the canal irrigation system. Agriculture in Pakistan is fundamentally dependent upon the Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS)\(^1\), which delivers water from the Indus and its tributaries to some 13.5 million hectares, or more than half of the cultivated land in the country. The system includes structures for water storage, diversion and distribution and flood protection. It is designed to ensure that water is available to farmers where and when they need it and to ensure that water beyond that needed for irrigation passes safely through the rivers and drains to the ocean. When parts of the system fail, water breaks out of the rivers and canals and surges through the zone that is supposed to be protected from floods.

The principal structures in the system include two main storage reservoirs, Tarbela on the Indus, upstream of the confluence with the Kabul River, and Mangla, on the Jhelum, as well as the Chashma barrage-cum-reservoir on the Indus close to Mianwali. Overall there are twelve barrages on Punjab’s major rivers, (including Trimmu and Panjnad on the Chenab and Taunsa on the Indus) and three barrages on the Indus in Sindh (Guddu, Sukkur and Kotri). The barrages help regulate the flow of water from the main river into the irrigation canal head works. Each of the barrages is calibrated to cope with a maximum flow of water and flow beyond this can put the structure in danger. They are protected by levees, which can be breached if necessary to relieve pressure on the barrage. The largest distribution system is formed by Punjab’s eight inter-river link canals and nineteen main canals. Sindh has fifteen main canals. The IBIS does extend into both Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (home of Tarbela Dam) and Baluchistan, although only small parts of those provinces are part of the flood plain. The east of Baluchistan extends close to the right bank of the Indus and is sufficiently low-lying to be affected by high floods in the river. Complementing the canals is a network of 5,500 km of embankments which runs parallel to the rivers. The distance between the embankments, across the river bed, varies and in places is several kilometres. During normal, non-monsoon flow, the rivers remain in a well-defined bed and most of the land along the embankments is exposed. Indeed, if you travel down the Indus outside the flood season, you can see cultivated farmland on either side of the embankments and these great walls of earth and stone, so far from the river, seem incongruous. The area to the river-side of the embank-

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\(^1\) The Disaster Needs Assessment section on Irrigation and flood management provides a simple description of the system, p122
ments is known as the kacha. Because it is relatively fertile and there is good grazing available, thousands of communities are settled on it, in both Punjab and Sindh. The kacha is the first area to be inundated in case of a riverine flood and people living there have adapted to this risk. On the protected side of the embankments are the pucca, or canal-irrigated area, the main urban areas and all major items of infrastructure such as factories and power stations. In addition to the canals, the IBIS now includes some 12,000 km of drains, which are also heavily loaded during peak flood. The network of drains has been developed over the past thirty years as the level of the water table has risen because of prolonged irrigation in the pucca zone. The main settlements and infrastructure such as power stations and factories are located in the pucca, “safely” behind the flood embankments. Whereas potentially any part of the kacha can be inundated without failure of the flood infrastructure, in the pucca area the main risk is from breaches in either the main river or the canals.

The opening act of the 2010 disaster was heavy rain and flash flooding in the northern hills of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province and the adjoining territories of Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir, far upstream from the canal irrigated zone. Prior to this there had been localised flooding from rains in Baluchistan, but this did not amount to a national scale of disaster. Rivers in the highlands can rapidly go into spate after heavy rain but the intensity of the July spate was beyond anything in living memory. Damage was mainly done where people had built along the river banks and along the path of hill torrents.

After the flash flooding in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, flood waters passed into the IBIS proper. Thereafter whether water passed any point harmlessly or caused flooding largely depended upon the performance of the IBIS infrastructure. There were three main features to the flooding in the IBIS. Firstly, almost all serious flooding occurred along the main channel of the Indus and not along the other great rivers of Punjab. In other years the Sutlej, Ravi, Chenab and Jhelum have had their share of floods, but not in 2010. Secondly flooding was largely sequential, with upstream areas hit first and downstream areas hit as the flood wave progressed along the river. The diagram below shows the pairs of districts sitting adjacent to each other on the right and left banks of the Indus, as it progresses from the upper reaches in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa towards the mouth at Thatta in Sindh. Broadly speaking, the floods hit these pairs of districts in sequence. The third key point about the flooding is that it was most severe where parts of the irrigation and flood infrastructure were overwhelmed by the volume of water in the system. Although many kacha dwellers were surprised to experience a flood more severe than they had anticipated, they have lifetimes’ experience of coping with floods. In areas where the river breached embankments it intruded into areas where people were far less prepared to survive floods.

There were four major breaches of flood embankments in Punjab and four in Sindh.² The main breach floods in Punjab

² DNA p122
Table 1: Indus riparian districts of Punjab and Sindh provinces

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Note: The table above shows the sequence of districts along the left and right banks of the Indus River, proceeding downstream from Attock District. The districts are paired, as they face each other on the river. The kacha areas of the district pairs were affected in sequence as the flood passed down the river system. Irrigation structures noted are those located on the river, where it passes through the district pair. Any flood affecting one of these structures renders vulnerable downstream districts on the left and/or right banks.

The main breach floods in Sindh were:

- Left Marginal Bund of Guddu Barrage (minor damage)
- Tori Bund – which inundated 490,000 hectares of the North West Canal command area and 400,000 hectares of the Beghari Feeder command area and did extensive damage to infrastructure in these two areas and contributed to the flooding of Baluchistan. (Severe damage).
- MS Bund and PB Bund, downstream of Kotri Barrage, which inundated the Pinyari Canal system and Thatta District. (Severe damage).

The floods generated many stunning images of vast expanses of water and hapless victims stranded on rooftops or on the embankments. People following the disaster through this stream of images could easily get the impression that a flood stretched seamlessly the length of the Indus Valley, from the Karakoram Mountains to the Arabian Sea, indiscriminately inundating everything in between. But for people caught up in the floods, who experienced the prelude of rain or flood warnings, followed by the surge of water, the struggle to get families to safety, to survive and then to return and recover, the flood was a far more personal and local experience. Each local flood was distinctive in the sense of when the flood hit, whether there was a warning and how long it lasted, where the water came from and how fast, deep and long-standing it was and where people had to go to survive. We can make better sense of what people experienced in the floods by disaggregating the disaster into nine more localized floods, which together account for over 80% of Pakistanis affected. Although there is something unique to the story told by every person who lived through the 2010 flood, there is a certain commonality to the experience of people who found themselves in any one of these nine floods. Each of these “local” floods constituted a major humanitarian crisis in its own right, as five out of nine of the local floods affected around a million people each and the other four floods hit two to three million people each. When we compare the flood experience of these nine different local floods, one of the most significant patterns that emerge is that close to half of the people affected by the floods were people living in areas where the primary cause of flooding was infrastructure failure. Of the nine local floods around which this study has constructed the flood narratives, in four of them catastrophic infrastructure failure was the main reason for severe destruction – Taunsa and Muzaffargarh District, Kashmore and the districts immediately adjoining Tori Bund, Dadu and the districts in the tail of the Tori breach flood and Thatta at the mouth of the Indus. Together these areas had a total affected population of 7.75 million, although this figure also includes the kacha residents of those districts, who would have been flooded even if the embankments had held firm. The fate of the people of Pakistan in the face of the natural hazard of a super-flood in the Indus depended on the administration’s maintenance and management of the flood infrastructure. Where that management was inadequate, people survived with no lasting damage outside the areas they expect to be flooded periodically. Where that management

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was inadequate, the result was massive disruption of people’s lives and damage which may take years to repair.

The nine local floods which occurred in succession during the flood season were:

1. **Swat flash flood**
   - Flash floods triggered by heavy rains hit the mountainous northern tracts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa on Wednesday the 28th and Thursday 29th July. Much of the infrastructure of the Swat Valley was washed away.
   - Population affected: 1,348,986, equivalent to 9.3% of total affected population.
   - Districts affected: Kohistan, Lower Dir, Upper Dir, Shangla, Swat

2. **Peshawar Valley river flood**
   - On 29th July, before any warning could be given, a wave of flood water washed down the Kabul River, causing it to burst its banks and devastate adjoining villages in the Peshawar valley. The water receded within three days as the river level fell.
   - Population affected: 1,062,534, equivalent to 7.4% of the total affected
   - Districts affected: Charsadda, Nowshera, Peshawar

3. **Upper Indus river flood (kacha)**
   - On 30th July the first surge of flood water from the upper catchment area passed through Jinnah Barrage at Mianwali and the River Indus went into high flood in Southern Punjab and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The flood water entered hundreds of villages in the kacha area along the river banks in Mianwali, Bhakkar and Layyah on the left bank and Dera Ismail Khan and Tank on the right bank. Authorities issued a warning and the floods mainly affected areas known to be vulnerable at times of high flood. The river stayed in high flood for five days but many of the kacha villages stayed flooded for three weeks.
   - Population affected: 2,308,811, equivalent to 16% of the total affected population.
   - Districts affected: Layyah, Mianwali, Bhakkar, DIK, and Tank.

4. **Taunsa left bank breach flood**
   - On Monday 2nd August the Indus main left embankment at the Taunsa barrage, known as Abbas Bund, breached,

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**Figure 2: Schematic diagram of Indus Basin Irrigation System**

Note this diagram shows the major irrigation structures located on Pakistan’s rivers and illustrates the main breach flooding. Predominantly the 2010 flooding occurred in the districts along the Indus River itself, rather than those adjoining the other main rivers.
which led to 150,000 cusecs of water surging into the normally safe pucca areas of Muzaffargarh District. Residents of Kot Addu, Sunawan and Mahmoodkot were forced to flee as their areas were abruptly inundated. Flood waters remained in many places for three weeks.

- Population affected: 1,780,226, equivalent to 12.3% of the total affected population
- Districts affected: Muzaffargarh

5. **Indus mid-stretch right bank kacha flood & hill torrents – (DGK and Rajanpur)**

- On 5th August flood water from the Indus breached the flood defences of Rajanpur town, leaving it under five feet of water. Dera Ghazi Khan and Rajanpur had already experienced a week of flooding from hill torrents which pass through the district. The river water inundated most of the kacha area along the right bank of the Indus in the districts.
- Population affected: 1,306,291, equivalent to 9% of total affected population
- Districts affected: Rajanpur and Dera Ghazi Khan.

6. **Indus mid-stretch left bank kacha flood**

- As the flood waters passed from Punjab into Sindh, the Guddu Barrage entered high flood on 5 August and the Sukkur Barrage on 6 August. The rise in water levels brought the riverine flood to the south of Punjab and north of Sindh. On the left bank, there was no further major breach and water entered the villages of the kacha area in Rahim Yar Khan and Ghotki, where warnings had been given.
- Population affected: 644,772, equivalent to 4.5% of the total affected population.
- Districts affected: Rahim Yar Khan and Ghotki

7. **Indus mid-stretch right bank breach flood (Guddu Barrage)**

- The most devastating breach of the flood season occurred on 8 August, when Tori Bund, a main embankment on the right bank downstream of Guddu Barrage collapsed. The breach became so large that it allowed a second stream of the Indus to form. The new stream on the right bank overwhelmed irrigation and flood protection infrastructure in upper Sindh and
adjoining Baluchistan, causing widespread devastation in areas well outside the normal flood plain. The flood was long duration because the Indus stayed in high flood in Guddu until 2nd September and throughout this period water flowed freely through the Tori breach.

- Population affected: 2,795,819, equivalent to 19.4% of the total population affected.
- Districts affected: Nasirabad, Jaffarabad, Kashmore, Jacobabad, Shikarpur

8. **Indus lower stretch right bank breach flood – Tori Band tail**

- The breach water from Tori Bund travelled over three hundred kilometres before finding a way to rejoin the main stream of the Indus. Thus towns and villages far away downstream from the original breach site were hit by the flood waters over the next three weeks. As the water pushed through the plains of the right bank it entered the flood protection and irrigation system under the Kirthar Hills, culminating in Dadu District’s Manchar Lake. Along the way the waters surrounded district centres and towns in Shahdadkot and Dadu forcing the administration in these districts, not normally flooded, rapidly to develop strategies for cutting through some roads and embankments and reinforcing others. Meanwhile the same districts anyway had to cope with the flooding of their kacha areas from the main stream of the Indus.

- Population affected: 2,307,825, equivalent to 16% of total affected population
- Districts affected: Larkana, Qambar Shahdadkot, Dadu, Jamshoro

9. **Indus mouth breach, right and left**

- The last place in Pakistan to face a major flood in the 2010 season was Thatta. The Indus at Kotri Barrage entered high flood on 20 August and stayed in high flood until 11 September. The flood first inundated the kacha areas on both sides of the river in Thatta. It then threatened the district’s embankments. The pressure peaked from 27th to 29th August. First a left bank embankment breached, leading to the complete inundation of taluka Sujawal and its headquarters town, with a massive displacement of population. Then, as a loop bund failed next to Thatta city itself, the administration ordered the evacuation of the district headquarters. Waters only subsided, allowing people to return to devastated homes, from mid-September.

- Population affected: 874,030, equivalent to 6% of the total affected population
- District affected: Thatta

### 2.2 Local flood narrative: the Peshawar valley

It was on Thursday 29th and Friday 30th July that it became clear that Pakistan was experiencing an extraordinary monsoon season and that main population centres were at risk. The author witnessed these floods at first hand. On Thursday I travelled from Islamabad to Peshawar via the motorway, in heavy rain. Along the way we stopped to watch the first flash flooding in villages of Charsadda District. The water was already lapping against the walls of village houses and people were trying to evacuate across a fast-flowing flood stream to reach the safety of the motorway embankment. Volunteers were on the ground marshalling for the evacuation while heroic swimmers from the embankment struggled to help residents across the deadly obstacle of a submerged motorway fence.

In Peshawar there were tales of bridges down in Charsadda and it was clear that what we had seen was only the start of a
By evening we were told the GT Road back to Islamabad was cut by floods and we had to retrace our steps on the motorway. But a routine trip degenerated into chaos as the flood waters in Charsadda now rose to overwhelm the motorway embankment, washing away sections of bridges and trapping thousands of cars. Several thousand of us ended up stranded overnight on a stretch of tarmac which had become an island. By morning the landscape had been reduced to a few tree-tops, with river boats gathering survivors and fodder stocks from the submerged villages. Remarkable farm dogs took to the water to round up swimming cows and buffaloes, encouraging them towards the safety of protruding sections of the embankment. To get back to Peshawar we too had to wade through the flood waters and even once the flood peak had passed the main road link between Peshawar and the Capital was reduced to a footpath and obstacle course, as the thousands of travellers helped each other scramble across the rubble of the collapsed bridge sections. It turned out of course that the scenes of devastation around Charsadda represented only a glimpse of a much larger scale disaster. The press reports from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa show how the scale of this local flood revealed itself on the 29th and 30th.

Dawn 30 July:

“Widespread devastation: Rain breaks 50 years record

PESHAWAR, July 29: The widespread monsoon rains broke the five-decade-old record in Peshawar as metrological office recorded 226 millimetres downpour on Thursday. Mohammad Saddiq, meteorologist at the local Met office, said that the provincial metropolis received 226 millimetres of rain till 5pm on Thursday. He forecast more rains during the next 24 hours. “The city had received 212 millimetres rains during the month of July in 1956,” he told Dawn on Thursday.

Heavy rainfall has pushed the provincial capital to complete disarray, submerging vast residential areas located along the banks of the tributaries of the River Swat. Telecommunication and internet services remained out of order for several hours in the city. The city remained cut off from the rest of the country. Many parts of the city were without electricity. The worst affected areas were Pajagi Road, Latifabad, Budhni, Charsadda Road, Ring Road, Dalazak Road, Pir Bala, Mathra, Lala Kallay, Wodpaga, Babo Garhi and other areas adjacent to Nowshera and Charsadda districts. The main road between Peshawar and Charsadda was closed for traffic. The flood had submerged the same localities in August 2008, rendering more than 200,000 people homeless, while hundreds of houses were damaged. Officials said that one of the major factors of the deteriorating situation was large-scale encroachments along the rivers’ banks and water courses. The Naguman and Shahalam, two major tributaries of the River Swat, and small water courses passing through residential areas of the provincial capital were overflowing which inundated hundreds of houses, roads, schools and other infrastructure. More than 300 houses were damaged in Pajagi. Major tributaries were in extreme flood
which caused large scale devastations in the area. The head of the Provincial Flood Warning Centre, Engineer Izzat Khan, said that Budhni Nallah was overflowing and more than 70,000 cusec water discharge was recorded on Thursday. He said that the River Swat was in extreme flood at Munda where 200,000 cusec outflow of water was recorded. “The water flow in the River Swat will cross 300,000 cusec figure that may cause more devastation in plain areas of Peshawar, Charsadda and Nowshera,” he said. He said that the fresh wave of flood would hit Peshawar during the midnight. The flood warning centre has issued a second warning to the authorities concerned to evacuate the people living along the banks of the River Swat and its tributaries.”

Although the rain falling locally on the 28th caused some house collapses and localized flooding, the real damage occurred on the 29th and the 30th as the flood wave generated by rains in Swat passed into the Kabul River and through the Peshawar valley. The Swat River and its sub-channel the Naguman join the Kabul River at Sardaryab. In normal times the flood plain here on the boundary of Peshawar and Charsadda Districts supports some of the most fertile farmland in the country, famous for its sugarcane production. As the flood wave passed down the Swat and Naguman, the rivers burst their banks and merged, inundating all the villages located in the V of the confluence. The flood took residents by surprise. Although everyone had experienced the rainfall of the preceding couple of days, residents said they had not received warning of the river flood and that it poured into villages which had always been considered safe and beyond the reach of high flood. In Charsadda the flood demolished a section of the main road bridge and gouged out whole sections of the main road itself. The largest item of infrastructure in that part of the Peshawar valley was the Islamabad – Peshawar motorway. Although it is constructed on an embankment supposedly above high flood level, floodwaters damaged bridges and topped several sections of the motorway, essentially cutting strips of it into islands, which by 29 July were surrounded by a vast new inland sea. Suddenly the motorway was transformed into a flood shelter, as whole villages found safety on the embankment. All main communication links between Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the rest of the country were thus severed.

Downstream of Charsadda the Kabul River enters a relatively narrow channel, with high banks, as it heads towards the Indus confluence and gorge at Attock.
tion of the flood were both made worse by the fact that this peak coincided with an increased release of water in the Indus passing through Attock. The high level of the Indus in the Ghazi – Attock section slowed the passage of the water through the Nowshera, helping to push the water over its banks.

Eye witness: **Imtiaz, Nowshera**

Son of Gohar Ali, resident of Mohib Banda
(A tale of community action, poor governance: no early warning and delayed response)

Imtiaz is an educated young man from one of the villages on the left bank of the Kabul River that became famous during the flood. Previously the village was remarkable because so many of the local Khattak tribe served in Pakistan’s police and armed forces. A clutch of famous army officers have their origins in this modest looking village pitched between Nowshera’s rich tobacco and sugar cane fields on one side and the river on the other. Latterly the village’s most famous son has been Faisal Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber. His father Bahar-ul Haq retired as an Air Marshall. But in the floods Mohib Banda was soon identified as one of the villages which faced the full force of the flood surge in the Kabul River. Imtiaz describes in great detail the experience of the first few hours of the flood.

“A normal flood in the Kabul River opposite our village is about 150,000 cusecs. That level of flood brings water close to our houses but does not flood them.

On the 29th July it rained all day. Our house is close to the road. I have a habit of getting up early. There is a drainage ditch in front of our house. That morning when I got up I noticed that it was backing up. It was flowing in the wrong direction and bringing water from the river towards the house.

People gathered to watch the water spilling out of the drainage ditch but no one really thought it was beyond the normal. I went off to the main village on some errand but when I returned and looked in front of our house, the water level seemed to be rising more rapidly. By then neighbours in the street had started to make small private embankments – ridges to try and keep the water out of their front doors. Meanwhile a phone call came from a relative who lives a mile away and told me that the lowest lying houses in the village had now been flooded.

I saw that the water coming from in front of and behind our house had joined up and then at 10 am water entered our house. We had 3 feet of water in the house. Already at this point kacha houses in our street started to collapse.

Our house is in a large compound with a 50 yard frontage on the street and various sheds and rooms built along the compound wall. The outhouses all started to collapse as if they had been dynamited. The same thing was going on throughout the village.

This was the point where we all started to worry. After all there were children present.

The centre of our village is about 14 feet above the level of the road where my house is located. We shifted the women and children along with my brother and the animals to this high ground.
I left our house at 11.30 by which point the water was 4.5 or 5 feet deep.

I wanted to walk directly through the village to the high ground but was cut off and had to find a long way round.

I went to my grandfather’s house, where my mother, my two brothers, my sister, my two sisters-in-law and my own two children were gathered. I found lots of people were gathered at this spot because it was the highest ground in the vicinity. But I and some friends decided to gather up other people at this safe place. There are a couple of houses and a masjid close to my grandfather’s house. When we had gathered people up there were about 2,500 people sheltering in this small space. After my first trip out, I saw that the river had increased in speed and swept away three youths at about 3 pm.

I teamed up with a couple of teachers, Mohammad Sayar and Mohammad Ikram. We collected some money and made arrangements for rice and other food. We set up a langar in the masjid. The people sheltering there were mainly women and children.

By then our village had become an island, there were 5 ft. of water all the way for 3 km as far as Aman Kot. We were being inundated both by the river flood coming down the Kabul River and by the rain flood.

A few men stayed on the roofs of their pucca houses. Until about 1pm that first day people who wanted to get out could. But after that the water was too deep and people were stuck where they were.

Initially with all the tension we did not feel hungry. People were more frightened than hungry.

Sadaqat Ali, my brother, is a fisherman and drives a boat for a living. He and some friends had made their way to the river bank to get their boats. Basically they wanted to save the boats from being washed away. Next they started a sort of river taxi service, ferrying people to village centre.

One old man was saved by his son, Rahman Gul, who picked up his mother and father by turn and carried them to safety. The old man used to make suitcases in Pabbi. Later on he got to meet Angelina Jolie when she visited Risalpur, Jalozai and Mohib Banda.

I only managed to save a radio and a laptop. However our electricity went off at 10pm the night before the flood and did not come back until four or five weeks later.

We started trying to make contact with the world. The former local nazim (Mayor) is a relative and he was equipped with a complete list of phone numbers for all officials. We rang down his list but could not get hold of anyone.

We made markers to track the progress of the rising water.

On the third day helicopters started to fly and we made contact with the outside world – we were able to get through on some of the phones. Launches also started to reach our village, crossing over from the GT road.

The boatmen started by charging exorbitant rates for extricating people from the flood. In those days they charged Rs.8,000 and Rs.10,000 for a launch to Aman Kot. But people had a bit of money and some jewellery, so some were happy to pay up. They were boatmen from other villages – mainly professional boatmen from Jehangira and Akora, even some people from Sardaryab. The helicopters also started throwing assistance at us – khairat. This just compounded the chaos. In front of my eyes another couple of houses collapsed in the turbulence caused by a hovering helicopter.

They threw cooked rice and water, in 1 kilo packs. But anything which landed on a pucca surface immediately burst open.

While we were camped out on our high ground we set up a patrolling system in

“Initially with all the tension we did not feel hungry. People were more frightened than hungry.”
While we were camped out on our high ground we set up a patrolling system in our local boats. We went and checked on the people stranded on the roof tops. Mainly they had decided to stay there because they were worried about thieves. I believe that as a village we did a pretty good job of surviving without loss of life except for those young men who were washed away on the first day.

We got some VIP visits by helicopter. Faisal Shahzad’s father turned up in one of the helicopters. He had come to pick up a nephew who lives in the village. I was there when they threw down the rope. They loaded up Shamshad the nephew, plus his wife and son Intikhab. They also filled available space – taking on board a couple of old women as well as my mother and brother. Then Lt. Gen Taj ul Haq, former frontier corps commandant and ambassador came to take his sister on a launch.

The third day we were kept busy evacuating people with the help of the army launches. We moved groups of women and children first, trying to send one man in each boat.

A cousin of mine, Kefayat Ali came in one of the army launches. General Alam Khattak, former commander of the Frontier Corps is close to some of us in the village and had deputed the launch. Kefayat himself is an old student activist and so knows about organizing. By about 3 pm of day three we were down to two or three couples in the village and so I took the last launch to Amankot and from there hitched to Pabbi. We had successfully evacuated our village.

When I reached Pabbi I was reunited with the rest of the family and we discussed where to go to – Peshawar or Mardan. However we could not move immediately as the road was closed by a collapsed bridge. It was only on the 5th day that I was able to move them again. I wanted to get to Charsadda or Mardan but could not get through. But someone took me to Peshawar. So I went there for a night and then returned to Pabbi.

After the evacuation the main centres for our village were Seena Public School in Pabbi and Amankot. The school is a three storey building and it was packed out with 15 to 20 people in each room.

On the 4th day water receded.

I hired a rickshaw and filled it with a few basic supplies of water and food. I wanted to take it through to the village. But there were so many of our people along the way it was difficult to make progress.”

2.3 Local flood narrative – the upper Indus and districts Mianwali, Bhakkar and Layyah

The first tract of Punjab hit by the river flood, as the floodwaters passed down the Indus from Attock included the southern Punjab districts of Mianwali, Bhakkar and Layyah. The flood surge reached Jinnah Barrage at Mianwali on 30 July. The main impact was on the kacha areas of the districts. The district administrations called for evacuation of these riverine areas but the result was patchy. As elsewhere, many of the kacha dwellers considered the warnings non-credible and ignored them until they saw just how high and destructive the flood was. The flood water penetrated into areas which had not seen a flood for decades. Meanwhile as the flood water approached the capacity of the barrage, the barrage management deliberately breached its protective embankments to relieve pressure on the main structure. In contrast to the breaches which occurred further downstream, those at Jinnah seemed to be successful. The water was channelled back into the river further downstream, with only localized flooding and the main structure survived undamaged. The great majority of flood victims in these southern Punjab districts were people who lived in the kacha area.

Nashaibi is typical of the riverside villages.
of Southern Punjab’s kacha. This area on the left bank of the Indus is lush, heavily planted to sugarcane in the summer season and with stands of acacia for shade. People live with an annual threat of floods and so build their houses on raised mud platforms, at least six feet above the level of the surrounding farmland. They expect to be able to sit out most floods, by gathering families and animals onto these local flood shelters if the river bursts its banks for a few days. The rural population is scattered across the riverine tract, in hamlets of a dozen or so of these raised platform houses. A great earthen embankment, about 18 feet high, marks the boundary between the kacha zone and the built up parts of the district. Kookerwala is a bustling suburb, most notable for its a dozen or so kilns, turning out Punjab’s ubiquitous red brick. Unlike many towns, there is a neat fringe marking the boundary between Kookerwala and the rural area. Along the backs of the houses and mosques in the last row of buildings the remains of a mud dike are visible – the impromptu outer defences of Layyah. Post-flood, as you drive out of Layyah and Kookerwala towards the river, that mud dike marks the end of urban congestion. But during August 2010, for the people of Nashaibi and other parts of the flooded kacha, the dike marked the first bit of dry land. Iqbal is a middle-aged farmer who found himself and his family caught up in the flood in Layyah’s kacha.

**Eye witness: Iqbal, resident of Nashaibi**

(Yet another tale of absence of government and peoples cooperation in the early days of the disaster)

“We had already heard on the radio about flooding up-country. But the flood came upon us gradually. The first day the river rose from its banks there was nothing alarming about the rise in the water. But by the fourth day of rising water it was so bad it was like the Day of Judgment. As the floodwaters entered my house the mud walls started to collapse. We placed our children on charpoys to keep them out of the water. That night felt more like a yearlong than a mere 6 hours. There were about two feet of water in the house. All our belongings and stored supplies – foodstuffs and so on were in the water. It was beyond the level in which small children can safely stand. There was the additional danger of snakes and scorpions which seemed to appear on every dry surface.

In the morning we neighbours all called to each other. In the river area we have a tradition of helping each other. Some people were paddling around on tractor tubes. The day of being marooned passed somehow. There was not much to eat or drink. Even the children found some patience as they do when rising to a crisis. There was of course no sign of government or boats. The next day we paid Rs.1,000 to a boatman to take us to some relatives living near Kookerwala. We stayed there for 15 days. After this time the raised mounds in

**Map 3: Map of North-West Punjab**
our area (on which the houses are built) were out of the water and so we were able to go back. But one disaster often brings another. On top of the river flood we faced 15 days of persistent rain. Any of the houses in our area which had withstood the first flood crumbled in the rain. We survived by sleeping out in the open using plastic bags from the bazaar for some protection against the rain. Eventually the river level dropped and the rain eased off. The first assistance we received in our area was from the Doaba Foundation. We were happy to receive some food."

Karam Hussain is a numberdar or village headman, who assists the lowest level revenue official, the patwari. After the floods he became Deputy President of the Layyah branch of the TBSZ

“We heard the warnings about the flood three or four days before it hit our area. But it was only when the water hit that we realized the scale of the disaster. Everything we had was in the water – our furniture and household goods and animals."

“It was 4 pm when the water entered my home. The level of water in our area was 4 feet above the floor level in our raised houses and 8 feet above the ground level. I got on my mobile phone to try to contact relatives who might be able to arrange a launch to extricate us. They got hold of one on the second day but it was private and cost us Rs.15,000. My house collapsed on the first day. While we were waiting to get away we survived on whatever cold food we had. But we were not able to make roti or tea.

A helicopter came and waved at us (Karam Hussain laughed while he described the visit of the helicopter). I killed three snakes in the house. 2 of them were about 4 feet but one was 8 feet. One of the snakes was an ajdahah (python). Two men in our area died of snake bites. We are 8 people in our family but left one boy behind to look after what remained of our house and belongings.”

Nasreen (A moving narration of hope and resilience)

A mother and resident of Nashaibi recalls the trauma of the period stranded after they discovered that this flood really was beyond what they were used to coping with and how for survival the family first turned to their relatives.

“We had a good life before the flood. But everything has been difficult since then. We barely survived the flood, as we disappeared under the water. There was no chance to save our household goods. We just had to jump into a boat and flee. For the first two days after the water came we were hungry. It desperately hot also, without shelter. I do not think we would have survived any longer if the boat had not come when it did. But there were too many people and too few boats.

While we were stuck there surrounded by the flood water we cried and remembered god. We prayed that god would save us. It was god’s grace that eventually a boat did come for us. There was no sign of any assistance from the government. And the boatman demanded a massive fare, more than we could afford. To cover the costs of those first few days I had to part with the dowry I had saved up for my child.”

“When the flood waters hit, we spent four days marooned. We adults and children had nothing to eat. We had hand pump water but it was no longer clean.

The boat dropped us to Kookerwala. From there we went to some of my relatives. For a month the water made it impossible to return home. In all we spent three months away from home, staying with different relatives. During that period my children did various bits and pieces of work, earning to pay for our rations.”
2.4 Local flood narrative: breach flood in Muzaffargarh

Muzaffargarh is the district most literally defined by its relationship to the great rivers of Punjab. It is located upstream of the final major confluence of the Indus and its tributaries, known as Panjnad, or the place of the five rivers. Thus the western boundary of the district is formed by the Indus and the eastern boundary of the district is formed by the Chenab. The district has a kacha belt alongside both rivers, with a known vulnerability to flooding. For example in the great flood of 1992, the main damage was done by the Chenab (which has already been joined by the Jhelum by the time it reaches Muzaffargarh). That flood inundated the villages of the Chenab kacha, for example in Jalalpur Pirwala and in the several inhabited islands of the Chenab. But in that flood the damage stopped at the river embankment. On the river side of the embankment was devastation but on the inland side everything was normal except for the flood victims from the kacha seeking shelter. The development of Muzaffargarh has been shaped by this pucca-kacha distinction. Although it is thought of as a poor predominantly rural district, modern Muzaffargarh is the site of several major industrial units. These include the Kot Addu thermal power plant and the Mid-Country Oil Refinery. The district headquarters itself is a substantial city. The industrial complex is supposedly located in a low-risk area and the population living in the pucca around also believed themselves to be safe from flooding.

Muzaffargarh’s experience of the 2010 floods was defined by the breach at the Taunsa Barrage, in the north of the district. The River Indus at Taunsa went into High Flood on the 1st of August. The next day flood waters peaked at 961,000 cusecs, well below the barrage’s rated capacity of 1,100,000 cusecs. Nevertheless on the 2nd August, part of the Left Marginal Bund embankment collapsed. The top of the embankment, also known as the Abbas Bund, was still a couple of feet above the water level at the time of the collapse – the river did not overflow the embankment. With the pressure of the storm surge, once it had cut an initial path, the river tore away a major breach about a kilometre and a half long in the embankment. The water flowing through the original breach virtually formed a new river, descending upon the northern part of Muzaffargarh District and eventually extending some 60 km in length, by 20 km wide. Below Taunsa a relatively narrow strip of low-lying land separates the Indus from the Chenab and so rather than rejoining the Indus, the breach water was expected to drain into the Chenab. As irrigation engineers immediately moved into damage control mode, they started making a series of breaches in the irrigation structures which were in the path of the breach water. The water flowing through the original breach virtually formed a new river, descending upon the northern part of Muzaffargarh District and eventually extending some 60 km in length, by 20 km wide.
the new river – the Taunsa-Panjnad (TP) Link Canal and the Muzaffargarh Canal, to save what they could of these structures and to ease the flow of the water towards the Chenab. Thus an unintended breach at Taunsa precipitated a whole series of deliberate breaches further downstream.

Immediately after the breach at Taunsa, the flood situation in Muzaffargarh District became critical. The waters first hit the northern tehsil of Kot Addu but then spread to populated areas in all of the district’s tehsils. In contrast to 1992, the flood affected both kacha and pucca areas and even threatened the main urban areas of the district. Immediately after the breach, the administration ordered the evacuation of the district headquarters, Muzaffargarh City (population 750,000), as a new flood surge in the Chenab added to the havoc wreaked by the Indus. As the peak passed without any further major breaches, eventually only parts of the district headquarters were inundated. But by the end of the flood, 788 villages were reported flooded by the Muzaffargarh Canal breaches alone and Muzaffargarh emerged as the most severely affected district in Punjab and was ranked alongside the worst affected Sindh districts.

In addition to the breach flood starting in the north of the district and pushing south, Muzaffargarh faced a true riverine flood, affecting the kacha. Alipur Tehsil, in the last V at the confluence of the two rivers was submerged, as the waters of the Indus and Chenab combined. A key factor which made the floods so devastating was the length of time that the rivers ran in High Flood. The Indus at Taunsa was continuously in High Flood for nineteen days, from the 1st of August. The Chenab had two shorter peaks, on the 29th July and 7th to 8th August. In more normal flood years the rivers recede quickly after a High Flood but this time the two and a half weeks of high flood ensured that waters would reach all parts of the kacha and sent a sustained influx of water into the breach areas.

Given the centrality of the Abbas Bund disaster in the experience of Muzaffargarh, the obvious question to ask is how the district might have fared if the breach had not occurred. How different would the Muzaffargarh flood experience have been if the flood peak had safely passed Taunsa Barrage without a breach? To give an order of magnitude of what Muzaffargarh might have looked like if Taunsa had performed according to plan, we can compare Muzaffargarh with its adjoining district, Layyah. Layyah is a neighbouring district, located upstream, in which no major breach occurred but there was widespread flooding of the kacha. It provides a rough model.
for what might have happened in Muzaffargarh of the embankment had held. If Muzaffargarh had suffered the same number of houses damaged per thousand population or the same percentage of its population affected, it would have seen 5,000 houses destroyed rather than the 59,000 that actually collapsed and 848,000 people affected rather than the 1,780,000 who actually were affected. The “what if” calculations, although they are only a crude approximation, show that far more people, houses and crops were affected in Muzaffargarh than would have been the case if the district had faced the same sort of flood that its neighbouring district did. Insofar as the Taunsa breach was the key element of difference in the flood between Muzaffargarh and Layyah, this further illustrates the point that the severity of the damage done in Muzaffargarh was due to engineering failure rather than simply the amount of water flowing in the rivers.

A year after the flood, survivors vividly described what it was like to be caught up in the rising waters. Perveen lives in Kot Addu, the second town of Muzaffargarh. Her area would normally be unaffected by monsoon flooding. But the breach of Abbas Bund left residents suddenly in the path of flood wave.

**Perveen Kayani:** Kot Addu (Callousness of authorities: no prior evacuation to breaching of Abbas Bund, TP link and Muzaffargarh canals; another tale of self-help and timely assistance of NGOs.)

“The water struck our house at 4 in the morning, before the morning prayer. Some people from our settlement had been keeping an eye on the local embankment. After the collapse of Abbas Bund people got on their motorbikes and spread the word. We told each other. People were asleep. Children had to be woken up. Everyone just had to run as they were. The water surged at us from behind our settlement. Everyone was distraught. I got my family onto a tractor trolley. Lots of us squeezed in until there was standing room only. There were even pregnant women travelling in this way. All the while it was raining also. You could not see the road as we were driving through a torrent. It was all like a scene from purgatory.

We headed towards Chowk Mandi. Along the way our trolley got a puncture. We had to get down and walk, carrying the children. Some people were running. We said our prayers at a mosque. Our driver did not know where to get his puncture repaired. Meanwhile our clothes were completely soaked.

Eventually we got to the high ground, the sand dunes. But we had no shelter. We had left our animals in our homes. Adults can put up with tough conditions but children have no tolerance for them and were all crying. While we were there at Chowk Mandi people brought us great cauldrons of food (degh). But the officials said that they would only feed people who were registered and staying in the lo-
We received no warning for the flood. Just a few hours before it struck we had to grab our children and run, leaving all our food stocks behind.

The month that we spent camped out in the sand dunes was like the Day of Judgment. We were hungry and thirsty and overcome by the sense of having lost everything we had. In such a time of disaster we had a right to expect that our elected representative would ask after us. Even when we returned to our village no one asked after us.

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Before the flood, Iqbal was known just by his trade as a tailor master. But he has energy and a determination to do something in life. So he is one of the people who during the floods emerged as a local leader. This started in the first few hours as along with some friends Iqbal tried to track the unexpected flood and see if it really would enter their village. Subsequently he has been one of the effective organizers in the movement for rehabilitation of flood victims.

As an example of just how devastating the breach flood was in Iqbal’s part of Muzaffargarh, Khara Attarwala Basti (about 65 km south of Abbas Bund), where the author met Iqbal, was a village of 100 houses. All of them had been flattened in the flood.

“I have always worked as a tailor master. I am married, with 7 children – 4 boys and 3 girls.

The day of the flood people had told us that there was water heading our way. I along with 2 or 3 other people on motorbike went to inspect the rising water. We realized that it would not spare us. There are large sand dunes in the area and we were hopeful that they would block the advance of the flood water.

At 13.00 we decided that our area was in danger. Our people had already heard about the breaching of Abbas Bund. We told them that it looked like there was a risk to our area.

There is a road about 4 km away from our village that serves the sugar mill. This was
a sort of last defence. Many people hoped that the flood water would not get across the road. But at 17.00 the flood tide broke through the road’s embankment. I and my friends were watching the water there and witnessed the breach. We fled to tell everyone. There are 20 villages in our moaza. After the flood broke through the road it hit and collapsed houses in all but two of those villages.

We fled towards the sand dunes, which are about a kilometre away from the village. Everyone from our village camping out there. We had to stay there for fifteen days.

After 15 days the flood changed course and started to ebb. After that we were able to venture home.

We lost three people to drowning in our moaza – a 40 year old man, and 18 years old and a 14 year old.

When we evacuated the village we were able to take some charpoys and a trunk with some bedding, plus household utensils and some of our animals. These were our emergency items. The main thing I had to leave behind was my wheat stock. I had three or four goats and a cow and got them all away before the flood.

I had built my house on a raised plinth and so my family was able to go back after 15 days. But all houses in the area had collapsed.

2.5 Local flood narrative: the right bank breach flood in Kashmore and neighbouring districts of Sindh and Baluchistan

Tori Bund is a massive earthen embankment stretching Maginot Line-like across a dusty landscape. On the river side of the embankment are a few lightly built reed huts, stands of acacia and eucalyptus trees and cattle and sheep browsing the rough grazing of the mud flats which stretch away towards the distant Indus. The first half mile of the inland side also looks as untended as the foreshore at low tide. The first proper building is a ruin – the collapsed offices of the Irrigation Department. But the clump of trees round the Irrigation Bungalow almost makes a garden. The century old building has arched verandas and high ceilings and at least one room maintained fit to entertain the officials who come to inspect the first line of defence. Staff proudly tell of how in former times Pakistan’s leaders have stayed in the Bungalow on hunting trips but most of the building is now dilapidated and a group of policemen nonchalantly playing poker in the veranda adds to the atmosphere of decay. Hazy in the distance, communication towers mark the first real town of the pucca, Ghouspur. This Tori Bund was the site of the most devastating breach of the 2010 season. A catastrophic failure of the embankment opened the way for flood waters to surge into the right bank pucca area, pushing as far as Baluchistan and areas that people had almost forgotten were part of the Indus flood plain. Almost one year after the flood, there was a flurry of activity in the area round Tori Bund. Convoys of dump trucks carried loads of white rock from Rohri and earth from the river bed. Gangs of labourers were weaving the rocks into

Map 6: Map of Upper Sindh
place on the river-side of the embankment, to form the new pitching, reinforcing the embankment. The pace of work was impressive, although the couple of pick-up trucks of consultants keeping half an eye on quality left an impression of low profile supervision.

Gangs of labourers were weaving the rocks into place on the river-side of the embankment, to form the new pitching, reinforcing the embankment. The pace of work was impressive, although the couple of pick-up trucks of consultants keeping half an eye on quality left an impression of low profile supervision.

The breach at Tori occurred on the night of 7th and 8th August as the flood surging through Guddu reached a new peak of 1,120,000 cusecs (although engineers at Tori claimed that the true flow was even greater). As part of the knock on effect from this major infrastructure failure, engineers had to breach the next part of the defences, the Ghousepur Loop Embankment, to clear a path for the breach waters. The Tori breach immediately transformed the scale of the disaster. The next day the flood waters overwhelmed the B.S. Feeder canal and inundated Ghousepur town. Over the next couple of days other towns of Kashmore and Jacobabad including Thal, Karampur, Hamyoon, and Mathiani were flooded. The administration claimed to have evacuated 700,000 to 800,000 people and flood waters entered neighbouring Jacobabad and Shikarpur districts. The massive flow of water through the Tori Breach, which from satellite pictures looked like a whole new great river, forced people and authorities in its path to make urgent decisions. People fled the low-lying areas of Kashmore, Jacobabad and Shikarpur, many of them heading towards neighbouring Baluchistan. The local administrations, faced with the surge, prioritized protecting major urban centres and made whatever deliberate breaches were deemed necessary to divert water from Shikarpur city (the Beghari Sindh Feeder was breached) and Jacobabad city (the
Nur Wah canal and Jamali bypass were breached on 15 August. Administration attempts to save Jacobabad became controversial when figures from Baluchistan, most notably former Prime Minister Jamali, accused the Sindh authorities of deliberately diverting flood waters to destroy Baluchistan. The Tori breach was made all the more destructive because of the long duration of the flood. The persistent high flood in Guddu through August meant that water kept on gushing through what remained of the embankment at Tori and into the new river. The main north-south road on the right bank, the Indus Highway, was submerged, cutting off upper Sindh from the provincial capital. Jacobabad City, the main urban centre of the right bank in upper Sindh, was essentially marooned from about 12 August until the end of the month. Most of the population left after the evacuation orders on 12 August, although in the end there was no major flooding inside the city itself. In Baluchistan the flood hit the plain areas between Sibi and Jacobabad. It is an area which has occasionally been flooded by torrents from the Baluchistan hills, but which is not normally vulnerable to the Indus River flood. Districts Jaffarabad and Nasirabad consist of flat and arid plains, with occasional small towns dotted across them, where wells have been sunk for irrigation. From 15 August, these small towns, such as Dera Allahyar, Rojhan Jamali, Sobhatpur, Osta Mohammad, Gandakha and Jhalpat, found themselves in five feet of water. Symbolically, even former Prime Minister Jamali’s family home was inundated in Rojhan Jamali.

Residents of the area round Ghauspur and Tori Bund explain what it was like to live in the path of the breach flood.

Chand, flood affectee in Ghauspur

“We can put up with having to die but we are not prepared to tolerate being insulted.”

He is 40 years old, the head of a house-hold camping out in an improvised shelter in the grounds of the local high school. When I met him he was sitting next to one of the most spectacular examples of appalling public hygiene. A stagnant pond was located between the family shelter and the school and the only latrine in the place was a sort of pirate’s plank rigged precariously over the pond, allowing people to defecate straight into it.

“On the night of 7th and 8th August we had already experienced two days of heavy rain. We placed our household goods onto the roof of the High School because we were frightened of a flood from the Ghauspur/BS feeder canal. First we shifted onto the roof of the school and then we shifted to the bank of the BS Feeder as its bank was supposed to be part of the flood protection. But as the waters rose we found ourselves surrounded there and we could not move back.

For the next couple of days we were abandoned there with our children, hungry. There was no solidarity in those times – just abandonment. But eventually the Army turned up and did a ration distribution. The food was scarce and the people plentiful. But at least it was something.

Over the next 10 to 20 days the waters receded and we were able to return to our home. Some of our goods had been washed away from the school roof, some were intact. We spent the next two and a half months living in the college. We were about 400 or 500 people in there. But outside the ground was too wet and muddy to think of living on it and so we had no choice.”

Abdul Sattar s/o Bejar Khan, Mombani

Abdul Sattar is a resident of Ghauspur town, which was the first major urban area inundated by water pouring through the Tori Bund breach. He and his family are originally from Naseer Shakh but have been settled in Ghauspur for 18 years. Before the floods Abdul Sattar earned
his living as a truck driver. He was out on a job when the breach occurred. His experience of the flood illustrates the experience of so many people in a society where thousands of breadwinners must travel for work. When disaster strikes their main concerns are about how to get home and who will help with the family until they reach there.

"Initially the talk about floods started when we saw flood in Sarhad (KPK) on TV. Then we saw Punjab. We knew a flood was coming. The local administration team did not tell us to move. My experience as a driver tells me that the engineers did not tell us about the flood because they had not done any work for 10 years. They had been stealing the budget which came for bund maintenance in the drought years when the water did not reach the bund.

They thought that if they told people to get out, a government commission would accuse them of suspecting the bunds to be weak. So they took the line that the position is fine, the water will pass, there is no problem….

But they knew that the water would break through. There was so much water in the river. So when the water did break they gave the order to evacuate.

It is perhaps good that it broke on this side, the right bank, because there is good access along the river.

The flood wave kept coming for a month and a half – much longer than what we were used to. You could not tell where the river ended and the land began.

The first day of the flood I had taken the truck to Sukkur. I waited for two days to see how much water there would be. The owner said let us go and do some work. The seth-owner of the truck said his father had ordered him to work. He said if you are so frightened tell your family to come to my house. I loaded watermelons but still phone calls were coming from my family pleading with me to return.

We set off for Hyderabad.

At midnight I received a phone call to say the river has breached the embankment and our town is at risk. I told my owner that we should unload at Hyderabad and go home – he just said his father wanted us to work. The seth kept saying that Ghouspur would be OK. In the end the seth said that if I was so keen to go home I should pay the Rs.9,000 for the diesel to get back. I was sufficiently desperate that I agreed. I drove quickly – on the way the police stopped me for speeding. But I explained that I was in a hurry to get home for the flood and they let me off. We set off at 2pm and by 5pm reached Khairpur. There we were told that the Ghouspur road was closed. We went to Shikarpur but there the truck broke down - its engine split in two with the heat.

There was a chaotic situation in Ghouspur. Brother would not help brother. Cars and donkey carts were not available. The fare to Kandhkot was suddenly jumped to Rs.5,000 instead of a few rupees. When I left the truck I did not have any money.

My children said they had come to their uncle in Kandhkot. I said OK – at least you have got out. Then I met a fellow driver on the way who gave me Rs.2,500 for my expenses.

Before this we had been preparing for my daughter’s wedding. We had gathered a jahez (dowry) – of earrings, golden nose studs, a large trunk for bedding, and lots of sets of clothes. It was altogether worth about Rs.50,000. For us, with my driver’s salary of Rs.4,000 that is a lot of money.

I said that somehow I would go and get out the jahez. I set off with a couple of relatives to fetch the jahez. Water had not reached Unar. When we reached Darri we hit the water. As we went further the water got deeper. The flow of water was sweeping my legs off the road. I kept going until water reached my chest. Two men coming on a boat swore at me politely warning that it was certain death and
there was no help there – but dacoits. So I gave up and returned to my family and we shifted to Rahim Yar Khan.

I started keeping a beard after the flood – thinking of the Day of Judgment. Policemen might someday be honest, but never a driver. A driver is a professional liar. Sometimes he lies to his owner sometimes to his customer. If nothing else he will steal the owner’s mobile card.

I used to smoke cigarettes. But I started saying namaz-prayer, where previously I had not even done tilavat-recitation the Quran.

I came back home after one and a half months. The house was like a mound of earth, along with the household goods. The house is still in that state. Our house faced towards the river – next to the small canal you saw yesterday. Thus our house was on the outer side of the town. Our roof beams were stolen – but nothing else was taken.

My family got out with only the clothes they were standing in. It was such a scene that everyone could just think of getting on the road to survive. My wife had never talked to me so fast on the phone. However my wife managed to get away with the jewellery”.

2.6 Local flood narrative: in the tail of the Tori breach flood, on right bank of the Indus lower stretch (Larkana, Shahdadkot, Dadu, Jamshoro)

The distinctive feature of flooding in Dadu and its surrounding districts of Larkana, Shahdadkot and Jamshoro was that they faced inundation from three sides through the flood season. A “normal” riverine flood threatened the kacha areas. The Tori breach flood bore down on them from Kashmore. Hill torrents from the Kirthar range and Baluchistan completed the picture. The area also has a distinct water management infrastructure, separate and different from the main river embankments of Kashmore and Jacobabad, constructed with the local hazards in mind. The local infrastructure has been developed with a view to controlling the run-off from Kirthar. Whereas infrastruc-

Map 7: Map of right bank of Indus lower stretch
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ture in the main plains areas of Punjab and Sindh consists of river-fed irrigation canals and river embankments, the area around Dadu also hosts the Main Nara Valley drain (MNV) and the Flood Protection Bund, running between two major inland lakes – Hammal Lake and Manchar Lake – and normally fed by the flood torrents, not the Indus. As the Tori Breach water washed across the landscape of the right bank, the fate of towns and villages along the way depended upon the administration deciding whether to breach or reinforce key parts of the web of roads, canals, drains and flood protection embankments.

The first threat to Dadu came on the 1st August as the Indus level started to rise ahead of the arrival of the main flood. As happened all along the river, the district administration started opening relief camps in local schools and preparing for the population of the kacha area to move out of the river bed. By 5 August the administration had declared an emergency to cope with the expected kacha flood and its focus was firmly on the 81 kilometre long stretch along the riverbank, with a population of 100,000 and over 200 villages. By 15 August the administration claimed that 95% of the kacha population had evacuated. In this initial stage of the flood, hill torrent water started to arrive in the area around Johi. Even before the arrival of the “super-flood” there were local breaching incidents, such as the 8 August breach of the Johi Barrage, which inundated five villages. Dadu was one of the districts where there had been extensive development of private bunds in the kacha area, where landlords sought to protect cultivation and villages in areas normally subject to only moderate flooding. However the river flood overwhelmed them.

As late as 24 August the Dadu administration announced that they were confident they could avert the flooding of the district’s most vulnerable town, Khairpur Nathan Shah. However the administration gave an evacuation order to the rural populations of 391 villages in Mehar, KN Shah and Johi of an imminent flood, from the Tori water. The scale of this evacuation order alone is an indication of how the breach floods, affecting the densely populated pucca areas was simply on a different scale from the earlier kacha floods.

One of the main concerns in Dadu and surrounds is the water level in Manchar Lake. Its outlets to the Indus have limited capacity, so that in periods of peak flood there is always a fear of it breaching embankments and flooding settlements nearby. In any case, drainage from Manchar to the Indus depends upon the river level being lower than the surface of the lake. When in high flood, the Indus can be higher than Manchar and so the drains back up. During the 2010 flood season the lake rose to 121.6 RL (17 September), exceeding the danger level of 116 RL.
From the final days of August Dadu faced an imminent threat. The administration ordered construction of a ring embankment for the district headquarters. Similarly, on 30 August it was reported that the 70,000 population of Johi town had started building a ring embankment, although the administration tried to persuade people to evacuate the town. However the arrival of the breach waters from Shahdadkot in Dadu illustrated the controversies of local flood management. The Damraho Wah canal marks the boundary of the two districts and runs perpendicular to the flow of the Tori breach water. The administrations had the option of breaching the canal to allow the flood to cross it. But they could not agree on a location for the cut.

On 31 August the high flood in the MNV was noted as posing a threat to the Zamzama oil and gas development camp of multinational BHP. Its airfield was reported flooded on 5th September. The camp is located on the left bank of the MNV, close to the Johi road. As the flood surge through MNV continued, fresh breaches on 2 September inundated some 100 villages around KN Shah. The administration ordered the evacuation of the town’s 100,000 population. Water from the breaches flooded the Indus Highway in KN Shah, blocking the main north-south road. On 3rd September flood waters entered KN Shah, leaving 6 feet of standing water in the centre of town. However people of Johi continued to man their ring embankment. Divided on whether they could avoid the fate of KN Shah, by 5 September 40% of the Johi population was reported to have left the town. Throughout the first week of September there was a mass exodus of displaced people from the threatened sub-districts of Dadu, KN Shah, Mehar and Johi, some heading to camps in the district headquarters, others towards Hyderabad, surrounding districts and even camps in Mohenjo-Daro.

By 6 September the Dadu DCO talked of Johi as of a town under siege – people were working to keep the flood waters out, but no one knew whether they would succeed or not. The other major sub-district headquarters, Mehar town, with a population of 300,000, was also protected by a ring embankment but the administration had to make multiple cuts to local canals to relieve Mehar, at the cost of flooding nearby villages. The measures taken round Mehar were a classic example of the kind of triage approach in local flood management – executive action sacrificed villages and farmland to protect the main urban settlement.

On 7 September the provincial irrigation minister, Jam Saifullah Dharejo gave a rare acknowledgement of citizens’ efforts, praising the popular mobilization in Johi “Residents formed a human chain to help reinforce embankments securing the towns. It is very heartening to us that local people are being very courageous and helping authorities, picking up stones to reinforce the embankments.” By 9 September the embankment was reported to be 18 feet high in places. (However, as recorded in the Johi case study, the town’s population reckoned that they had been pretty much abandoned to their fate and were not just helping the authorities but saving themselves in the absence of effective measures from the authorities). On 10 September the Dadu DCO issued a final evacuation order for Johi and Mehar towns.

A turning point in the flood threat to Johi and Dadu district centre came around the 9th September when the irrigation department breached the FP bund to ease the flow of water towards Manchar, reducing pressure on the MNV Drain and the Johi bund. However the flood threat persisted for another week as water continued to surge through the MNV Drain from Hammal. Eventually the critical move in the flood management for Dadu came on 16 September when the Irrigation Department breached the embankment of Manchar Lake at Bagh-i-Yusuf to release water towards the Indus. This cut was the result of a top level political decision made in a
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meeting hosted by the Dadu DCO but involving the Chief Minister and provincial leadership. Meanwhile the high flood had also passed through the Indus causing a reduction in the flow of water through the Tori breach. Thus, after the Manchar cut, the flood threat to Dadu’s towns such as Mehar and Johi receded and the administration withdrew evacuation orders.

Irshad is a local journalist from Dadu District

Irshad Khoso, KN Shah

“When the flood came I got stuck in 5 feet of water on the Indus Highway. My brother took my family to safety. When I reached my house I found my father there, stranded. I had to put him on my shoulders and walked him out. But I decided to stay behind in the area so I could do my reporting.

This was the first flood that I had seen. During the rest of the first day I continued to rescue people. But at about 6.30 I decided to get out myself. Lots of friends were waiting for me.

Our house is in a low-lying part of town and ended up under 9 feet of water. There was higher ground near the petrol pump, which is where we gathered for safety. To get out of the flood I had to walk 3 km through the water to Kolachi.

Most people had abandoned the city before the water actually hit. Perhaps some 500 people stayed back to watch over their possessions. The main role of the army rescue here was to help get food to these people.”

Abbas Chandio is a farmer and community activist living in Goth Ladhan of Dadu District. He and his peers hoped desperately that the Irrigation Department would manage to channel the Tori breach water safely past their village without it flooding. But efforts were doomed to fail and the whole village had to evacuate.

“I have seen many floods, but this was different. For example I witnessed the Nai Gaj flood (A flash flood in 1995, in which the local hill torrent badly damaged Dadu’s Kaachho area along the Kirthar hills). It was fast and furious when it hit but then it was over and we were left to help clear up the damage.

This time we really started to worry when the water got to Shahdadkot. But some of our people said we have seen dozens of floods – they were not worried – they said what will this do to us.

I tried to persuade people to get out, telling them that by morning all our roads would be closed. Eventually they agreed.

But there was a real lack of solidarity. There was just no sense of fraternity.”

“This flood was a great disaster. It took a while for the water to spread and rise. On the first day that water entered the area it reached to Khudawah Bund. Because I was socially active I stayed on in the area at a time when many of my neighbours were heading for Hyderabad.

I went to the irrigation engineer to see if he could supply us with a dumper truck or something to prepare for the flood. It seemed to me that he had already worked out that the area would be inundated and so he did not bother to help.

Lots of people were on the embankment trying to strengthen it in the face of the oncoming water. But it was hopeless. As the water arrived, first the embankment collapsed in one place and then the water over-topped it.

Standing there watching it we realized that there was more power in that flood water than in anything else we could imagine. When we saw the power of the water I shouted to everyone to run. They all ran, including me.

The second breach in the Khudawah broke exactly opposite our village. Some vehicles arrived to evacuate the rest of our village. People headed for Garokh or Nai Gaj.

That night there was a group of about six
or seven of us who remained stuck in our village. I and some friends decided to set out wading from the village as we knew there was no other hope of rescue. We had to cross the flood water although we knew a couple of people had already drowned in the vicinity.

Four or five of us formed a human chain. We took something like two hours to walk a distance that normally we would do in 15 minutes. By the time we emerged from the water we could barely talk.

A police constable kindly brought me a glass of water and as I drank that I started to revive. Eventually we reached the rest of our villagers.

When we got to the Johi Barrage we found six people from our village. Someone had fished them out and deposited them there.

From the barrage we could witness buffaloes, cows and people swimming in the water. The army had already fished two corpses out of the water. They were Legharis.

From there we went to Kotri. I have family there and half of our village established itself in Kotri. I met up with my family there but after 3 days returned to the home area.”

Ali Akbar of Goth Ladhan describes how prompt action of evacuating animals before the flood actually hit helped protect his main asset, his livestock.

“I farm eight acres and have two buffaloes.

I took the buffaloes with me to Garokh the day before the flood. At that point the water had reached our last defence line. There was no sign of any authorities. I hoped to be able to return home but then at 6 that evening the canal breached. I stayed there with relatives for two months. Friends provided me with fodder for my animals. When I went home I had to buy fodder.”

2.7 Local flood narrative: breach flooding of the mouth of the Indus, left and right bank, Thatta District

Thatta District at the mouth of the Indus was the last part of Pakistan to be flooded but the vast areas inundated in the final days of the flood season meant that Thatta was the scene of one of the largest rapid displacements. Thatta experienced two forms of flood and resultant displacement. As the water passing through the Indus River’s last major irrigation structure, Kotri Barrage, increased to high flood, the river flooded settlements in the kacha area on both banks and water quickly reached the main embankments. This kacha area flood was fully predicted.

By 18th August the District Administration had established relief camps and was calling on people to evacuate threatened areas. Thatta’s kacha area is intensively farmed and densely populated. Some of the villages in the belt, such as Jhirik and Tando Hafiz Shah, have over the years

Map 8: Map of Thatta
grown into small towns with over a thousand houses. As elsewhere there were reports of some of the kacha population trying to stay on, either because they were frightened of losing possessions if houses were unattended or because they were boatmen or fishermen, confident of their ability to cope with the water.

The Indus at Kotri reached High Flood on 20 August and stayed continually in this state until the 11th of September. This was a far more sustained “super-flood” than in normal years and put tremendous pressure on the embankments in the district. Troops were deployed to the main embankments. However, by 21 August there were reports of the first damage to the left embankment protecting Thatta, the Monarki Bund. The situation was compounded by the numerous (40) “Zamin-dar bunds” which local landowners had established in the river bed and which restricted its flow until they too were washed away. During the period of peak flow, the different factions of the district’s political elite and district administration mobilized villagers to place sandbags and try to reinforce the threatened embankments. The first efforts focused on designated vulnerable points such as the old Surjani protective bund. Irrigation authorities struggled to preserve the irrigation infrastructure, which in Thatta includes a section of the RBOD, the KB feeder canal and the Pinyari Canal. After six days of high flooding the flood defences started to collapse. Flood waters now burst into the pucca areas, forcing a new round of unplanned displacement. The first large population centre to be evacuated from the pucca area was Sujawal, after a major breach at Kot Almo on the left bank, Molchand-Surjani bund. The administration ordered some 500,000 people out of Sujawal and by the 29th the town was reported under eight feet of water. The 1,300 feet Kot Almo breach became one of the most destructive and disputed of the season. The water flow through it was equivalent to a large sized river, with up to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3: Showing irrigation structures and flood losses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Irrigation Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period of High Flood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affected Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worst Affected Taluka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes of Flooding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
100,000 cusecs which eventually filled a new inland sea estimated at 2,700 square kilometres. After Sujawal, the breach waters flowed towards the Arabian Sea, inundating Jati and other small towns on the way.

This breach was the subject of controversy, with some Sujawal residents and members of the district’s Shirazi faction claiming that influential landlords had opened the breach to target political rivals and divert the water threatening Thatta towards Sujawal.

After Sujawal, Thatta City came under pressure. By 27 August the Faqir Jo Goth loop bund was breached and the administration ordered the complete evacuation of the city. At this point the numbers of affected people went astronomical and it was estimated that 1 million people had been displaced in Thatta over a two day period. The sequence of kacha flood followed by embankment failure and pucca flood meant that Thatta residents went through successive displacements. Those fleeing Sujawal first sought shelter in Thatta city but then had to shift again after the evacuation order. A massive IDP encampment sprung up in the old necropolis area of Makli, as some 400,000 people temporarily sought shelter on the high ground of the graveyard, in the cricket ground and public buildings. However by 30th August, when they assessed that the Pir Jo Goth breach had been plugged and the threat to Thatta city had receded, the authorities allowed its population to return. Sujawal remained cut off until 6th September, when some people were able to venture back to the town. However work on plugging the Kot Almo breach could only start on 17th September after flood waters in the Indus receded. By 24th of September many of the displaced people who had gathered in Makli had managed to return to their home areas and those who had to stay on were at least able to dispatch male members to check on property.

Table 4: All Pakistan flood losses, as of 10 January 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Houses Damaged</th>
<th>Population Affected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>75,596</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
<td>1,156</td>
<td>1,198</td>
<td>284,990</td>
<td>3,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>497,700</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>1,235</td>
<td>876,249</td>
<td>7,274,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.A.K</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>7,106</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilgit Baltistan</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2,830</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,985</td>
<td>2,946</td>
<td>1,744,471</td>
<td>18,074,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: NDMA, PDMAs, GBDMA, http://www.pakresponse.info/FactsandFigures.aspx)
عنہ جوہر ایک میہری قوم کی تین کیتیں کیا میکوں دیس نا لکن جوہر ایک مختلف سلسلہ دو کیونوں دیکھیں کا میکوں دیس نا لکن

عنہ جوہر ایک مختلف سلسلہ دو کیونوں دیس نا لکن جوہر ایک مختلف سلسلہ دو کیونوں دیس نا لکن

بنیاد ویڈیو پہلیں جیتیں ہیں، میٹر سامراج کے میکوں دیس نا لکن

نواب میں (مظفر)
3.1 Preparedness and forecasting

The Pakistan Meteorological Service routinely forecasts the intensity of the annual monsoon. Already in early July they correctly forecast that there would be above average intensity rainfall for the season and this forecast was available to the national level flood management authorities, who met three times in advance of the floods. Irrespective of the forecast, there are standing instructions for the district administrations of all riverine districts to conduct preparations for the forthcoming monsoon season, in May and June. Each line department is supposed to stock up with essential supplies and ensure that its personnel are prepared to play their role. The most extensive preparations are taken by the Irrigation Department, which is supposed to inspect all parts of the district flood infrastructure and to stockpile emergency construction materials in case embankments have to be reinforced. However the initial round of flooding caught the administration and population of Swat and the Peshawar valley by surprise as the July 27 – 29 rains were far beyond expectations and affected areas which do not normally experience severe monsoon flooding. Nevertheless, once the floods moved on to Punjab and Sindh, they were more predictable as the main source of water was the rivers. Data on the flows in each of the barrages was updated daily, providing the basis for an accurate prediction of the downstream flood peaks several days in advance. Once it became a main river flood, the administration in the downstream riverine districts were able to predict the flood hazard based on an assessment of the robustness of their embankments and the amount of water arriving. This of course did not automatically mean that the population in affected areas knew or even comprehended the nature of the flood they were about to experience as this depended upon the efficiency of dissemination of warnings and their credibility.

3.2 Rescue

The first stage of the flood response was the rescue of people marooned in flooded areas or cut off by the destruction of infrastructure. This became a mammoth and high profile operation. The most prominent role was played by the Pakistani army and navy, who deployed boats and helicopters across the flooded area. In the initial stages of the floods, both in the Peshawar Valley and downstream riverine districts, there was a significant voluntary effort, with local volunteers, traditional boatmen and NGOs extricating people from the flooded areas. Flood survivors have multiple tales of friends, relatives and local youth mobilizing in the hours after flood waters struck. The sheer logistical resources of the military and their facility with public relations meant that their rescue effort was high profile and they could report the largest number of recorded rescues. By the time the flood became a riverine flood, which could be predicted in the downstream districts, local administrations mobilized boats. They were able to commandeer hundreds of civilian boats from the communities which fish or ply goods on the river. Accounts from survivors indicated that the voluntary and private efforts and
boats commandeered by the local administrations mobilised as much capacity as did the military. The rescue effort was supplemented by international assistance and aircrews. After the initial destruction in K-P, there were relatively few casualties in the floods. This is in large part a testament to the effectiveness of the rescue effort.

The administration in riverine districts issued evacuation orders to the population of their kacha areas. In some cases where the army had been deployed they were sent to help evacuate the kacha. However there were multiple examples where kacha dwellers refused to leave the river bed or at least insisted on leaving some of their men behind. Given the severity of the flooding, some of those who struggled to stay on in their homes in the flood path later regretted it and had to escape when it became clear that water levels were higher than they had bargained for.

Kacha dwellers gave several reasons for declining evacuation orders or offers of rescue. In the first place they believed that they would be able to survive in the riverine area because they had experience of previous floods were accustomed to the water.

This basically amounted to doubting the accuracy of the warning because many kacha areas were fated to experience complete inundation, beyond the capacity of any mitigation measure. Secondly they were concerned for the welfare of their livestock, which they believed they were better able to care for in their homesteads than in any camp setting. Thirdly they were worried about the security of their land and other assets. They feared that if they displaced, thieves or land grabbers would take them. The fall back strategy adopted by many of the kacha dwellers was to evacuate families and non-swimming animals at the first warning, with men and those animals which can swim (water buffaloes and cows) staying on.

Those who stayed on gambled that if waters rose above the level they could withstand, they could then swim out to the nearest embankment. There were indeed many tales of men swimming out with their animals, although in this severity of flood it was inherently risky.

Those in charge of rescue or evacuation, by boat or by helicopter, rarely had provision for livestock and were only in a position to extricate people. Given the vital importance of livestock in livelihoods strategies, particularly for poor farming communities in the kacha, people are most likely to comply with evacuation orders if their livestock can be taken care of. Those who struggled to evacuate after the flood had hit described the extortionate rates they had to pay private boatmen for transporting animals to safety.

A different set of issues arose as the administration sought to evacuate people living in the pucca areas, in cases where vital infrastructure had been breached or was expected to. The decision to evacuate Muzaffargarh City, Jacobabad, Thatta and other urban areas entailed the involuntary displacement of hundreds of thousands of people at a time. None of these evacuations was a hundred per cent – in
all of the urban centres some residents chose and managed to stay put. However, many of the people who did comply with the evacuation instructions complained bitterly about the lack of arrangements. This applied in particular to those who had already displaced into the urban centres and had already used up their resources in the first move. The authorities giving the evacuation order could give no undertaking about the availability of adequately resourced relief camps for the urban populations to move to. Although the district administrations were working to the limit of their capacity a priority must be given to making arrangements for the involuntarily displaced.

### 3.3 Managing the flood waters

**Citizen mobilization and local flood defences – the case of Johi**

Along the length of Pakistan the approach of a “super-flood” forced local administrations and citizens to take the life and death decision of whether to evacuate their homes and communities or to try to keep the flood waters out. In many places, particularly much of the kacha, the sheer volume of water in the main riverine flood was such that there was no realistic alternative to evacuation. In some locations, such as Muzaffargarh City, the authorities’ decision to order general evacuation was controversial as they were unable to provide any adequate alternative location and in the event flood waters did not enter the city. However, in numerous marginal areas, timely action to reinforce ring embankments protected small towns from the flood waters.

A glance at the media accounts of the work to reinforce flood defences leaves you with the impression that the work was masterminded by the ubiquitous district administrations, helped along by local members of parliament, the Pakistan Army and the irrigation department. These accounts reduce residents of the threatened areas to anonymous “beldars”, wielding shovels as directed by their elected representatives. In reality there was significantly more agency, with citizens struggling to play an active role in saving whatever could be saved. The small town of Johi in Dadu District stands out among many examples of citizens taking matters into their own hands and ultimately succeeding.

From 30 August to 16 September the population of Johi developed and manned a ring embankment to keep the flood waters out of their town. There were plenty of doubters and calls for evacuation along the way. But the civic effort was successful and ensured that Johi did not join the long list of population centres washed away by the flood.

Johi has a long history of citizen action. During the 1990’s a group of volunteers established a movement they called the “Kaachho Bachao Tehreek”. This was part of a long Sindhi tradition of educated youth working for social uplift and the volunteers of KBT were well networked with similar local groups across the province.

They tried their hands at income generating schemes, cultural programmes and periodic flood relief in the villages of the Kaachho – a strip of land between the Flood Protection Bund and the foothills of the Kirthar Range. The paucity of resourc-
es available to the KBT during the 1990’s lent their efforts to “save” the Kaachho a Quixotic quality. However the endeavour helped build the experience of the volunteers. Today they run another community development organization in Johi known as Sujag Sansar. Sujag Sansar operates a non formal education centre in its office. Its media cell produces videos on social issues and the group participates in various networks of community activists across Sindh. The KBT – Sujag Sansar volunteers formed the nucleus of the citizens’ committee which saved Johi.

One of the original KBT volunteers, Wafa, explains the spirit which underpinned the Johi mobilization:

“You once told me that to tackle some kinds of challenge you have to be mad. Well during the flood we were all mad and that is why we were successful. When all the irrigation experts told us that Johi would drown, the DCO told us that we must be mad to stay there.

TRDP provided us with about 2000 sacks for sandbags. They stockpiled the sacks in Dadu and for about 10 days I travelled to and fro between Johi and Dadu, picking up the sacks and other supplies we needed. In those days I used to have to take a boat from Johi College on the outskirts of town and it would ferry me to the MNV drain where I would cycle to Dadu.

In those days there was such a spirit that each one of us could do twice as much as we would in normal time.

During Ramazan our mullahs gave a fatwa saying that those working on the embankment could drink milk during the day. Of course they would never give such a thing in writing but everyone understood it. This is unprecedented.

They were strange times. One day I saw three college girls who delivered a rickshaw full of cold drinks to the people who were working on the bund. They apologized for not being able to shovel earth but said this was their contribution.”

Abdul Fateh Dohri, a local headmaster, is one of the more articulate Sujag Sansar volunteers. He speaks for the group in elaborating how they mobilized the citizens of their town to hold the floodwaters at bay. One of the main points that emerges from his account is how local infrastructure management decisions rebound on communities in the vicinity. The Johi citizens were able to throw earth and sandbags onto their embankment and to respond to breaches. But the success of their endeavour also depended upon breaches in the two main items of infrastructure in the area, the FP Bund and the MNV Drain, as well as other structures such as the roads running perpendicular to these two embankments. The more the flood water pouring into the area was held up by obstructions, the more it climbed up their embankment. But decisions on these breaches were taken by the Irrigation Department and the Pakistan Army.

“From day one, when the water broke Tori Bund we knew that the water would eventually reach here. But our people showed courage to face it.

Tactically we were not in such a bad position – we did have some safeguards to make use of. To the north there was a distributary which had been worked on in 2000. It is known as Nai Shakh, the 9th distributary from Johi Branch.

The MNV capacity, when it is flowing at normal level is 3,500 cusecs. But the maximum capacity within its banks is 8,000 cusecs. We knew the risks we had faced before. In the 1995 flood we were hit from breaches in the FP Bund after the hill torrent floods. The MNV left bank is well maintained as the second defence line for Dadu town. But the right bank could be expected to breach. There is an aqueduct to carry the Johi Branch across the MNV. They cut the Johi Branch. But even after the cut in the Johi branch there was a series of hindrances to the progress of the water away from Johi. The Bhan Road is
raised to about 5 feet above the level of the surrounding land. If a cut had been given in this road it would have helped reduce the pressure on Johi. The ring bund is approximately 17 km in length. It is constructed by linking the Bypass, with the 9th minor, with a link road.

For 5 km of the ring bund, it ran along the main road. At the deepest point our embankment was holding out 20 feet of water. The FP had been remodelled and worked on since the disaster of 1995. It had been built to 3 ft and received stone pitching. The natural flow of water was along the FP Bund. The challenge we faced in terms of water was a breach on the west of the FP Bund PLUS a breach in the right bank of the MNV plus the cut in the Johi Branch.

The problem with the cuts was also that they did not make a single cut, they made multiple cuts. This meant that the water was completely uncontrolled because each one of these initially small cuts soon opened up, stretching from 30 ft initially to 300 ft within a matter of hours. The water rushed into our area.

On top of the flood water that came from the Tori Breach, we faced constant heavy rain which added a new wave of water.

When we decided to defend our ring bund everyone joined in. Farmers cut their crops to throw on the embankment. The NGOs helped supply plastic sacks and use them for pitching of the embankment.

One of the incidents which determined our fate was that further south the water had built up inside the FP bund and was some 10 feet above the level of Manchar Lake. A brigadier touring the area saw this and realized that it meant that the Dadu second defence line was in danger from water stacked up so high. He ordered a blast of the FP bund.

But the breaching of the FP bund created a new pool of water and essentially cut off our area from Dadu. Until that point the government had kept machinery working on the FP bund but not on our embankment. After the FP breach our people petitioned the government to let us have the machinery which was now anyway stranded. The administration finally relented and agreed to let the machinery help us.

The main problem that we faced at that point was the failure of the administration to go ahead with timely cuts in the roads, which would have kept the water moving past us and reduced our water level by 3 feet.

The government had called on us to evacuate but eventually relented.

When we approached Dr. Hameed Chandio Sahib MNA looking for assistance to save our town, he offered to send as many vehicles as we wanted, to evacuate.

At the peak of the flood we were manning the bunds 24 hours a day. We have experience of this kind of work. Normally if we
ask 10 people to come and do something we are lucky if we get 2 volunteers. This was different. Everyone wanted to be part of it.

The most dangerous point was when there was a wind storm which set up waves. The waves were rapidly eroding our embankment and we desperately needed more pitching. In this too everyone joined in. Anyone who had plastic sheeting brought it along. Even the mullahs from the masjids brought along floor matting to throw on the Bund. At that point the main water level was 25 feet below the top of the bund. But the waves were tall enough to wash over the top.

I witnessed a peasant who had a field of gourds. He came and told me to lift the crop and use it for pitching. We did that and his vegetables protected the bund against the waves for a whole hour.

All night people would stay up filling sand bags. In one place the pitching was 17 sacks high. But every day the water level would rise about 10 inches. Before the flood I suffered from sciatica. But since I did my stint on the bund I have been fit and healthy. Maybe all the exercise was good for me.

My own house is in a low lying area of the town and water flooded our lane in 1995. Now I have a two year old daughter. I had to put her and my library of books and cassettes and our wheat store onto the roof for protection.

Apart from the water itself we knew to worry about the law and order situation which often deteriorates during an emergency. But here there was no incident.

To the east of the town we have three villages of Rinds, which were the first to be hit. They joined in and proved to be the strongest of our workforce. They are hard working peasants and so were better than the rest of us at shovelling earth. Our usual predicament was reversed. If we asked for two people, ten would come.

We were pleased to be able to project what we were doing to the world. We have a media unit in our organization which supplied videos to ARY and GEO. We got good coverage, especially in Urdu. We wrote some of the articles ourselves. This also helped keep up our morale. Our media unit made a documentary on the Johi ring bund which is on YouTube.

We knew there was a constant danger of the bund failing, especially at night when we could not inspect it properly. As a reserve measure, we obtained lots of steel charpoys with plastic sheeting and had them on standby for instantly plugging any holes we might face.

When the work started we became one great team and all the boys were happy to be a part of it.

I was mad. My tribe has a reputation for being mad. Even in the office here we put all our equipment upstairs. I am a teacher, now designated as a grade 18 administrator. For the moment I am a sarkari mehman. (i.e. waiting for a new posting).

My family has had a long association with water management issues. My forefathers were involved with the original settlement of the Nai Gaj. In 1873 there was a fight over the water here. Colonel Anderson was sent to deal with it. In 1879 Anderson oversaw the new water distribution. The Talpur dynasty had just been ended. My family had been involved in a dispute with the Talpurs and so were involved in the arbitration through Anderson.

Some of our women took their turn working on the bund, especially on the day that we were threatened by the wind and waves. You should remember that this is a place where women are rarely seen in the bazaar.

We should not be too harsh on the rulers. Dr. Hameed Soomro played a model role as a friend of our area.

Iqbal Memon the DCO helped us to mobilize assistance.
But in the flood aftermath discussions that this researcher was able to undertake with affectees simply did not seem to place the organized relief and recovery effort at the centre of their experience of the flood.

The biggest Seth in Johi used to come every day and watch us working on the bund. He said your embankment will never hold. He avoided donating anything to our work. I saw him standing there sceptically inspecting our work. A child came along and handed him a glass of coke. He drank it.

But in all seven points where we had based our work teams, people brought degs,

For once the different political factions in our town set their differences behind them and cooperated.

The pesh imams of the masjids told people to help us – these were the same imams who in normal times would barely let us into their masjids.

For us it was like a dream. The whole of Sindh was flooded and we occupied a low-lying area. But our solidarity meant we were able to keep our town safe.

Abdul Rahim Rind Advocate is notorious as the meanest person in the whole of our town. In normal times we are frightened to talk to him. But during the flood at two in the morning he would be out on the embankment distributing cups of tea with his own hands.”

3.4 Relief & Adequacy of Relief Measures

Post-flood, the most obvious change, visible to someone driving down any of the main roads which run parallel to the Indus, through the flood affected areas, is a new forest of signboards. The settlements themselves vary between those which outwardly seem back to normal and those where collapsed buildings are still visible. But few have escaped the signboard craze. The boards proclaim shelter assistance, infrastructure rehabilitation, supply of agricultural inputs, cash for work and numerous other projects, with donor names prominently displayed. They are reinforced by the mass media, which has given saturation cover-

age to statements, reports and promises from those involved in aid provision. The Government of Pakistan, armed forces, Provincial Governments and District Coordination Officers have had most opportunity to give their accounts in the media of what they have done to help the flood affectees first survive and then recover. However the United Nations, donor countries and non-governmental aid agencies have all done their bit to inform us of the nature of their assistance.

The narratives of their flood experience as articulated by those who lived through it are rather different. They describe a struggle to survive and a list of challenges that they faced in the sequence of displacement, return and recovery. They describe encounters with the different assistance schemes which were rolled out during the flood aftermath and acknowledge them as one of the tools they relied on for survival – alongside household and community resources. But in the flood aftermath discussions that this researcher was able to undertake with affectees simply did not seem to place the organized relief and recovery effort at the centre of their experience of the flood. While often appreciative of practical assistance rendered, such as food rations in the early stages or tents and construction materials later on, survivors seemed completely remote from the massive logistics effort, the elegantly conceived projects or the painstaking multi-agency coordination processes. Even community activists who were the local points of contact for outside assistance agencies working in the flood affected areas seem to have a different worldview from humanitarian community insiders. A comprehensive assessment of how the humanitarian effort performed would require a thorough review of the programmes in all the different clusters and a look at impact on the ground. Instead, this review restricts itself to collating some of the interlocutors’ references to the needs and problems they faced in the relief and recovery phases.
and the assistance programmes they encountered. Because none of the flood affectees or the civil society activists had much of an overview of the relief effort, as a point of reference, the key points drawn from the United Nations’ review of the humanitarian response are presented below:

In talking about the periods humanitarian agencies dubbed the “relief phase” and the “recovery phase” flood affectees describe a struggle for survival and then for resuming something like normal life. But aid agencies and government were largely in the background as the affectees largely seemed to take it for granted that they would have to depend upon their own efforts. Many did also articulate a sense of entitlement, indicating that they did believe that the government had some obligation to help them. But in reality expectations were low and the last thing anyone was going to do was sit around waiting for an official response.

Several of the people who described their experience of the floods should be thought of as community entrepreneurs. They are the ones who took the initiative to approach the district administration and aid agencies to mobilize assistance. This kind of role started in the earliest phases of the disaster when communities were on the move. Even if families took the preferred route of staying with relatives, they needed rations to reduce the burden on their hosts. But when people returned to their villages needs increased and the entrepreneurs had to lobby with aid agencies to try to bring them to the community. When the aid operation got going, whether through the philanthropists who drove vanloads of foodstuffs to KP in the initial days of the flood, or the NGOs who gradually entered the fray, effective community entrepreneurs tried to bring some order to the process and make sure that distributions were orderly and fair. They helped fill a gap in local knowledge which affected many of the organizations scaling up for flood response.

In contrast to the local community entrepreneurs, several affectees spoke scathingly of the role of traditional feudal politicians in the aid process. They were suspected of capturing assistance, finding ways of intervening in distributions to play local politics, favouring some groups and punishing others.

A classic example of the community entrepreneur is Abbas Chandio of the badly affected KN Shah in Dadu. His account illustrates how the persistent entrepreneur mobilizes assistance from government and NGOs.

“I met with our MPA and explained to him that all our foodstuffs had been lost. I told him that we urgently needed assistance. He promised to work on it. We went again to the MPA after 10 days and then to the DCO in Kotri. I explained that our tribe had no intention of staying in a camp but we needed assistance nonetheless.

The relatives provided us shelter but the food was a problem for all concerned. The DCO allocated a water tanker that started to do the rounds with fresh water. Later his people started to provide cooked food. Our fellow villagers had been scattered in
the displacement. About 20% of our villagers were in Mobili Chandio and 10% in Jatoi Goth.

I went to meet them all and gathered up their CNICs so that I could negotiate assistance for them. I met with the MPA looking for assistance. He promised to provide 50 10kg bags of flour.

But my village population is 2000. I offered to bring all our people to see him so that he could judge if they were deserving and distribute himself. He offered 20 more bags but I simply refused.

We left him and went straight back to the villagers to recompile the list of residents and deserving beneficiaries, complete with a note of CNIC numbers. I took this round the NGOs – the Red Crescent, Thardeep (TRDP) and so on and got some assistance.

We made a team in Dadu, with 2 people from the village and 2 from the town. We spent 10 days lobbying and collecting there. They promised us that they would provide assistance as soon as our people were back in the village. That is indeed how it worked out – we managed to get assistance when the people came back. Although it is true that the NGOs provided assistance, the international community seemed to be holding back. They never provided more than 25% of our needs. For about 5 months they sustained a basic minimal level of assistance so that we survived. Now we have had to stand on our own feet.

In the meantime poverty has increased. You see it among our people. They are no longer able to join each other in celebration of their sadness or happiness as before. We do not go to weddings in the way we used to. Not only were our crops and houses destroyed, our whole system was destroyed.

My whole family got sick during the flood. All of us ended up sheltering under one plastic sheet – I, my wife and our two children. When we got back I was able to go to friends, borrow money and build us a room.

But the poor are worse off. We have re-

A SUMMARY OF THE HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

Humanitarian agencies recognized the Pakistan flood crisis as the world’s biggest disaster of the 21st century, perhaps the largest disaster ever, affecting more people than the combination of the 2004 Asian Tsunami and the 2010 Haiti and 2005 Pakistan earthquakes. An estimated 2.9 million households were affected, including 1.9 million seriously affected and 80% of food reserves were lost. It was estimated that 12 million people required humanitarian assistance.

The humanitarian operation, mobilized in response to the disaster, was massive, complex and involved a baffling number of actors and coordination structures.

$3 billion was pledged in assistance to Pakistan for flood response. The United Nations moved rapidly to launch an appeal, which became the main vehicle for international humanitarian assistance. By the time of the evaluation of the humanitarian response, it had received $1,255,381,156.

On the government side, the National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) provided strategic leadership, with provincial counterparts (PDMAs) coordinating activities in the provinces. However the District Coordination Officer (DCO) emerged as the key figure within the government system for coordinating the range of assistance activities.

The United Nations coordinated international humanitarian response, with its
specialist agencies such as WFP and UNICEF assisting within their own sectors. The UN implemented a “cluster approach” which became one of the hallmarks of the humanitarian operation. Initially activities were organized into four “life-saving” clusters of Food, Health, Water and Sanitation & Hygiene (WASH) and Shelter. Subsequently and somewhat controversially, the United Nations allowed the number of clusters to proliferate to eleven.

The combined national and international effort delivered a relief operation which lasted five months from September until January in most of Pakistan (with an extension until April for badly affected parts of Sindh).

In the relief stage agencies tried to address the full spectrum of survival needs of flood affectees, including food supplies, health services, temporary shelter, water and sanitation. In keeping with latest humanitarian practice, in addition to these fundamentals there was a massive effort for logistics plus information management, and responders tried to address rights issues under the headings of “protection” and gender.

The relief phase was followed by an early recovery phase intended to help communities back in their home villages to address longer term needs, such as shelter and livelihoods.

The main achievements claimed for the humanitarian response were that rapid expansion of WFP assistance helped avert potential food shortages in the early stages of the disaster. In addition the lack of major disease outbreaks is partly attributable to the rapid expansion of health services and preventive measures.

The success of the agricultural population in most affected areas in planting their winter crop on time was a major factor in the economic recovery from the flood. In part supply of grants of seeds and agricultural inputs helped kick start this agricultural recovery. However four districts affected by the Tori Bund breach were unable to plant in time.

Aid agencies struggled to muster the resources to build houses to the standards recommended, even when these were restricted to one robust room per homestead. By the end of the relief phase shelter was recognized as an area of outstanding need. But coverage was patchy. In addition to the vagaries of agency coordination, problems in coverage were exacerbated by patronage-related interference by quasi-feudal politicians and their allies in the administration who sought to override beneficiary criteria.

All involved struggled to cope with cumbersome coordination. There was a perpetual tension between the requirements of efficient area management (which was best done at the level of a district) and the ubiquitous clusters, which pushed everybody towards thinking in sectors. Tied to the cumbersome coordination there were widespread funding delays which left many organizations implementing relief activities after the optimal time had passed. In particular Pakistani NGOs found it difficult to gain access to the resources they required to mount a timely response.

The United Nations system commissioned an evaluation of its humanitarian response in March 2011 and the report provides an accessible introduction to how the world helped deal with Pakistan’s disaster.
Breach of trust: People's experiences of the Pakistan floods

People’s experiences of the Pakistan floods

Repeatedly been to the government and the NGOs but have never received the assistance we required.

But, as for the government! You know about the Pakistani government. You know about the corruption. The government used to complain about the way the international community channelled assistance through the international NGOs. But if we had received a fifth of the resources that went to the government we would have been OK. We also knew how our vaderas – feudal lord work. They try and grab control of the aid distribution and then they use it for building their vote bank. What we want now is that those who were responsible for our predicament should be punished.

Even now we face NGOs doing surveys for shelter. Some person has just come to our village from UN Habitat talking about providing cash grants for house building. But the amounts are simply unrealistic. He talks of giving people Rs.30,000 to rebuild. We have told him that we simply cannot build anything in that amount.

The first batch of assistance we got was from TRDP, consisting of 428 ration packs. We made a 10 person village committee to organize our distribution. We set up the centre in a school so that we could keep all the goods there and avoid having to store them in any one person’s home. We did not want to give anyone the chance to take over the distribution and then say ‘I am the one who helped you. For us it was an issue of faith.”

In terms of practical needs, in the initial stages of displacement people required somewhere safe to stay. The preferred option was to go and stay with relatives. However as a last resort, people were prepared to stay in government run camps. The issue of dignity arose with regard to these camps and may explain why they were such a least favoured option. A volunteer who witnessed the camps in Dadu City described how people resented the insulting attitude of some of the police charged with distributing food to the inmates.

Karam Hussein, numberdar, from Lavyah, has a typical critical account of the way that camps and distribution were organized:

“When they had to flee, most of the people from our villages preferred to stay with relatives. The administration did have camps but the police were involved in distributing food there. In the best of times no one wants to have dealings with them. But the way they doled out food in the camps was especially humiliating. In Lavyah town the local women managed to get hold of most of the relief even though they were not displaced. There should have been better registration.

The local MNA Saqoain Shah Bokhari came to Lavyah to do a distribution. But it was entirely symbolic. He distributed in the town, not in the kacha areas where people really were displaced. He visited Kookerwala Bund and gave away a token bag of food. Relief distribution was chaotic – a “bander bant” (a monkeys’ circus).”

In contrast some of the camp experiences were far more positive. At its best the camp was an orderly environment in which aid agencies tried systematically to cater to the range of needs. This in turn contrasted with the situation once people
had returned to the villages and assistance seemed more like a scatter gun approach, with different agencies catering for some needs of some people and no one assuming all over responsibility.

**Khadim Hussein**, activist from Dadu, describes the struggle of running the camps in the early stage of displacement and how, before the arrival of increased institutional assistance, the displaced camps were a joint effort between district administration, local volunteers and philanthropists.

“In the initial days of the flood there was a real spirit of humanity. For example in the first collection we received Rs. 70,000 in donations. We collected food and bedding. Our store was full. For two months people supported our work. We ran four camps on the embankments, with over 400 people per camp.

It was not easy to run them. We found that no one paid attention to hygiene. The embankments in the area around our camps were in a filthy position, with open defecation. Eventually we were able to build latrines. But today, after the flood, some influential people still have tents piled high in their stores.

The DCO provided hot rations – degs.

I met some people who refused to take the food which was brought to them. When I asked what was wrong they told me that they felt so humiliated by the way the food was thrown at them like animals, they preferred to go hungry. This was when the police had responsibility for food distribution.

SAFWCO and various other NGOs started to distribute food when they saw that the government operation was inadequate. Within our organization we made units, with each unit taking responsibility for one camp.

But we faced massive issues of NGO coordination. Everyone seemed to end up working in the same union council.”

**Rubab**, woman activist of Dadu elaborates on the struggle to assist in the camps

“We provided assistance during the flood. For example we found a pregnant woman in one of the camps and brought her for delivery.

We monitored the situation of the women in the camps. The political figures engaged in sexual harassment, blackmailing the pretty women who they found there.

There was a complete lack of preparation from the administration. For example in the schools, which always become our IDP centres, there was no provision for separation of male and female latrines and there was no running water.

The most serious case we dealt with was in the IDP camp in the Girls Pilot School. A local influential broke into a young woman’s room to harass her. But he was disturbed before he could rape her and people made a fuss. We made a complaint and tried to file a case. But by morning the woman had withdrawn her complaint after coming under pressure.

The other kind of complaints that we dealt with were lack of latrines, over-crowding and shortages of rations.”

In terms of practical needs first on the list was food and this was indeed often the first thing people received. Many affectees did indeed lose food-stocks and livelihoods, so their first concern was to feed the family.

Health was a major issue. Almost everyone living in the flood affected areas seemed to have experienced bouts of fever, diarrhoea or skin ailments. They seemed to consider the period of post-flood illness as a phase they were obliged to go through. No one expressed any faith in the efficacy of preventive measures. But as every household had a caseload of sick people, access to health care was clearly a priority. The emphasis on the post flood bout of illnesses described in...
these conversations explains why mobile medical camps form such an important part of the traditional Pakistani response to flood disasters.

The main outstanding need that people referred to when describing their situation nine or ten months after the disaster was shelter. Progress on rebuilding varied. The enterprising respondents had rebuilt, some from their own resources, some with assistance from NGOs. Others were still surviving in temporary accommodation, including one community in Muzaffargarh which had been accommodated in Turkish prefabricated shelters. Most of these shelters, just before the author’s visit to the village, had been demolished by a wind storm. On the outskirts of Ghouspur Town another community coped in temporary huts next to a stagnant pond, while they gathered bricks ready to rebuild. However, even those who had moved back into their own houses mentioned shelter as an outstanding community need – poorer members of their communities were still struggling. House rebuilding was also the most visible recovery activity under way in several of the villages visited for the conduct of flood review interviews. This was the most visible evidence of prioritization underway in the nationally coordinated recovery program. In villages visited in Layyah, Muzaffargarh, Rajanpur, Kashmore and Dadu NGO teams were in evidence, helping to erect one room brick-built dwellings for a small selection of the local poor.

In terms of economic rehabilitation needs, people related the travails of trying to get back on their own feet. They have fewer assets than before and in several cases they report that there is less work to be had. Most people seemed to take it for granted that finding work or restarting cultivation was their own responsibility. Apart from references to the supply of agricultural inputs, there was little sign of expectation of economic assistance. A sprinkling of people had done stints of cash for work and the community entrepreneur from Nowshera was aware that aid agencies in his area were gearing up for a new round of cash for work assistance. Conversations in Sindh referred to the on-going struggle to restart agriculture. In addition to the delayed planting of the rabi crop because of standing water, farmers were affected by electricity shortages and the tardiness of repairs to the irrigation system, which also threatened their summer or kharif crop. However the key economic concern mentioned repeatedly was that of inflation. Already in debt and struggling to restart work or businesses, people complained of rising food costs and electricity bills.

Although affectees acknowledged and were appreciative of the range of assistance which they had received from NGOs, some were also critical of a chronic tendency for the aid agencies to under-perform. The organisations promised far more than they ever delivered and many of the projects were blatantly mismanaged and there were real problems in quality control. For example, Iqbal, community activist of Sabzujat complained:

“Although the NGOs certainly have done some relief and recovery work, there are major problems with it. It has been a string of broken promises. All the relief allocation seemed to depend on getting hold of a token. Praise to God, I never got a token. However they would do things like promise Rs.15,000 worth of goods for the token and then deliver only Rs.4,000 worth. I did 3 months of cash for work on clearing rubble. The rate was supposedly Rs.50 per day. We were 60 of us working on it. But after 3 months they paid us off with Rs.5,000. Then they were to distribute livestock and made a goat farm for the purpose. They were meant to give us three goats each worth about Rs.8,000. But they never gave anyone the full package.”
Sohail, community activist in Janpur elaborated on the inadequacy of the assistance operation:

“The aftermath of the flood left a dreadful sight of people begging for relief. Just along the Indus Highway at Talaiwala, the whole area filled with people waiting for relief. Every now and then a vehicle would come along and give things out and everyone would grab for them. It lasted a full two months, before the area emptied and people went home.

The assistance the government provided in the camp established in the high school was like salt in flour – a drop in the ocean. After all, the whole of our 400,000 population was affected.

The Prime Minister came and gave a speech. That day they would not let anyone into the school. So he did his performance and left.

The NGOs lay on their own shows. They conduct a small distribution for a few people but still take lots of photographs.

We still have people here who are without shelter (chaddar and chardiwari). Of course the NGOs have been working on shelter but with a scatter-gun approach – four families here, four families there and lots left untouched in between. They sometimes complain about the large crowds of people gathering around them but that is only natural when so many people have needs.

In Shah Jamal Colony here, perhaps 10% of the houses have been rebuilt

German Emergency Doctors is working on house reconstruction. But there are real quality problems. They have allowed their contractor to reduce the proportion of cement in the mortar and the cement blocks to a ridiculously low level. They are building with a ratio of 1 to 16. They provide 3 bags of cement where there should be 8. With this poor quality construction there is a real danger that people will die. If there is another flood houses built to these specifications will collapse just like kacha houses.”

Finally several of the affectees mentioned that their abiding impression of the floods was of the experience of having to pay commission (bribe) for everything. They felt that numerous functionaries in the aid pipeline took advantage of their position to extract a commission from beneficiaries. The simplest and most blatant example of this was in the system of distributing assistance through tokens. Every token commanded a price, even if the actual donor intended them as a tool for free assistance. Indeed the art of survival as an IDP involved learning which tokens were actually worth something. To prosper in an aid distribution you needed the savvy of Goldman Sachs, or else you risked paying the agent more than the value of the relief goods which eventually arrived.

Perveen of Kot Addu offers a classic description of a determined woman wrestling with the demands for commission and the bureaucratic run around:

“I went to a ration distribution. They told me “Bibi sit down”. They kept me waiting. Then eventually they said “Bibi your name is not here. Your settlement is not included”.

Response
There were tokens for aid distributions. They were sold on the black market. We had to pay Rs.2,000 or Rs.2,500 for a token that would provide you Rs.4,000 or Rs.5,000 worth of relief goods. The MNAs and MPAs had local representatives that organized everything. The NGOs in the area worked through them. Even the Red Crescent aid packages were sold like this.

I went to the distribution centre and got myself a Red Crescent package. I was so full of hope that this would keep my family fed. It was heavy and I hired a rickshaw for Rs.300 to take it home. It contained two maunds (80 kg) of flour. But when I opened it up, the flour was foul-smelling.

It was a bitter disappointment.

For the next distribution people told me “Bibi go to the tehsil”. I first had to go to the DDR and then to the tehsildar. But the tehsildar complained that the DDR had not properly signed the paper he had given me. This is the way they give you the run around, making you walk the 3km between their offices and hoping that a woman would soon despair and leave them alone. But I was determined to get bedding and a ration card.”

Imtiaz, the community entrepreneur from Mohibanda, Nowshera provides a final example of how local level organization served to improve the coverage and effectiveness of aid delivery. At the same time, Imtiaz offers what amounts to a critical bottom-up evaluation of the range of humanitarian assistance activities rolled out in one of the most severely affected communities in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. His assessment indicates that there were serious issues of aid effectiveness and also that assistance agencies would be well advised to tap into such local insights for managing and evaluating their work. His account of attempts to bring some order to the relief effort carries on from Imtiaz’s testimony on the “rescue” phase of the flood.

“I had some money because there was Rs.7,000 left over from what I had collected on the first day and before that I had been doing some construction and so had set aside some of my own money. Water and rice were available from the relief centre and with our money I bought the other things our people would need – like milkpak, naswar and cigarettes!

On the 5th day I took the children to Mardan, spent a couple of days with them and then returned to the village.

The village was drowned in two feet deep mud. The only place that people had managed to clear out a bit was the mosque.

With the help of one of our elders Taza Khan and three volunteers, we set up a village distribution centre. We quickly realized that lots of people were bringing relief to the villages. But much of it was being wasted by the chaos that ensued when donors tried to hand it out with no proper arrangement.

Our idea was to persuade the donors to distribute through us.

The kind of philanthropists who brought aid in those first few days were mainly non-Pashtuns from the other side of the Indus, or Pashtun retired army officers. This period of displacement and relief lasted for about a month. Most of our people would spend the night in Pabbi, but they would commute to the village for the great clean
up. People’s main focus in this month was on cleaning out their houses.

With support from UNICEF a water tanker started to come from Jalozai camp. Initially it was done on an emergency basis and people would bring containers to the collection point. Someone conducted a distribution of non food items in Pabbi and so our people got hold of water containers. At various points batches of mineral water were also delivered.

After about a month and a half a local NGO installed 200 gallon water tanks in various points across the village, which made the collection of water more convenient.

We still face a water problem. The original bores in our village are to a depth of 50 to 80 feet. But this stratum is now polluted. People have bored to 150 feet and found a second layer of water, which is clean. The NGOs have promised to help us with the deeper bores but nothing has materialised yet. NRSP tested the experimental bores. World Vision has also been there for a survey. Previously we had a household level distribution system, with pipes connected to a tube well. World Vision expressed interest in rehabilitating the old system. But they just got funding for a standard hygiene project and so were not able to do what we had proposed.

We went to meet with the DCO. He explained that there is a political government and so if we wanted our work done we had to lobby the MPA and get his signature. He also called his public health engineer who referred us to his district management cell, who simply said that it is impossible. I went to the Social Welfare department who managed to come up with the grand assistance of a couple of household level water filters (despite the fact that at minimum we have three community level mosques).

Norwegian Church Aid also ran a water treatment plant for about three months after the flood.

To organize our distribution system we worked around the mosques. There are a total of 12 mosques in the village and each of them has a membership list. We gathered up the membership lists from each of the mosques and prioritized ten people from each, so that we had a prioritized distribution list.

Later on three or four rival groups tried to set up alternative distribution schemes. One of these groups was run by a head teacher, the other by a retired army major and the last by a ruffian. They managed to take over their own areas and so we retreated into ours.

When the NGOs started to come there were lots of meetings. The NGOs needed to know about security. They needed to locate staff and they had to do their assessments. Our key role in this period was in providing guidance to them.

After a while we worked out that the NGOs mainly used untrained staff, many of them were from Mardan. Very few NGOs ended up dealing with us as to get to us they had to walk across the village and to the banks of the river, passing the other centres along the way.

We had contacts with multiple NGOs. We found that most of them had different teams for survey and implementation. They had access to inputs like seed, fertilizer, fodder and construction materials. However staff of several of the local NGOs proposed fifty-fifty deals – where we would receive half of the amount we signed a receipt for and they would keep the rest. This practice seemed to be a bit less in the international NGOs.

For example, BEST was responsible for seed distribution in our area. Hassan from Pabbi came to our centre in the village and informed us that his team had completed their assessment. He announced that he had identified 59 farmers. But we told him there were 800 qualified beneficiaries and such a distribution could cause problems. Instead they shifted their distribution to
The food distribution was meant to start in September but was delayed until November. We believed that the real reason for the delay was pressure from the MPA to get assistance to villages he had a political interest in regardless of whether they had been affected by the river flood.

Eventually they covered 900 households and managed to do a distribution to 1200 people from a neighbouring union council, using our place as their base camp. Hassan however got fired for his initial mistakes.

As well as our lobbying on the Watan Cards we ended up agitating for access to food. Fazl Raziq was in charge of WFP in Pabbi. We went to meet WFP as a political delegation representing our area. Hassan Raza informed us that he had authorized 1,700 distribution tokens for our village. But he gave the contract for conducting the distribution to Muslim Hands, working under International Relief. Muslim Hands had only received 300 tokens – not enough for the full authorized distribution. They agreed to come back for the registration of our village. The food distribution was meant to start in September but was delayed until November. We believed that the real reason for the delay was pressure from the MPA to get assistance to villages he had a political interest in regardless of whether they had been affected by the river flood.

CRDD started a FFW scheme, clearing drains and so on. They concentrated on unregistered people. But after a while they shifted to Mardan.

Now WFP, through CRDO have started another round of assistance. They visited homes and checked CNICs and identified 540 beneficiaries. They promised to give one month of food to the prioritized beneficiaries and to provide cash or food for work for other people, with a promise of Rs.3,400 equivalent for 12 days of work. They commenced this work on 20 May.

The food distribution was meant to start in September but was delayed until November. We believed that the real reason for the delay was pressure from the MPA to get assistance to villages he had a political interest in regardless of whether they had been affected by the river flood.

Comparisons
Some of the poorest, such as widows and destitute have ended up getting off. Private benefactors and the army and so on have repeatedly been showering them with assistance and even giving some of them new plots of land.

This has only benefitted people who have been able to live or camp close to the main road, where the philanthropists spot them. Some of them have made the transition from living in a kacha house to building a pucca house.
Some of the lasting negative effects are that many people no longer want to work – they are still waiting for aid handouts. Others are mentally disturbed by the experience.

We saw the residual anxiety in the recent wheat harvest. People who would normally have stored the wheat straw for fodder instead sold it off, in fear that straw supplies would be taken by a new flood.

We have heard from other villages that the flood has caused an increase in petty violence. However fortunately we have not had fights in our village.

Jamaat ul Dawa has also made an appearance in our village, although rather ineffectively. A teacher who belongs to their organization brought a team to the village. They selected 9 people to receive housing assistance. Fortunately the beneficiaries are genuinely poor people. However the assistance has not arrived yet.

Our assessment of government performance would be 2 out of 10 – they only served their own people.

Our assessment of UN performance would be 8 out of 10 – at least they got aid as far as the distribution points, although they did not extend beyond that and had inadequate checks over their partners.

Our assessment of the NGOs would be 5 out of 10 – patchy performance.

Although survivor accounts suggest rather erratic standards of performance by the humanitarian organisations which responded to the floods, there have long been attempts in the humanitarian community to set standards for aid delivery. Most experienced organisations, Pakistani and international, recognised that their assistance should comply with the “Sphere Standards”.

One of the biggest losses in the area was animals. Our people lost a total of 1,000 animals. One of the NGOs managed to hand out about 30 cows to 15 families. The land has also not all been levelled to get it back to full productivity. This costs Rs.25,000 per acre. The DCO claims to have a massive project for this and has selected beneficiaries on a party basis. “
Sphere standards

The Sphere Standards are a set of guidelines to ensure quality and accountability in humanitarian action. A group of international NGOs with experience in disaster response, along with the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement launched them in 1997. They aim to set out the consensus on best-practice in administering humanitarian relief in times of natural and man-made disaster. The practical heart of the Sphere Standards is a set of specifications and implementation guidelines for the four main sectors which generally have to be addressed in an emergency – 1. Water-supply, sanitation and hygiene promotion, 2. food security and nutrition, 3. shelter, settlement and 4. non-food items and health action. A more general set of Core Standards give guidance on the organization of the humanitarian response, including issues such as planning based on thorough analysis, involvement of the disaster affectees in designing the programmes and coordination. The Sphere authors have linked their standards to a Humanitarian Charter. This lays out the philosophical and legal foundation of humanitarian assistance, based on the right to receive humanitarian assistance and the right to protection.

In Pakistan the Sphere Standards have provided an easily accessible checklist of needs to be addressed and standards to be achieved in assistance to those affected by flooding. For example Sphere sets a norm of 7.5 to 15 litres of drinking water per day for survival needs and recommends a maximum of 250 people per tap. Although Pakistani NGOs and government agencies have decades of experience in running relief camps, Sphere offers a universal standard to inform local practice.

Sphere also affected the flood response in a slightly more bureaucratic way. When the United Nations took responsibility for coordinating agencies involved in flood relief and helping to channel resources to them, it adopted the same grouping of sectors used in the Sphere Standards. The four main technical chapters in the Sphere Handbook were reborn as agency coordination groups, each with its programme of meetings and reporting and a funding window. However it is not always possible to refer to a manual for every challenge in disaster relief. One of the distinctive features of the Pakistan floods was the way in which, particularly in the early stages, people relied on help from relatives and neighbours and tried to avoid shifting into the kind of camps in which Sphere was developed and tried to avoid becoming completely dependent upon official assistance.1

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3.5 The Watan Card Scheme

3.5.1 Significance of the Watan Card scheme

Sometimes a name or phrase enters daily conversation in such a way that you cannot make sense of what people are saying unless you understand it. The words may not be in the dictionary, or at least not with the new meaning which has been coined for them. But they become so commonplace that people talk as if everyone was familiar with the new term. Anyone dropping into the flood affected areas and listening to daily conversation would within a short time encounter the neologism which has spread the length of Pakistan on the back of the flood - “Watan Card”. Any group of people discussing the aftermath of the flood are bound to refer to this ubiquitous badge of entitlement for government delivered assistance. If any single object has come to symbolize that assistance programme, it is the green plastic ATM card bearing a Pakistan flag and labelled “Watan Card”.

Not only has the term Watan Card established itself in contemporary Pakistani vocabulary, it has become a main focus of flood related politics. Those who organized and mobilized flood affectees in the year after the disaster homed in on the Watan Card not just as an individual badge of entitlement but as an example of the contract between the national political leadership and the citizenry. Affectees believed that at the outset the leadership promised them compensation which would be commensurate with their losses and that only by sustained protests and lobbying could they hold the leadership to this promise. This was a recurrent theme in the interviews conducted nine months after the flood. The Watan Card scheme thus also provides a remarkable case study of organized citizenry holding the leadership to account for promises made but long delayed.

3.5.2 How the scheme was meant to operate

The Watan Card scheme emerged as the government’s flagship assistance programme for flood victims. The scheme was announced on 8 September after agreement reached at the economic coordination body the Council of Common Interests. Provincial and the federal governments agreed to put matching funds into a programme of cash assistance for affectees. The scheme was both simple and elegant in conception. Family heads in flood affected areas that held computerized National Identity Cards were to receive an ATM card which was credited with a once-off cash grant of Rs. 20,000 which they could access through regular bank machines. The scheme utilized the database and logistics of the institution responsible for maintaining the national population database, NADRA.

Up to March 2011 the government had issued 1,524,952 cards, each supposed to provide assistance for a household. For many survivors the Watan Card represented the most substantial element of assistance which they received and the only one which went some way beyond securing daily survival to providing help with restarting their lives. Despite all the negative images of Pakistani bureaucracy,
people’s experience of the Watan Card administration seemed to be relatively positive. Those who received the cards found the process fairly straightforward and the novel approach of disbursing through the banking system, although a new experience for the majority of beneficiaries, was probably less agonizing than what people would have expected if disbursement had been through the local bureaucracy along the pattern of payment in social safety net schemes. However some of the feedback from people who have experienced the Watan Card scheme indicate that it failed to achieve its full potential and ended up being rather more like the traditional bureaucratic and patronage influenced relief schemes that its inventors hoped to replace.

3.5.3 Eligibility

The Rs.20,000 grant was intended for a nuclear family, defined as a married couple and their unmarried offspring. The card was to be issued to the registered head of family, which in Pakistan usage is normally the male. From the outset the scheme did anticipate that some cards would be issued to women where no male head of household was available and the problems in operationalising this were much discussed in flood follow up interviews.

Because the Watan Card scheme was so tightly linked to the national identity card system, possession of a valid CNIC, with a recognizable address registered in a designated flood affected area, became a key eligibility criterion. Likewise, as the definition of family was important, to be eligible to receive the card, married men had to have updated their CNIC to reflect their married status. Otherwise they were simply considered as dependents of their parents.

3.5.4 Registration strategy

The availability of the national population database meant that NADRA rather than local officials generated the first draft list of people to be considered for the scheme. Provincial governments (through their Relief Commissioners) were to notify the affected areas. NADRA generated lists of registered family heads in those areas. The provincial governments were then responsible for verifying the lists and supplying final beneficiary lists to NADRA for processing. This is the way the scheme worked in Punjab and Sindh the two provinces which accounted for the bulk of Watan Card recipients. They published their notified affected areas, specified down to village level. Thus CNIC card holders with an address in a village designated as affected were eligible for a Watan Card. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan, the administrations settled for a more traditional method of conducting a ground survey in affected areas. From the survey these administrations compiled their lists of CNIC-holding eligible beneficiaries. The scheme also provided for a quota of cards to vulnerable individuals who might have been excluded in the family head based lists, including disabled and woman household heads.

In principle, to have their Watan Card issued, eligible beneficiaries, whose names appeared on the final lists, only needed to present themselves at a NADRA field centre. There they had their biometrics checked, a process which involves match-

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>608,825</td>
<td>11,987,999,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindh</td>
<td>644,027</td>
<td>11,254,021,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPK</td>
<td>233,248</td>
<td>4,093,856,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>117,939</td>
<td>2,130,931,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJK/GB</td>
<td>19,310</td>
<td>324,277,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,623,349</td>
<td>29,791,085,477</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Progress in Watan Card scheme, Phase 1 to May 2011
ing their fingerprints against the national database.

The scheme’s provision for allocation of a small number of cards to vulnerable people outside the standard beneficiary list added a degree of discretion as the district administration had the responsibility for designating individuals eligible under these categories. They amounted to approximately 12% of total Watan Cards issued.

Table 6: Watan Card allocations to vulnerable groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Processed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>151,400</td>
<td>121,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons with Disabilities</td>
<td>21,804</td>
<td>18,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>14,108</td>
<td>11,990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5.5 The Watan Card scheme in practice

It is hard to over-emphasise the extent to which issues around Watan Cards permeate discussions among food affectees about the aftermath of the disaster. Some of the discussion is positive. This is indeed the relief intervention that the largest number of people acknowledges having received. For the author, with two decades of experience in Pakistan disaster relief, it was a new experience to travel the length of the country and encounter in all locations people who acknowledged having benefitted from a national scheme. In any discussion, many of the men present can produce their Watan Card from a pocket or wallet. However people also debate every aspect of the scheme and articulate numerous examples to illustrate how a programme so elegant and simple in design becomes rather more complex when confronted with the realities of Pakistani rural life and the interface between populace and government.

The two fundamental issues regarding the scheme concerned the size of the grant beneficiaries would receive and the role of elected politicians in determining coverage of the scheme. In addition to these the operational issues raised by flood affectees included the eligibility of women and disabled affectees, problems around family definition, registered addresses and up to date population registration, arrangements for the issue of the cards, access to banks and opportunistic corruption at different stages in the process.

3.5.6 The issue of minor relief assistance versus substantial compensation

The official announcements at the launch of the Watan Card scheme were carefully constructed to refer only to a once-off Rs.20,000 relief payment. However nearly a year later the bulk of flood affectees discussing the Watan Card were convinced that the real plan was for a more substantial compensation plan of Rs.100,000 and that by delaying this payment the government had reneged on a commitment. The confusion arose because senior political leaders from the outset announced that they intended to use the Watan Card scheme to make compensation payments (i.e. Rs.100,000) rather than the smaller relief payment which was initially authorized. For already example on 16 September Chief Minister Sindh, Qaim Ali Shah was reported as saying that he expected the CCI would decide to pay Rs.100,000 per family for house reconstruction. The problem was that the resources were not available, a formal decision had not been taken and thus the only scheme actually agreed was that for the relief payment. Nawaz Sherif, commenting on flood relief in Punjab, also said that the provincial government was lobbying for a Rs.100,000 payment. Likewise on 2 October, as the Prime Minister visited the worst affected areas of Muzaffargarh he stated clearly the government intention to enhance the assistance available through the Watan Card scheme to Rs.100,000.

Discussions with flood affectees nine months after the Watan Card scheme was
Announced indicated that people were acutely aware of the promises which political leaders had made regarding payment under the Watan Card scheme. Although people mentioned different amounts, most remembered the promises of Rs.100,000. Many of those people who had been involved in protests by the Flood Affectees Rehabilitation Movement believed that their agitation had helped keep alive the issue of a second instalment. Indeed, in June 2011, NADRA announced that it was launching the second phase of the scheme and that some of the funds pledged for a second instalment had been pledged. Given the scale of the disaster and the sheer number of affectees, the completion of the first round of the Watan Card scheme, with the Rs.20,000 relief payment, was one of the greatest logistical achievements of the entire flood response. Not only did the scheme reach an impressive number of flood affectees, it did so in an appropriate timescale. The payment was intended as relief assistance and it was disbursed while people were still in the relief phase – either displaced or newly returned to damaged houses. The experience of the compensation payment was exactly the opposite. Conversations with flood affectees suggested that the failure to deliver on the promise of compensation had undermined government credibility. Even with the announcement of a second round in June 2011, the timetable for the assistance programme had got out of step with that of the affectees. The NDMA had already declared an end to the relief phase in January and for other programmes had shifted to rehabilitation and recovery. The majority of people had long returned to their villages. Affectees had been obliged to make arrangements for their shelter, whether by disposing of assets or going into debt. In general people resented the failure of the government to make a sizeable contribution to the rebuilding of their houses at the time when they needed it. But relatively few people have waited. Instead they have made whatever sacrifice was needed to rebuild and restart their lives.

3.5.7 The role of elected politicians in determining coverage of the scheme

On one level the Watan Card scheme represented a rare consensus among the national political leadership. The main political parties of the country backed it. In particular, the Punjab and Sindh provincial governments and the federal government all prominently supported the scheme, which conversely insulated it from the kind of political competition which can emerge during episodes of inter-provincial rivalry. Conversations with flood survivors make it abundantly clear that people expect political patronage to play a key role in access to relief and recovery resources. They expect elected politicians to manoeuvre themselves into positions of influence either with the area administration (DCO) or directly with aid agencies, so that they can direct resources towards their clients. The idea that the sponsorship of a patron (sifarish) is necessary to secure any entitlement is still widespread.

The design of the Watan Card scheme supposedly challenged the concept of patronage as the basis for allocating assistance. In principle the allocation of cards was based on objective and verifiable criteria and a modern bureaucracy, equipped with the latest technology and a client-oriented approach. Neither in the identification of beneficiaries nor in the handing out of cards and cash was there any obvious role for the local power brokers who had dominated so many other processes. People described witnessing traditional surveys – a low level revenue official walking through the area to note down degrees of damage to individual houses. But the administration also had access to SUPARCO satellite maps to undertake an objective determination of the extent of flood devastation as a basis for notification of affected areas.
Some of the complaints from all three provinces visited suggested that enterprising politicians had managed to find some way of interjecting themselves into the process, despite the supposedly robust design. Affected attributed some of the strange decisions in the notification of affected areas and compilation of beneficiary lists to political rivalries, suggesting that influential MPAs and MNAs were able to win notification for areas which were unaffected.

However blatant departures from the scheme methodology were rare and the fact that all beneficiaries ultimately did have to go through NADRA ensured that there was some degree of bureaucratic adherence. A thorough study of how much impact patronage had would have to cross check beneficiary lists, notifications of affected areas and the satellite images.

3.5.8 Coverage in practice

There was clearly a significant degree of controversy over coverage in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, associated with the field survey. The PDMA relied upon the lower tiers of the revenue department to affected areas and households.

NADRA representatives repeatedly claimed that their scheme offered a technical fix for the challenge of ensuring that assistance was targeted at deserving beneficiaries. The key elements of the fix were the population database and biometrics, which meant that they accurately identified the people who were issued cards and the link of the database to addresses – cards would only be issued to people registered as living in areas which the government had officially notified as having been flooded.

In reality dividing areas into affected and unaffected involves an arbitrary cut-off point, as flood damage in any area is usually partial. Higher elevations in a village may escape entirely and well constructed houses may survive where kacha structures collapse. To cope with this provincial governments had to use a combination of “universal compensation” and “survey based compensation”. Under the universal compensation everyone in an area was deemed eligible for the Watan Card. Under the “survey based compensation” a household level survey is undertaken and cards go to those families whose houses are found to have been destroyed or damaged. It was reported that Punjab (Express Tribune 21 October) used a 50% cut off for switching between these two schemes – Watan Cards for everyone in villages with more than 50% damage and a survey in villages with less than 50% damage. However in multiple conversations with flood affectees, none of them seemed to have a clear understanding of the basis on which eligibility was determined.

In Layyah, Karam Hussain, numberdar and Deputy President of the Layyah...
branch of the TBSZ, was the lowest level local official involved in surveying flood affectees. He enumerated the range of problems which emerged over eligibility:

“The problems that some people experienced in the Watan Card scheme were all about the status of their CNICs. Those excluded included:

- People who had not updated their cards after marriage – and so they were treated as single (and un-entitled).
- Women who did not update their cards after becoming widows – and so they were treated as dependent on their husbands.
- Other dependents of deceased male household heads.
- People with errors in the address registered on their card, so their card did not reflect that they lived in a flood-affected area.

Overall in Thind Khurd, about 100 people were excluded from the scheme.

There has been little action on the applications submitted by those excluded. The government asked for appeals but then ignored them. It also failed to deliver on the originally promised amount for the scheme. Everyone heard the government announce it would provide Rs.40,000 on the Watan Card, but the full amount never materialized.”

3.5.9 Coverage of areas not affected and exclusion of area affected

“And in the Watan Card distribution there seemed to be no governing principle. Some people received, others did not. I know of people who had migrated to Layyah town as long ago as the 1980’s or 1990’s. They still received their Watan Cards, although the town was unaffected by the flood.” (Amanullah in Layyah)

Iqbal of Sabzujat in Muzaffargarh, the tailor turned community activist, describes the opacity of the Survey Based Relief system. He witnessed Nawaz Sherif’s original promise to the people of Muzaffargarh that they would receive Rs.100,000 compensation through the Watan Card. But when it came to the detailed work of identifying beneficiaries the system worked far less smoothly than suggested by the official briefings. Iqbal reports a lack of transparency in the survey and mystery about high rates of beneficiaries in less affected villages and the exclusion of people in villages such as his which had been 100% affected.

“At Eid ul Fitr Nawaz Sharif and some Saudi prince came to our area. He made a speech saying that all our houses would be rebuilt for us and everyone in the area would receive a Watan Card. We were very hopeful. The government announced that people would receive Rs.100,00 through the Watan Card scheme. Of course although Rs.100,000 would not be enough to make good all our losses, it is certainly enough to sustain hope. When officials surveyed our area they showed that there had been 100% destruction.

The survey for our moaza was scheduled for 9 November. Then on 9 November our patwari took three days of leave. He asked for a 2-3 day postponement. But instead the administration postponed the survey by three months.

The surveys ended up bearing little relation to reality. For example in Nur village there was at most 20% damage. From our area 1202 heads of household went on the list out of our total population of 8000. Our people were confident that because of the total destruction in the area we would receive our Watan Cards. They believed that these cards were in our fate. We met with the father of Hina Rabban Khar to lobby him. But the authorities promptly closed down our local NADRA field office. We did not even get the 1202 cards which seemed to be a reasonable minimum. We undertook a protest strike. After this the authorities issued
some 184 cards out of our initial claim of 1202. We were left wondering whether it would have been better if they had simply not taken our names in the first place.”

“Then when the judicial commission came one of them suggested that maybe I had not obtained a Watan Card because I am not head of household. I retorted that, if this is the principle then we must have a strange family structure, as out of our 8000 population only 184 have received cards. Do we have only 184 household heads for so many people?”

Nowshera famously became one of the places where flood affectees rioted over the delays in issuing Watan Cards. Imtiaz, resident of Mohibanda, adopted the role of community activist facilitating access to relief assistance. Thus the Watan Card scheme became a key focus of his efforts. His account suggests a low level of transparency and high level of politicization in the way the scheme was implemented. In part this seems to have been caused by the KP Government’s emphasis on survey based compensation. Even in villages which were 100% affected entitlement depended on getting a mention in the survey and multiple figures seemed able to affect the final outcome of the compilation of beneficiary lists.

“The issue of beneficiaries of the Watan Card scheme became complicated and controversial. The patwari started off the Watan Card process in our area by conducting a survey on 20 August. He registered 1180 people as eligible beneficiaries. It was meant to be done on the basis of families. But for example in our household there are 7 families, in the sense of married couples. But four of them ended up on the list and three did not.

In our settlement we identified 193 people who were eligible and included on the patwari’s list, who were then excluded from the NADRA beneficiary list. We called these the delayed cases.

The next interesting initiative on the Watan Cards came from the local MPA Pervaiz Khattak who installed a computer in Pabbi and tasked a team to work on compiling beneficiary lists. This went on for two months. The problem for us was that we had a rivalry with Pervaiz. He is the one who produced the beneficiary list from which the 193 were missing. We had not backed him in the elections as we aligned with rival candidate Zulfiquar Aziz of Amanjot, who is closer to us. Pervaiz had also opposed the participation of women in the elections, a position we were not prepared to agree to.

When the Flood Inquiry commission visited Nowshera we were able to meet and lobby Mohammad Azam Khan.

Imtiaz Ahmad played a key role on the issue of the Watan Cards. Fortunately we had a full record of the cards for our area. Azam called us to the dak bungalow and gave us the number of his personal secretary. He set 16 March as the deadline for final corrections. We managed to get 530 included, on top of the 1,180 person patwari list.

The Watan Card scheme was initiated on the 29 October. But many of the card holders have still not received the money. Word has spread that it will reach their accounts in June. The people who received their cards in May have not yet got money. The situation has been complicated by the Pabbi ATM not having money. Some people managed to take money out in Peshawar.”

“There was a problem of inadequate coverage in the relief. For example our survey indicated 2,400 affected and eligible families but the Watan Card scheme finally only reached 1,700. Those left out were mainly poor people unable to lobby.

Initially we worked from the patwari list as I was not optimistic that we could go beyond that.

Nothing turned out as people expected. The patwari list distinguished degrees of
damage to houses – completely destroyed, partial damage and cracked. People understood that they would get Rs.80,000 for destroyed houses and Rs.20,000 for partially damaged.”

“Although Pervaiz Khattak is the irrigation minister he has mainly busied himself with Watan Card affairs rather than agriculture.”

“They talk about the Watan Card. But our house electricity bill for the period of the flood had come to Rs.20,000. They took away the meters of families who could not pay. This clamp down was despite a statement from the minister for power that he would waive the charges for the period of the flood.”

Ali Akbar from KN Shah makes the link with the more general problem of inflation

“Yes, I was able to draw the cash on my Watan Card. But when I received the money tomatoes were at Rs.100 per kg. Money does not go far when prices are that high.

They have turned us into orphans and left us.”

In interpreting the complaints about the Watan Card it is important to note that despite the official line that the Rs.20,000 payment was relief assistance, almost universally flood affectees expected the Watan Card scheme to be used for delivering a grant for house reconstruction. Many of them made the obvious and correct point that Rs.20,000 is not adequate for building a family house. This confusion was caused by the early political promises about compensation, followed by the long silence on when it would actually arrive. However, the timely availability of cash grants during the relief phase was an appropriate recognition of the fact that a disaster imposes heavy demands on the economic resources of poor households. The coverage of in-kind assistance schemes, such as the relief camps, is never adequate to meet all household requirements or protect their assets for future recovery. The Watan Card’s Rs.20,000 injection somewhat reduced the pressure on households to sell off their assets or go into debt in the early stages of the flood.

3.5.10 Adequacy of relief assistance

Unsurprisingly, affectees made the point that surviving a flood is an expensive business and that most of them spent more than the value of the relief grant in the process of fleeing their homes, looking after the family while displaced and eventually returning home. There were even numerous complaints that the haemorrhaging of household assets started from the point people had to call boatmen to extricate them from marooned villages. Some affectees claimed to have spent half the value of a Watan Card just in shifting family members and animals to dry land.

Perveen of Kot Addu complains of the inadequacy of the relief payment compared to the other costs imposed upon flood affectees, most notably high electricity tariffs and erratic billing.

“They talk about the Watan Card. But our house electricity bill for the period of the flood had come to Rs.20,000. They took away the meters of families who could not pay. This clamp down was despite a statement from the minister for power that he would waive the charges for the period of the flood.”
3.5.11 **Bureaucracy and rural reality - problems around family definition, registered addresses and up to date population registration**

The scheme organizers anticipated several circumstances in which deserving flood affectees might encounter difficulties obtaining a Watan Card:

1. Incorrect address – some people have addresses entered wrongly from the time of CNIC issuance either because they have subsequently moved or because the address is simply not recognizable. A rather lengthy procedure is in place for the address to be verified by the DCO, who then notifies the provincial authorities for inclusion on the beneficiary lists.

2. Failure to notify marriage – many people were excluded from the lists because of their failure to update their CNIC. They thus were excluded from the lists of eligible household heads.

3. Female household head – in cases where the man is not available to receive the card, a woman can be designated as the card holder. But until NADRA did the designation, the woman would be excluded.

4. In case the family simply possess no CNICs they had to register and get those issued before trying to get onto the Watan Card list.

The more widespread and serious complaints of the operation of the Watan Card scheme concerned the way in which the NADRA database fails to reflect the realities of rural life and thus skewed entitlements. The whole Watan Card scheme depended on heads of household possessing a valid CNIC, registered in the affected area. A substantial minority of flood survivors lived in affected areas but did not appear on the NADRA lists. In the first place these flood survivors included woman heads of household who had not been designated as such in the NADRA records. Those issuing CNICs and maintaining the database generally designate a man as the head of household, reflecting the societal norm. However the reality for many rural women, particularly poor women, is that they have to bring up a family without a man – because he has migrated, died, remarried or deserted. These women take full responsibility for dependent children and sometimes even older relatives and work in a whole range of occupations in the rural economy. Their social status is ambiguous as the reality of their independence is only barely recognized. Even widows are expected to seek the protection of their in-laws or parental home. Therefore it is unsurprising that few of these women have updated their details in the national database, to claim their status as female household head.

Flood survivors also complained of the problem of migrants, those who reside in areas other than their original domicile. Many of those who were living in flood affected areas and whose houses were destroyed subsequently found that their names were missing from beneficiary lists because their CNICs had been issued from other districts. Similarly, despite the government’s efforts to extend the CNIC to universal coverage, there is still a hard core minority of citizens, especially those living in remote areas such as the riverine belt, who have never been registered. Lack of or out of area registration was also particularly a problem for marginalized communities, who in normal times have minimal interaction with the administration and formal economy.

Migration towards areas where land and jobs are available is an important part of the livelihood strategies in the riverine belt and flood plain. New villages are colonized as land is developed and whole communities maintain a semi-nomadic existence. These people found themselves excluded from the basic design of the Watan Card scheme because of the difficulties of matching the national database to the complexities of life along the rivers.
Nasreen, a woman head of household from an affected village of Layyah described the frustration of her bureaucratic encounters in the attempt to get her record updated so as to receive a Watan Card:

“I did not get a Watan Card. I do have an CNIC from my Soomra Nasheeb address, but there were complications.

I have appealed to the DCO and to the NADRA officials. But they have not been able to solve my problem and do not give me a conclusive reason.

At one stage my husband had gone to Lahore for work. His Lahore address was entered in the NADRA computer. I have had my CNIC remade showing my correct address here. But the NADRA officials say that the Lahore address will remain permanently on the record.”

Sohail, the community activist in Rajanpur’s Jampur complaints about the apparent impossibility of rectifying the simple record-keeping problems which blocked some affectees’ access to the Watan Card scheme.

“Watan Cards are still a big issue here. We have already taken out one rally to protest about it. I estimate that up to 40% of deserving beneficiaries were excluded in the initial survey. No one has been able to get themselves included subsequently. Even when there have been simply bureaucratic issues, such as change of address on their CNICs, they have not been adjusted.”

Four flood affectees living in a completely destroyed village of KN Shah, Dadu illustrate the range of implementation problems. Overall their assessment is positive – they acknowledge that the great majority of affectees did receive the card. But everyone is aware of problems, whether affecting them or neighbours. And they are even aware of the centralized complaints system.

Abbas Chandio

“When the Watan Card scheme was launched some people were indeed left out. That programme has been affected by corruption in the sense that they have also included areas that were not even flooded. I estimate that about 2% of people in our area were excluded from the Watan Cards. But the exclusions are all explained by technical problems with their CNICs.”

Shah Nawaz

“I got a Watan Card but my brothers did not. We are a total of 6 brothers and 4 of us are married. The other 3 married brothers have updated their cards to show they are married. But they had to go to the DCO and the mukhtiarkar to fill in forms. We did so but are waiting.

About 80% of the people here who received Watan Cards have been able to encash them. The others are waiting.”

Karam Ali

“I received my Watan Card but have not been able to draw cash on it. First I went to the ATM at Mehar but no cash was available. Next I went to Dadu and got the same result. I went to Kakar and met the bank manager who told me there was no cash on the card. Then I went to the Bank Manager in KN Shah who said the same.

Finally I found a private computer wala who helps people with complaints. For Rs.100 he filed a complaint on the internet on my behalf.”

Ghulam Mustafa

“I got hold of the Islamabad NADRA complaint number. I have complained for myself and on behalf of 8 other people. The reply came back to wait. They have registered my complaints and reply by mobile phone.”

3.5.12 Arrangements for the issuing of the cards,

The Watan Card scheme design was based on an idealized client-friendly, efficient system, under which NADRA officials were supposed to be able to process every beneficiary in only thirteen minutes.
This smooth processing may have happened in some locations, but what flood survivors recall was far more traditionally tortuous and chaotic. Survivors describe long queues at NADRA offices, where people had to brave the harsh weather for extended periods, for fear of losing their place. These complaints basically refer to the period of waiting to gain access to the NADRA team, while police used a customary level of violence to keep order among those waiting. However, the lack of discretion at the point of issue meant that, once they actually gained access to NADRA, entitled beneficiaries generally did receive their card.

Abdul Sattar, the roguish former driver from Ghouspur, gives an alternative account of the clash between bureaucratic systems and rural Pakistani reality. He describes the attempts by the administration to put in place a rational system where the NADRA field team, equipped with their modern technology and procedures, would process individuals according to a timetable organized by Union Council. But, according to Abdul Sattar, the sheer pressure of applicants, the determination of local politicians to show that they could win favours for their clients, the determination of the police to involve themselves in controlling access to the centre and the willingness of all sides to resort to commissions and bribes, meant that he ended up obtaining his Watan Card literally through the back door.

"The approval for issuing Kandhkot cards came in September 2010. Bhitai high school in Kandhkot became the Watan Card centre. There was a board with timetable giving the days for each Union Council, and we read the UC Ghouspur date on it.

We are the ones who create the institution of rishvat. The unaffected people are the ones saying help us first. The NADRA people sit inside while outside people are fighting. We have no patience.

We waited for 4 days. But other UCs mus-
Operational difficulties were real and implementation was certainly not as smooth as suggested by the NADRA generated flow diagrams. Such lurid criticism seems to be a serious mis-reading of the scheme, which deserves due recognition as the only operation which was able to put cash into the hands of the majority of flood victims when they needed it and to do so in such a way that excluded most opportunities for political patrons or commission agents to interject themselves between the citizenry and the assistance.

On 21 October the Express Tribune in a more thoughtful assessment offered specific examples of discrepancies in the allocation of Watan Cards. These included examples of undeserving people receiving cards (multiple members of a nuclear family) and deserving people excluded from the scheme (some residents of 100% affected villages unable to obtain cards). In addition the report cited examples of problems in card activation – people received cards but they did not work.

This tenor of criticism seems more appropriate. Operational difficulties were real and implementation was certainly not as smooth as suggested by the NADRA generated flow diagrams.

3.5.14 Bureaucratic reality check – including the disabled

Nasir is a farmer from Thatta Ghurmani moaza in Muzaffargarh District who also happens to be a double lower arm amputee. In his normal life, successfully cultivating sugarcane and wheat on two and a half acres of irrigated land he is an inspiring example of overcoming the challenges of disability. Nasir and his family have found solutions to every problem associated with farming when you have no hands. But NADRA, in their part of the Watan Card Scheme, failed to respond to the bureaucratic challenges of disability. He lives as a fully active member of his community, and is quietly proud of his status as a peasant farmer, who earns a living on the land. He lives with his disability rather than being defined by it. He had hoped that after the flood he would be treated by the government as a normal citizen, entitled to the same assistance given to other people whose houses were damaged. Instead his disability seemed to provide an excuse for perpetual procrastination in providing Nasir with access to the Watan Card assistance. There is a provision within the scheme for a special quota for disabled people and there is a redress mechanism for refused cards. But Nasir was never refused, just politely delayed. His experience provides an extreme example of how an efficient bureaucratic machine can fail when confronted with the reality of rural life. However, after Nasir participated in a communal hunger strike in Islamabad organised by Tehreek Bahalia Sailabzadgan and Pattan in February 2011, his case received some publicity. Sarwar Bari, National Coordinator Pattan took Nasir along with him to The Supreme Court Flood Commission of inquiry. While presenting his position on flood situation, Bari presented the case of Nasir to the judicial flood commission. In response Chairman NADRA who was present there personally took interest in his case and issued him the Watan Card within two days.

“When I went to the NADRA office to collect my Watan Card, they told me that the computer would not issue it until I gave a thumbprint. They confirmed that my card was in the system – the NADRA people can check on the Internet. I went four times to the NADRA office and three times to the DCO’s office. They reassured me that I would receive my card and that they would include me on the quota for disabled people. But nothing ever happened. I have seen the computer list and my name is on it. NADRA just would not issue it. They eventually agreed to take a toe print but said that they would have to refer it back to head office for advice. They told me that a reply would come in a few days. But the field office packed up and left before any reply ever came.”
“I already have a CCNIC, which NADRA managed to issue without thumb prints.”

“Our area was flooded when the Abbas Bund was destroyed. Although our area is considered kacha, it was not the normal river flood which hit us but the flood caused by the breaching of the Abbas Bund.”

“There are about 150 households in our settlement. The homesteads are scattered, with everyone living on his own plot. About a third of the people in the settlement received cards, although some households received as many as five in the one household. The government chose who should receive.

My living quarters consist of one room inside a compound. In the floods the boundary wall collapsed, as well as the animal shelter. There was some damage to the living room, although it did not collapse. (Because no assistance came from government) We just had to patch up the walls and the room ourselves, doing kacha repairs.”

“I used to run a shop but it did not work out. Therefore I am now just dependent on my farming – the sugarcane, wheat and rice. The main crop on the land at the time of the flood was sugarcane. I lost about half of that. I had a smaller amount of rice and fodder and lost those entirely. I have three buffalo and two calves.”

3.5.15 Watan Cards – the verdict

It is remarkable that nine months after the launch of the Watan Card scheme it was possible to travel the length of Pakistan, visit flood affected communities in three provinces, and find that most eligible people present in discussions had received their Watan Cards. The scheme does seem to be the instrument available to the government which has the most potential to reach the affectees. It is of potentially historic significance that central and provincial governments have at their disposal a practical mechanism of transferring resources to an important category of the country’s poor – flood affectees. However there are major problems of transparency and it is clear that the scheme is under a veritable siege of people trying to distort the original design to introduce political patronage and carve out a role for rent-seeking institutions such as the police or revenue administration.

Given the relative success of the Watan Card scheme in overcoming the host of challenges associated with determining entitlements in rural Pakistan, it is all the more troubling that there should have been such a delay in the movement to the second phase of the scheme, the payment of compensation or assistance for housing reconstruction. The Supreme Court might opine that “assistance delayed is assistance denied”.

3.6 Performance of the different actors, charity and voluntarism

Feedback from flood affectees suggested that three categories of actor performed relatively well. The initial informal response of non-institutional actors, basically the neighbours and relatives and local volunteers helped save lives and helped people cope with the first round of displacement. In the institutional response, the Pakistan Army, and to a lesser
The scope for improving the performance of the administration lies in improving links to the flood affected communities, for example through reviving local elected representatives (the Union Councillors).

extent the other services, won almost universal appreciation for their role in the rescue effort and the first rounds of relief. Local NGOs and to a lesser extent international NGOs also won accolades for their efforts to access remote and worst hit areas, including the inundated areas where incomplete evacuation meant that people were marooned. The publicity around flood response inevitably focused on the institutional effort and gave only limited recognition to the citizens’ response. This should be redressed by giving due recognition to the non-institutional response and ensuring that at least people are not over-stretched. A fair evaluation of this effort would recognize the way in which public servants did mobilize to reinforce flood defences and to channel resources to a massive displaced population. The scope for improving the performance of the administration lies in improving links to the flood affected communities, for example through reviving local elected representatives (the Union Councillors).

3.7 The sideshow of the Islamist organizations

From the onset of the floods in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa a recurrent theme raised both by the Pakistani leadership and international commentators was that of the role of welfare organizations linked to banned Islamist militant groups. One of the conclusions drawn from the 2005 earthquake response was that the militant organization Lashkar-e-Taiba successfully used the cover of a welfare wing to involve itself in rescue and relief, so as to boost its public profile and mobilize support. Given that there has been an increase in militant violence in Pakistan since the earthquake, in the wake of the 2010 flood some commentators raised the prospect of Lashkar-e-Taiba (through its assistance wing Jamaat ul Dawa) or other groups doing the same in the floods.

Overall there is no convincing evidence that militants achieved any boost to their legitimacy in the floods. Instead their role has been minor. The issue of banned organizations featured in the debate about the floods because of the centrality of terrorism issues in Pakistan’s general international dealings and not because the militants were particularly effective or visible.

The most prominent “Islamist” welfare group active in the floods was the Al Khidmat Trust. They deployed volunteers from the earliest stages, even contributing to rescue on the first day of the floods. Subsequently they established

Overall there is no convincing evidence that militants achieved any boost to their legitimacy in the floods. Instead their role has been minor. The issue of banned organizations featured in the debate about the floods because of the centrality of terrorism issues in Pakistan’s general international dealings and not because the militants were particularly effective or visible.

The most prominent “Islamist” welfare group active in the floods was the Al Khidmat Trust. They deployed volunteers from the earliest stages, even contributing to rescue on the first day of the floods. Subsequently they established
relief camps and offered medical relief. In terms of personnel deployed they were one of the larger NGOs and seemed to be well-organised and highly motivated. However Al Khidmat is linked to the Jamaat Islami, a lawful political party in Pakistan. Involvement in welfare activities is indeed consistent with one aspect of Jamaat Islami’s traditional way of doing grassroots politics. The other legal political parties, such as MQM and Tehreek Insaaf, also fielded welfare wings. Lashkar Taiba did operate in the floods and prominently displayed its original insignia of a sword, although operating under the name of Jamaat ul Dawa. However, the scale of their operations was dwarfed by the overall size of the relief effort. Jamaat ul Dawa was a small player within the relief operation and did not seem able to mobilise institutional resources which might have leveraged what was available from its own supporter base. In addition, the currently most active militant group, TTP, stood aloof from the entire relief effort. From the point of view of rule of law, the authorities have an issue to address regarding banned organizations circumventing the legal restrictions on their activities. However from the point of view of the consequences of the floods, the relief operation apparently did not provide significant opportunities for the militants to mobilize.

3.8 Experience of internally displaced camps

Life in a relief camp was central to the experience of the flood aftermath for many of those affected. At their best the camps provided a place of refuge and easy access to relief and services. But where camps were poorly run residents felt stripped of their dignity and were left at the mercy of an unreliable logistics line and erratic administration. Moreover, precisely because the relief camps were the visible face of post-flood assistance, they tended to monopolise the attention of relief providers and the administration, over-shadowing the issue of the thousands of survivors who coped outside the camps.

There is a long tradition of relief camps in Pakistan disaster response. Whether the disaster is a flood, an earthquake or an outbreak of violence, the response is always organized around camps. These camps range from small informal roadside settlements with dozens of families to large institutionalized camps housing thousands of them. Whereas most camps provide accommodation for the displaced, others just provide specialist services such as medical care and the flood also saw a mushrooming of collection points for donated relief goods, which are also known as relief camps.

In the informal relief camps people who had moved out of flooded areas simply sought out dry land close to their home villages. They established temporary settlements on the roadside or canal and river embankments or occupied public buildings such as schools. They brought whatever personal belongings they could, often including their livestock, and rigged up temporary shelters using whatever material was available. For many flood affectees these informal camps were their only place of refuge before returning home. As
As well as genuinely providing a place of shelter for those forced out of their homes by the flood water, the NGO camps provided photo opportunities, a convenient way for organizations to display the people they were helping.

As the relief operation got underway, the district administrations and relief agencies identified places where displaced people were gathered and tried to reach them with relief goods. Depending upon the availability of well-resourced organizations, in the weeks after the flood, some of the families in informal settlements received sporadic deliveries of food, tankers of water and plastic sheeting or tarpaulins to improve their shelters.

Many of the NGOs which operated in the flood tried to run fully serviced relief camps. They negotiated with private owners or government to get access to vacant patches of land, pitched tents, installed sanitation facilities and established self-contained settlements. They then opened the gates to flood displaced who were on the move, filled up their camp and sought to deliver sufficient food and relief materials to cater to all needs as long as the displaced had to stay there. Flood affectees moved into these camps precisely because the institution sponsoring the camp promised easy access to assistance. In return NGOs, private sector companies, informal welfare associations and political parties clearly used these camps as their main vehicle for publicizing the work they did in the floods. As well as genuinely providing a place of shelter for those forced out of their homes by the flood water, the NGO camps provided photo opportunities, a convenient way for organizations to display the people they were helping. Although the various organizations which moved into running the small relief camps varied in their ability to sustain a regular supply of assistance for the people they had attracted into the camps, the fundamental fact of the non-governmental relief camp effort was the relatively small number of people it catered to. They had extremely limited capacity, which meant that far more flood displaced found shelter with friends relatives and in informal settlements or in the government-administered camps, than in the NGO camps.

The majority of people who experienced life in a flood relief camp did so in a camp run by the District Administration, which emerged as the lead organization setting up and supervising camps with a capacity to accommodate hundreds or thousands of families. As the United Nations agencies started to mobilize their relief assistance, they focused their efforts on helping to service the District Administration camps and to help with provision of relief goods there. Likewise as international NGOs went into action, they took on roles supporting the District Administration and UN in taking care of the people who had been attracted into the burgeoning official camps. The official camps became the main focus of a professional relief effort, with administration and aid agencies striving to meet international norms for camp-based assistance. Although quality certainly varied, people moving into the official camps found a planned environment, where someone was trying to deliver water, sanitation facilities, shelter and food supplies according to established standards.

In comments on the experience of life in the relief camps, flood survivors have tended not to focus on the basics of food or essential services, but on issues of privacy and dignity. It is clear that many people saw the camp not so much as a shelter but as a source of entitlement.
By shifting to and staying in a camp, the survivors established their credentials as affectees and claimed entitlement to the flow of relief goods following in the wake of the flood. In the most basic case, whole families parked themselves in official camps or in strategically located (i.e. on access routes) informal camps, just to improve their chances of receiving food hand-outs.

But numerous flood victims complained about the way in which so many distributions descended into chaos. Individual philanthropists and small organizations prepared food packages or delivered other relief goods and tried to hand them out to worthy beneficiaries without the benefit of any real organization on the ground. Too often such charitable efforts degenerated into brawls or literally the “survival of the fittest” as flood victims ended up pursuing vehicles from which benefactors threw their assistance.

People who were used to working for their living were shocked to find themselves propelled into a situation where first they had to display themselves publicly, for example by camping on edge of a highway, and then they had to wrestle with their neighbours just to feed their families.

Parallel to the issue of privacy and disorder was that of proximity to their home areas. The majority of flood survivors, beyond immediate survival, were focused on returning to their home areas as soon as possible. The moment that flood waters receded, survivors started to send back family members to check on what remained of houses and to secure or retrieve possessions. They all saw the sojourn in the camps as a temporary stage prior to heading back to restart life in their permanent settlements. There was an obvious tension between survivors’ impulse to get on with picking up their lives again in home areas and the pressures on them to maintain a presence in the relief camps, remote from their home areas, so as to retain entitlement to assistance. The sheer scale and duration of the flooding were such that relief camps were the only viable option for accommodating much of the affected population. However needs varied and for many of the flood survivors relief camps were as much a brake on their recovery as they were a facility. The most obvious example of this was in the riverine floods in Nowshera and Charsadda. Here the nature of the disaster – high impact but short duration - meant that relief camps made little sense. The flood wave passing down the Kabul River and tributaries did indeed immediately render thousands homeless. But the water receded over the next week and almost all villages became accessible. Nevertheless the administration went ahead with establishing tented camps and philanthropists drove out in search of victims on the roadsides. People’s concerns for their immediate dignity and long-term well-being could far better have been accommodated if the focus for assistance had, from the outset, been on people in and close to their home areas. Even in Sindh, where standing water inevitably delayed the return to home areas, there was scope to help people closer

**Principle 4 and 8 of the UN’s Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons**

“Certain internally displaced persons, such as children, especially unaccompanied minors, expectant mothers, mothers with young children, female heads of household, persons with disabilities and elderly persons, shall be entitled to protection and assistance required by their condition and to treatment which takes into account their special needs” and “displacement shall not be carried out in a manner that violates the rights to life, dignity, liberty and security of those affected.” However, the gross misconduct of our agencies including the government directly violates these principles.
to their homes and reassure people that they would not be penalized, in terms of loss of entitlement to humanitarian assistance, for returning to their homes.

Another theme from the experience of relief camps was the difficulty which survivors experienced in caring for their livestock. The main productive assets which people struggled to save from their homesteads as they evacuated in the face of the floods were cows and buffaloes. As long as survivors stayed in informal settlements outside the main towns, they were able to forage for fodder. People either made local arrangements for grazing or commuted back to home areas, to retrieve fodder stocks, which in the riverine areas they often store in raised shelters. But as the period of displacement lengthened or as survivors were obliged to shift to the urban-based institutionalized camps, they found it impossible to retain their livestock. The impossibility of matching the demands of emergency livestock keeping with the demands of relief camp life helped drive the distress sales of livestock.

Selling off their cows and buffaloes cheaply represented the classic way in which the pressures of short term survival compromised people’s future livelihoods.

Table 7: Institutional affiliation of IDP camp managers in Sindh and IDPs they are responsible for

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Camp Manager Type</th>
<th>Number of IDPs</th>
<th>Proportion of IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil administration</td>
<td>494,627</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No camp manager mentioned</td>
<td>249,024</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>91,670</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces</td>
<td>42,845</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>38,110</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>8,917</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>91,670</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,016,863</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Table 4, Statistical analysis of camp profiling monitoring survey in Sindh Province, http://www.pakresponse.info/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=g-es0iW8psD%3d&tabid=73&mid=425
Perspectives of flood-affected communities - the case of Muzaffargarh
4.1 Introduction and methodology

This chapter presents the results of a small sample survey conducted by the Pattan research team in 15 flood-affected villages distributed across the four tehsils of Muzaffargarh District, as an additional source of insight into the perspectives of flood affectees. In depth interviews documented respondents’ experiences of coping with the floods, their perceptions of reasons for the flooding and their assessment of the performance of the range of institutional and non-institutional actors involved in flood response. Sample size was 150, consisting of 75 men and 75 women, from different households. Fifteen Union Councils were selected from the affected area of the District and 10 respondents were selected from each Union Council. The small sample size and sample design mean that confidence intervals cannot be assigned. However, the research team was confident that respondents articulated the range of opinions present in the flood affected population of the district. The results provide a meaningful representation of affectees’ experiences in one of the most affected riverine areas which, taken alongside the flood narratives, can be used to triangulate community perspectives on the flood.

4.2 Profile of the affected population

Muzaffargarh’s most defining feature is its riverine geography. It is located in the “doaba” or land enclosed by the confluence of two great rivers. The District is bounded on the west by the River Indus and on the east by the River Chenab. The district’s southernmost tip is the Panjnad, the last confluence of the Punjab’s five rivers with the Indus. The other major geographic feature is the Thal Desert in the north of district, in Muzaffargarh Tehsil. The sample was predominantly rural and includes villages in all the major ecological zones of the district. Most of the respondents in the northern tehsils of Kot Addu and Muzaffargarh live in the canal irrigated zone, something which clearly defined their experience of the floods. Respondents in the southern tehsils, in the V-upstream of the Chenab-Indus confluence mainly live beyond the canal irrigated zone – the kacha between the river bed and flood embankments and the nashaibi, above the true riverbed. In normal flood years the Muzaffargarh kacha areas expect to be flooded when the river is at peak flow. Homesteads are designed to withstand moderate flooding and communities are used to shifting to safer areas in the face of high flooding. Outside the kacha, communities expect the flood protection infrastructure and canal embankments to protect them from flooding.

The respondents in the survey were typical of the population in Southern Punjab, an area which has seen endemic poverty, but gradually expanding access to social infrastructure and some penetration of education. Although in the primarily agricultural economy cash-crops such as cotton and small scale livestock-rearing have allowed some people to achieve a standard of living just above the poverty line, the majority of respondents reported household incomes barely equivalent to $0.5 per person per day (under Rs.10,000 per month). Half of respondents were male and half female, selected from different villages. A large majority were Seraiki speakers (92%). There is still a strong gender gap in education, 53% of men describing themselves as illiterate, and 88% of women. In terms of occupation, a majority of men described themselves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tehsil</th>
<th>Canal-Irrigated</th>
<th>Desert</th>
<th>Riverine (kacha)</th>
<th>Well-Irrigated (Nashaibi)</th>
<th>Urban</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alipur</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jatoi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kot Addu</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muzaffargarh</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
as farmers (62%) or labourers (19%), with the rest involved in off-farm trades, such as mechaCNICs, electricians and drivers. Women predominantly were not directly involved in the cash economy and described themselves as housewives (63%), although 26% described themselves as farmers. In contrast, possession of Computerised National Identity Cards provides an insight into a significant change over the past decade in the way in which the genders relate to the state, even in such a relative under-developed district. A majority of both men (88%) and women (71%) had CNICs. The take-up of CNICs in predominantly illiterate rural communities is an indication of a sense of citizenship and entitlement and demonstrates that communities accept their women sharing in this entitlement. It would be entirely wrong to think of the Seraiki speakers of Southern Punjab as somehow set aside from the state and the national economy. People living in even the remotest villages interact with the state and have expectations of it.

4.3 Nature of damage and losses

The survey considered loss of household and personal assets and social infrastructure. The single greatest and most universal loss was to the housing stock. Over all 68% of respondents stated that their house was severely damaged – either destroyed or damaged beyond repair. No ecological zone was spared the damage – all four zones reported over 60% destroyed or not repairable housed. However the intensity of damage did vary between communities. Worst affected were the respondents from Jatoi tehsil, who had suffered 90% total destruction of their houses, compared to 53% in the survey as a whole. On the theme of citizenship and interaction with the state, the survey was designed to identify whether flood victims had lost important documents. In the event only some 10% reported loss of CNIC’s. Given the extent of damage to housing and the widespread possession of CNICs, this indicates that people prioritised protecting this important document. They were no doubt aware that it would be the key to entitlement during the relief stage. There were few complaints about loss of other documents.

The pattern of loss of access to public utilities also reflected the narrowness of communities’ integration with the state. Almost three quarters of respondents (73%) had lost an electricity connection. But no more than a handful had lost any other form of utility, simply because the penetration of gas, piped water and telephones in rural Muzaffargarh is minimal. Given the dependence on agricultural livelihoods, loss of irrigation infrastructure was far more important. 65% of people reported that their irrigation channels (khalay) were destroyed and 32% reported that the major structure on which they depend, the irrigation canal itself, had been damaged.

The main items of social infrastructure accessible to the rural population of Muzaffargarh are health centres and schools. Both incurred damage. However recovery
76% of respondents claimed that they did not expect the floods. The authorities did issue warnings but respondents claimed that the dissemination of flood warnings was patchy. Despite the scale of the flood waters surging south, some 35% claimed that they received no advanced warning of the flood. Even when the warning was distributed it was late in penetrating to the villages.

Floods in Muzaffargarh was inherently predictable as flood waters had travelled the length of Punjab before reaching the district. However experience of recent years was simply not a good enough basis for people to comprehend the scale of the flood waters coming and how they would reach previously safe areas. 76% of respondents claimed that they did not expect the floods. The authorities did issue warnings but respondents claimed that the dissemination of flood warnings was patchy. Despite the scale of the flood waters surging south, some 35% claimed that they received no advanced warning of the flood. Even when the warning was distributed it was late in penetrating to the villages. Only 56% of those who said they were warned received the warning a day or more before the floods hit. The most unprepared were people living in the desert area of Muzaffargarh, 60% of whom claimed that they received no warning, suggesting that the authorities too failed initially to anticipate how much bigger was the 2010 flood from what they were used to dealing with. In other ecological zones a majority of respondents acknowledged receiving a warning, with the percentage highest at 78% in the most vulnerable area, the kacha riverine. Overall the best warning seems to have operated in Muzaffargarh tehsil where 75% of respondents, amounting to almost all of those living outside of the desert, acknowledge receiving a warning.

There is a big difference between receiving a warning and being able or inclined to act upon it. Warnings need to be both timely and credible. 88 respondents, equivalent to 62% of those who were displaced from their villages, did so after the flood struck. In part the delay in people leaving the areas which were devastated by the floods is a reflection of their deep reluctance to become displaced. Hazardous as sitting in the path of the floods may be, riverine communities also consider displacement a costly and risky exercise.

### Table 9: Patterns of displacement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-institutional</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open air</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rented house</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-total non-institutional</strong></td>
<td>110</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government tent village</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government building</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO tent village</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total institutional</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total responses</strong></td>
<td>147</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Where people chose to displace to in the Muzaffargarh sample also illustrates an often over-looked aspect of the floods. Most flood victims were displaced to a non-institutional setting.
The majority of people either went to stay with relatives or simply camped out in the open, with a handful succeeding in renting houses. In reality the choices were limited.

In all ecological zones a steady proportion, of around 40% stayed with relatives and this should be thought of as the preferred option. The only respondents who had opted for accommodation in a government relief camp were in the canal-irrigated zone in northern tehsils of Muzaffargarh and Kot Addu. In the desert area a majority of people (60%) simply survived in the open (as described in the flood narratives above). Much of the media attention and indeed the focus of policy-makers have been on flood victims in a camp setting. However multiple disasters in Pakistan have shown that victims prefer to avoid the institutional setting of a camp.

Riverine communities’ attempts to avoid ending up in displaced camps are not necessarily a reflection of poor conditions in the camps. Indeed most respondents who gave feedback on the camp conditions were generally positive. In terms of overall assessment, men and women were both positive, as only one out of the 28 stated conditions were “bad”. A majority of those commenting ranked water provision, food, medical facilities, security and privacy positively (either “good” or “normal”). However there were interesting gender-based differences in the assessment of privacy and security in the tented camps. Only 2 of the 18 women who commented on the camps considered privacy arrangements “bad”. In contrast 7 of the 13 men who commented, equivalent to 54%, complained that camp privacy was “bad”. The discrepancy was similar for assessment of security. This is suggestive of men asserting a concern for female modesty beyond even that expressed by the women themselves.

4.5 Local causes of flooding and attribution of blame

The survey provides insights into the popular perceptions of the fundamental issue around the flood – how the hazard of the large volume of water passing through the river system was transformed into a disaster, with the inundation of villages and agricultural land. While specific causes varied from location to location, 68% of those venturing an opinion blamed the flood on failure of the riverine embankments. However those who attributed their woes to a break in the embankment were divided in their opinion of whether this was “natural”, through the accumulated pressure of the flood water (51%) or through outsiders’ deliberate destruction of the embankment (38%). Many people apparently were convinced by the rumours of influential figures having organized the demolition of the embankments. Far more people ventured opinions on who was responsible than actually acknowledged that their local embankment had been demolished. Respondents blamed landlords (29%), the local MNA (30%) and the local MPA (29%).

4.6 CNIC, Watan Cards, banking and house reconstruction

The Watan Card was the most important instrument for delivering relief to the household level and was supposed to be available to all households which had lost their family home, irrespective of the gender of the household head. In reality, the survey indicated that the card had been issued almost exclusively to men. 57% of men in the survey received the cards, contrasting to only 2 women, or 3%.

Within these flood affected areas and
Breach of trust: People’s experiences of the Pakistan floods

57% of men in the survey received the cards, contrasting to only 2 women, or 3%.

even allowing for the point that in effect only men stood a chance of getting Watan Cards, the card distribution was not determined by the level of damage to family houses. Only 61% of the 41 men who described their houses as having been totally destroyed received cards. This was only marginally higher than the 47-48% of the residents of partially destroyed houses who received cards. Despite the popular belief that owning a damaged house was the main criterion for inclusion in the Watan Card scheme, according to the scheme design all residents of these flood affected communities should have received them. The single most widespread explanation for non receipt was that men did not have CNICs. This provided a classic example of how the CCNIC has started to become a badge of citizenship and entitlement, with the corollary that those who fail to obtain the card or face complications such as working and residing far from their original domicile, can easily be excluded. The majority of men who did not receive a Watan Card simply stated that they did not know why they had not been granted it. However flood affectees’ tales of the procedural difficulties in obtaining cards provide at least a clue to how men, and thus households, were left out. 65% of those who eventually obtained cards complained of some level of difficulty in obtaining them. This suggests that at least some percentage of those who did not receive cards simply failed to overcome the procedural hurdles that the recipients complained of. More positively, the Watan Card scheme seemed relatively impervious to corruption, as only 5 of the 44 recipients reported having paid bribes to receive their card.

Table 10: Stated reasons for not receiving Watan Card (male)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cannot explain why not</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having CNIC of another city</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in possession of CNIC</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political rivalry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Men Not Receiving Card</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Procedural difficulties in obtaining Watan Card

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Procedural Difficulties Faced by Watan Card Holders</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To some extent</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Receiving Watan Cards</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents’ experience of banking technology also suggests that by and large they were able to overcome the problems of accessing banking services in rural Punjab. For starters, banks have already penetrated such rural areas. Some 12% of both male and female respondents reported that they had bank accounts before the flood. When it came to using the Watan Card, they had to travel varying distances. Over half of the Watan Card owners were able to access an ATM within 20 miles of their homes. However at the top end 4 holders claimed to have travelled over
fifty miles to find the ATM. Over three quarters of the Watan Card holders had to seek assistance in operating the ATM (36 out of 10).

Table 12: Access to bank facilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distance from Home to ATM</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 to 5 miles</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 to 10 miles</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 to 20 miles</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 50 miles</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 50 miles</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main post-flood cash requirement faced by most Watan Card recipients was rebuilding their houses. However, in the event the single instalment of relief assistance provided in 2010 was simply not relevant to house rebuilding. 80 out of 81 respondents who commented on the issue stated that the funds provided under the Watan Card scheme were inadequate for their house reconstruction needs. It is therefore unsurprising that over half of the men who received Watan Cards said that they had delayed their house reconstruction, while only a third said that they had rebuilt one quarter of their homes. Of the 26 affectees who stated their other sources of funding for house-building, the largest proportion (12) had sold off animals to cover the cost of rebuilding and the second largest proportion (9) had taken loans. Other minor sources of finance were NGO assistance, labouring income and savings.

Table 13: Progress on house reconstruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House-Building by the Watan Card Recipients (male)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did not build</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built 25%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built 50%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built 75%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built 100%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Watan Card Recipients (male)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those who had received their Watan Cards had a range of experiences of the reality of the scheme. More than half of card holders reported that they had been able to obtain their instalment “easily” or “very easily” (28 out of 44). Although people mentioned difficulties in operating the card, most of these difficulties related to congestion rather than fundamental flaws in the scheme operation.

Table 14: Difficulties faced by Watan Card holders in accessing funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Difficulties</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long queues and rush of people</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited money in the ATM machine</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police action</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having to go to the bank multiple times</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An interesting insight into people’s perceptions of the way the Watan Card scheme operates was provided by those who had not received cards. Of the 24 stating what they were doing to pursue their claim for a Watan Card, 22 said that they were “requesting influential persons”. Despite the attempts to roll out the Watan Card scheme as one of universal entitlement for citizens who had lost houses in the flood, those who failed to get the cards initially resorted to patronage networks to seek redress.

4.7 Crime, dignity and social relations

One of the concerns expressed during the floods was of a partial break down of social order, associated with the uprooting of much of the population from their home setting, the disruption of livelihoods and the anarchic system for relief distribution. The survey respondents provided some evidence for this. In the most concrete terms social disorder manifested itself in a perceived proliferation of theft. Some 67% of respondents claimed that there had been an increase in the inci-
Despite the attempts to roll out the Watan Card scheme as one of universal entitlement for citizens who had lost houses in the flood, those who failed to get the cards initially resorted to patronage networks to seek redress.

Table 15: Perceptions of why INGOs help?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perceptions</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In accordance with their belief in humanity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To reduce our problems</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To maintain dominance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To dispose of excess money</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They do not assist</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: Effect on attitude of experience of INGO assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect on attitude of experience of INGO assistance</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Effect</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

dence of theft and armed robbery in the wake of the floods. This perceived crime wave was worst in the most developed of the tehsils Kot Addu, where 82% (41 out of 50) of respondents believed there has been an increase in robberies.

4.8 Agricultural inputs and agricultural recovery

The main livelihoods rehabilitation programme which was implemented in Muzaffargarh was the distribution of agricultural inputs to flood affectees. Despite being fundamental to the process of rural recovery the inputs distribution programme was a well kept secret, with remarkably low levels of awareness. Only 30% of the respondents acknowledged having information about the inputs programme and only 25 people in the overall survey, equivalent to one sixth, actually received the seeds and fertilizers package. They reported that they received a standard package of one 50kg sack of seed and one of urea fertilizer per assessed acre. However, distribution was very patchy. The inputs were only provided to men and reached a minority (20 out of 46) of the male respondents who described themselves as farmers. A smaller group of 5 men who did not even describe themselves as farmers also acknowledged receiving the inputs package.

The main problem of the seeds and fertilizers programme was the limited coverage. Despite a few complaints regarding inconvenience, the feedback from those who availed of it can be characterized as relatively positive. Over half of the recipients (14 out of 25) claimed that it was “easy” or “very easy” to obtain the inputs. The complaints they mentioned were mainly to do with inconvenience. As in the case of the Watan Cards, the main complaint recipients cited was the rush of beneficiaries at the distribution outlet. The small sample contained in the survey suggests that the scheme passed muster on the issue which has discredited previous seed distribution schemes. Participating farmers responded positively on the quality of the seed received (22 out of 25 described seed as “good” or “very good”) and on its germination (23 out of 25).

4.9 Recovery expectations

Survey respondents were asked to identify their remaining needs for recovery. Responses indicated that they were concerned about a clearly defined handful of core needs. The single most common need identified was for cash (90 respondents, equivalent to 60% of the total). Second most frequently mentioned was house rebuilding assistance (32 respondents or 21%). Otherwise the only significant expectations mentioned were for food assistance, employment and business start-up assistance.

4.10 Attitudes to INGOs

For many thousands of residents of rural Muzaffargarh the floods and relief assistance provided their first encounter with international assistance agencies. Despite the coordination and management issues around the assistance programme, addressed elsewhere in the report, the encounter was broadly positive. Survey respondents provide some evidence for a “hearts and minds” effect in that a large majority of respondents ascribed positive motives to the international assistance provided. People also reported that their attitudes to these international agencies for the future would either be unaffected by the encounter (30%) or affected positively. The tentative picture this presents of warmth towards a vaguely understood “international community” contrasts sharply with the fears that some commentators raised at the start of the floods, that inability of government to cope would leave the field open for Isla mist charities to win hearts and minds.
4.11 Attitudes to external actors and political representatives

People in Muzaffargarh came to remarkably differing conclusions about who was overall to blame for the devastation in the flood disaster. The sharpest difference was between male and female perceptions. The majority of woman respondents concluded that nature alone was to blame and they did not single out any human agency as being involved. In contrast the majority of men (58%) respondents concluded that the flood damage was indeed due to human agency.

(Responses coded as “nature” where respondent only mentioned nature and “human agency” where respondent mentioned one or more human agents and did not mention nature).

Those who had a more political understanding of the floods, in the sense that they did not solely blame nature, were also divided in who they considered responsible. However the most frequently mentioned villains, on whom people blamed the floods were “influential landlord-politicians” (considered by 22% of respondents to have caused the flood destruction).

Table 17: Who respondents blame overall for the flood disaster

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency blamed</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influential landlord-politicians</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal government</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial government</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defective development policies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation Department &amp; non-maintained dykes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the most strongly expressed opinions in the whole survey concerned the role of political representatives in aid distribution. 148 people, equivalent to 99% of respondents, stated that the elected MPA or MNA and political parties failed to distribute aid fairly. The prevailing sentiment was that elected representatives use the process of aid distribution to engage in patronage politics, rewarding supporters, rather than distributing according to needs-based entitlements, even though many of those expressing this sentiment may have had little or no exposure to political relief distributions. In line with this, a paltry 17 respondents, equivalent to 11%, acknowledged that at least one of their elected representatives had managed to visit the community during the flood emergency. The perception of inaccessibility seems to have contributed to the popular cynicism regarding elected representatives. The respondents made it clear that they considered the neglect by their elected representatives as unacceptable but not inevitable and they illustrated clearly how this could be expressed in terms of electoral accountability. They stated that if there were a new general election there would be a strong anti-incumbency vote. Overwhelmingly respondents said that they would vote against the individual candidates who represented them in the Provincial and National Assemblies (91% of respondents).

Table 18: Whether people blame disaster on nature or human agency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Blame Nature</th>
<th>Blame Human Agency</th>
<th>Blame both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Unsurprisingly, 77% of respondents reckoned that their problems would have been somewhat alleviated if the local government bodies had been active at the time of the floods. Similarly, 82% of respondents said that they favoured immediate local government elections, to fill the void in local representation.

Table 19: Whether in new election respondents would vote for the same party?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voting Intention</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable (did not vote previously)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20: Whether in new election respondents would vote for the same candidate?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voting Intention</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable (did not vote previously)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Slightly more cautiously, respondents expressed confidence in elected local government. Because the elected local bodies established under Pervaiz Musharraf have been suspended in Punjab and no new election has been held, local government in Muzaffargarh at the time of the floods was defunct. When it operated, local government provided the lowest and most accessible tiers of elected representatives as directly elected Union Council members were elected at the village cluster or Union Council level. Unsurprisingly, 77% of respondents reckoned that their problems would have been somewhat alleviated if the local government bodies had been active at the time of the floods. Similarly, 82% of respondents said that they favoured immediate local government elections, to fill the void in local representation.

Table 21: Whether functional local government would have made it easier to cope with the flood?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes, much easier</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes, somewhat easier</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.12 Assessment of government departments

In the course of the floods and their aftermath residents of Muzaffargarh encountered a wide range of institutions, public and private, humanitarian and political, which had some impact on their lives as they struggled to recover. Respondents voiced strong opinions about the performance of this range of institutions, as well as the non-institutional sources of assistance. Each respondent was asked to give an approval rating of the range of institutions, on the basis of which all institutions were ranked. The ranking provides a stark representation of the tenor of the conversations which surveyors held across Muzaffargarh. The first finding is that some institutions do enjoy a positive reputation, primarily those with a solid track record of delivering services. This cuts across the government and non-government sectors, hence both NGOs as a whole and the (government) Health Department had a positive approval rating while other government departments that people considered had been unhelpful in the floods, such as WAPDA, had a low approval rating. Secondly, the Pakistan Army features as one of the institutions with a positive approval rating (although not quite the most popular!) The positive response of the Muzaffargarh residents suggests that the Army succeeded in rebuilding its public reputation through the rapid mobilization for the initial rescue phase, followed
by its high profile involvement in delivering relief assistance. The third significant finding from the approval ratings is that respondents acknowledged the contribution of the “non-institutional” response – their friends and relatives. From narratives of what happened in the flood aftermath it is clear that people first of all depended upon their social networks. The first round of assistance, including rescue, food and shelter, was often provided not by institutions, but through these informal networks. Respondents also had a decidedly unsentimental response to the individuals who helped them out – although respondents appreciated friends and relatives more than most other institutions, the approval ratings were just under 50%.

The fourth significant finding from the approval ratings is the discrepancy between the levels of satisfaction expressed with religious parties versus other political parties. Whereas political parties as a whole were ranked dismally as one of the least popular institutions in the floods, a quarter of respondents were satisfied with the religious parties. This probably reflects a residual impression that the religious parties are more moral and inclined to deliver welfare to the deserving than the secular parties, which are tainted with association with complaints of corruption and patronage. The fifth significant finding is that what remains of local governments (the former Nazims and the district government institutions) still enjoys a higher approval rating than the federal and provincial government or representatives elected to them. The woefully low approval rating of the MPAs and MNAs is indicative of a serious level of dissatisfaction with elected representatives, perhaps with the “political class” as a whole, rather than just the individuals who happen to represent the district.

Finally, the federal level body which is supposed to be coordinating disaster response simply has no public profile at the level of Muzaffargarh. Two thirds of those surveyed simply declined to comment when asked whether they were satisfied with NDMA performance.

### Table 22: Ranking of institutions by approval ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health Dept</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNO</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Parties</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Department</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAPDA</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Government</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Department</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landlords</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazim</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigation Department</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDMA</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNA</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Department</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the most strongly expressed opinions in the whole survey concerned the role of political representatives in aid distribution. 148 people, equivalent to 99% of respondents, stated that the elected MPA or MNA and political parties failed to distribute aid fairly. The prevailing sentiment was that elected representatives use the process of aid distribution to engage in patronage politics, rewarding supporters, rather than distributing according to needs-based entitlements, even though many of those expressing this sentiment may have had little or no exposure to political relief distributions.

The fifth significant finding is that what remains of local governments (the former Nazims and the district government institutions) still enjoys a higher approval rating than the federal and provincial government or representatives elected to them.
سیزی روز سیاست نہ تھا کی بھیڑا گئی بس میران دو کھیل
ساذا نیل ناکے بلن نقشان نہیں تول ابیزہ بس نقشان دو کھیل
ود رسین کل نئے ہری کے بھیڑا حل دیک ایوان دو کھیل
بھیڑا نہیں اعلان بجاوت دا کول شو کھشسر اعلان دو کھیل
نواب مغفور (مظفرگر)
5 Issues, Gaps and Concerns
5.1 The institutional infrastructure – the issue of local government

The experience of the flood operation exposed a major lacuna in the institutional infrastructure, the lack of functional local government. Constitutional reform has passed responsibility for local government to the provinces. All provinces have chosen to disband the elected local governments which they inherited from General Musharraf’s period in government and have delayed legislating for the replacement and holding elections. The local government system introduced under General Musharraf provided for directly elected councils in the lowest administrative unit, the union council. Union councils are essentially village clusters, with a standardized population size around 25,000. In their final version they had 13 elected councillors, including a quota of women. Their Nazim (chairmen) and deputies then formed the sub-district (tehsil) and district councils and the members formed an electoral college to elect the District Nazim, who was the most powerful elected local representative. While the local government was in operation, many union councils achieved a surprising level of activity, with the councillors becoming involved in lobbying for better performance of government services, local dispute resolution and other worthy causes. The absence of such a grassroots cadre, in touch with the population and empowered to speak for them was sorely felt throughout the flood experience.

The administration faced as much of a challenge in interacting with the population as it did in dealing with the water or the infrastructure. The range of tasks in which intermediaries for interaction between the administration and the population were required included the dissemination of warnings and organization of evacuation, organization of people inside settlements or camps and of services within the camps, articulation of needs, identification of beneficiaries and helping people to comply with the requirements of assistance schemes.

In the absence of the union councillors, for outreach work the district administration mainly had to rely on lower level revenue officials (patwaris). The patwaris are inadequate substitutes for local elected representatives. Although patwaris are intimately familiar with the areas they are responsible for, because their primary role is as guardians of the land register, they are not accountable to the community and have not traditionally taken on the kind of all-round quasi social worker role that union councillors were developing for themselves. Another key feature of the local government system is that the Union Councils are based on “multi-member constituencies”. Residents have a choice of which councillor they may approach, which provides an important check against factionalism. The other institution many district administrations turned to was the NGOs. Although there are many good examples of NGOs performing a social mobilization role on behalf of the administration, their coverage is ad hoc and never as comprehensive as the local government.

The only elected representatives available to the population in the flooded areas were the MPAs and MNAs. Some of these elected politicians certainly did lobby hard for their constituents. However, reporting from the flooded areas turned up multiple complaints by affectees about the inaccessibility of their MNAs or MPAs or about them practicing gross patronage by favouring some parts of the constituency over others. The union councillors would have been better qualified to serve as community representatives because of the small size of their constituencies, because they tended to live in the communities they serve rather than the provincial metropolis and because they tended to be from a similar class background to the majority of their constituents.
5.2 What it means for poverty

The most likely lasting effect of the floods has been exacerbation of poverty. Within the massive area that they affected, floods have managed to undo much if not all of the last decade’s gains in poverty alleviation.

Floods have firstly contributed to material poverty. They have stripped households of their productive assets, robbed them of livelihood opportunities and pushed them into debt. The most significant productive asset which many affectees have lost is livestock, (despite heroic efforts to save them). This is significant because one of the most successful ways in which large numbers of Pakistanis edged across the poverty line over the past decade has been in small scale livestock keeping. Some lost their animals in the initial floods. But many who managed to extricate their animals from the flood waters found it impossible to obtain fodder or to care for them in their displaced settlements. They therefore sold the animals off. However because of the flood, purchasers have been looking for distress prices and so livestock owners have received a fraction of the animals’ pre-flood price. The floods have disrupted other livelihood opportunities in the affected areas, hurting all classes. Other off farm enterprises, such as retailing or oil presses were disrupted where people lost their stock or equipment. The loss of the cotton crop is very significant from the point of view of poverty alleviation.

5.3 Public order and crime

One set of narratives from the flood tells of social solidarity, as neighbours, relatives and strangers gave generously to those affected by the flood – sheltering the displaced in their houses, feeding them and at times risking life and limb to take part in the rescue effort. However, from the earliest stage of the flood, a counter-narrative also emerged, of how some exploited the opportunity for crime presented by the flood. Displaced returning to their houses, which they had abandoned in the face of rising flood waters, found that household belongings had been looted. The fear of such looting constrained people from abiding by flood warnings, obliging them to leave some of the men behind to try to guard houses and farms. Indeed it was this sense of insecurity which made it so difficult for the authorities to persuade the populace to comply with evacuation orders in so many districts.

But even when people had moved out to safer areas beyond the reach of the floods, there was a series of public order incidents. Aid convoys were looted en route to distribution points, resulting in targeted beneficiaries being left without assistance and forcing aid agencies to abandon their distribution plans. At distribution points aid agencies found themselves overwhelmed by crowds of people trying to grab the aid goods, which also rendered it impossible to ensure orderly and fair distribution.

A far larger body of complaints about aid misappropriation related to diversion by those either charged with undertaking the distribution or protecting it – where
Breach of trust: People’s experiences of the Pakistan floods

they deliberately provided goods to non-entitled, or harassed the flood affec-tees and sought bribes to allow them to receive their entitlement. The multiple experiences of direct and indirect theft of the belongings or entitlements of those affected by the flood highlighted the importance of population protection within the overall flood response. Things worked better where community leaders among the flood affec-tees had a role in helping

maintain public order and ensuring that the vulnerable received their allotted share. The assistance process also worked better where aid organizations accepted responsibility for making robust arrangements for a dignified and fair distribution.

Although maintaining public order during emergencies and mass displacement has always been an issue, some of the commentary on disturbances during the 2010 flood season suggested that the situation had deteriorated relative to previous disasters. Apparently, increasing numbers of people are prepared to seize the opportunity provided by the population upheaval to loot the property of the displaced or relief goods. The following case study of Ghauspur in Kashmore illustrates a “worst case scenario” in which the breach flood precipitated a two day campaign of

looting in the flooded town. Local informants were convinced that the long run erosion of the rule of law, combined with the hardening of religious intolerance and weakening of the position of traditional community leaders created a situation in which both organized criminals and opportunists systematically looted the property of the local Hindu community.

The manager of the Ghauspur Hindu mandir, Naz, describes his community’s long roots in the town, their role in contemporary Ghauspur and how the looters systematically targeted the community once floods hit.

“There are 250 families in the community. The mandir has a history of 180 years. It was associated with Shah Ghaus Jilani, who is reputed to have requested Hindus to join his Muslim settlement in today’s Ghauspur. The mandir was a wide following, with some of the Hindus who migrated from the area still retaining their links to it. The third guddi nishin was Baba Gharibdas, the most famous of 5.

As a sign of the communal harmony normally present in Ghauspur, the people of the two communities visit each other’s places of worship and participate in each other’s celebrations.

The Hindu community is 90% business people, with 10% salaried employees. Their businesses include general store, doctor, medical store, mobile phone shop and karyana shop.

During the peak of the floods about 50 Hindus stayed on in Ghauspur and 250 Muslims. They stayed on their roofs. I was in Kandhkot on the day the flood hit.

The flood marked the start of a two day general rampage. Gangs of men headed for the Hindu businesses and started breaking open the shutters to get in and loot them. They targeted general stores, cloth shops and food shops. This rampage went on for two days, with the gangsters

Aid convoys were looted en route to distribution points, resulting in targeted beneficiaries being left without assistance and forcing aid agencies to abandon their distribution plans.
carrying away everything they could find.

We went to the DPO and the Rangers. I was camped outside the DPO office pleading for assistance, but being steadfastly ignored. We immediately put the story in the media and contacted our local MPA. Eventually after two days the army and the rangers agreed to move to Ghouspur. But by then our community had been 80% looted.

The people who were involved were mainly driven by criminality – they were out for personal gain. But it was the Hindus they targeted. As well as our shops and warehouses they broke into our houses. They stole ACs and TVs from the houses. They stole sacks of wheat, flour and fertilizer from our stores.

They carried away whatever they were able to. They brought boats to ferry the loot off across the flood waters.

Their targeting principle was that they hit all Hindus, plus weak Muslims. They left alone the properties belonging to powerful Muslims – basically they went after people who could do nothing back to them.

Before the flood hit everyone was worried about their lives, more than their property. People had sent their families away to safer places, three days before the flood hit.

The situation was complicated by the disruption of communication which accompanied the flood. Mobile phones were down. To be able to talk from Ghouspur, people climbed onto the roof of the mandir, to be able to pick up the signal from antenna in Ghotki on the other side of the river.

The volunteers who stayed in the mandir shifted all their food supplies onto the roof and slept up there. The water around the building was 5 feet deep.”

When I was lobbying for help the army kept me outside their officer’s door for 20 minutes. I was emotional and crying. They dismissed me saying I should just go and see the DCO.

I finally got to see Col. Sheryar. But he too said he was under the authority of the DCO and so would require written instructions from the DCO if he was to do anything. All I asked for was one vehicle with 12 men.

People also came from the nearby villages. I recognize them as I deal with them every day in my shop.

One of the Muslims tried to save us. Liaqat Badshah picked up a Koran and stood in front of the mob pleading with them to go home. They simply ignored him and carried on looting.

When law and order was restored we got 32 of them arrested. But they all got bail and were back on the street within a week. All their names are recorded in the thana (police station). We identified the people who had taken part and went along with the Rangers to raid their houses. We recovered lots of stolen property from their houses. Of course when this happened the looters got angry. They shouted out that we shall not let banyas raid our houses.

The Rangers contingent was commanded by a Captain Manzoor, from Moro.

A tribal system prevails here. Criminals here have zero fear of the police as they are confident that the police are powerless to do anything to them. They are only frightened of the Rangers and Army, who are not cowed down by the Sindhi tribes.

The losses we sustained were in crores. For example we lost Rs.20 lakhs just from three warehouses belonging to Seth Roshan Lal, our largest shopkeeper.

On the basis of this experience we have decided that in future we shall not leave. We shall stay and resist. The political leaders have frequently visited our town. We have petitioned them to have a rangers post established here. They agree but do nothing. A Rangers piquet in our area might have prevented the episode.”

The following case study of Ghouspur in Kashmore illustrates a “worst case scenario” in which the breach flood precipitated a two day campaign of looting in the flooded town. Local informants were convinced that the long run erosion of the rule of law, combined with the hardening of religious intolerance and weakening of the position of traditional community leaders created a situation in which both organized criminals and opportunists systematically looted the property of the local Hindu community.
One of the local Hindu businessmen, Seth Duwarkar Mithawala, who was present in Ghouspur throughout the episode, described his experience of the looting.

“I have a sweet shop and a wholesale sugar business. I stayed here throughout the flood and looting. The looters even came to the mandir to eat from our langar. Through the days of the flood we were feeding 200 people. The rangers, police and army all fed here. The looters were predominantly townspeople. People I recognized included men from the Sheikh, Mirani and Jagirani communities.

One of the reasons that things got out of control was that most of the Syeds were not present. They are normally responsible for community leadership among the Muslims. Perhaps if the Syed biraderi had been here they might have been able to stop it. But they too were worried for their lives.

When the flood hit there were only four policemen in the whole town – the SHO, a subedar and their two guards. There should have been 50 men. Even when people did get arrested, they paid money to officials after a couple of weeks to get out.

On the third day the rangers and army camped in the mandir and the police came back on duty.

In the 1996 flood there was no looting here.

We wonder what happened between 1996 and 2011 to make people respond to similar circumstances in such different ways. Why did they loot in 2011? I believe that the increase in religious prejudice in the intervening period is one factor which prompted this looting.

We went through 55 days of hell, which is how long the road was closed. We used to burn up 100 litres of fuel for our generator per day. We had to ferry this in by boat.

The Shikarpur – Ghouspur road opened after two and a half months. The Kandhkot – Ghouspur road opened after three and a half months.

The looters of course gave the excuse that the goods were going to be destroyed anyway – they were helping themselves to abandoned property. But they were armed. There were two or three AK47s. Lots of people were armed with lathis (batons), pistols, shotguns and knives. The other key implement they had was heavy duty cutters. They used these for simply snapping all our locks. Chinese locks are in general use in our town and the heavy cutters just snapped them open effortlessly. Where did ordinary people get such tools from? The possession of these cutters showed clear criminal intent.”

Nazr Mohammad Shah of Ghouspur

Nazr Mohammad is a member of the local Syed community. With their spiritual status, the community has long acted as community leaders and specialized in conflict resolution. They act as a link between the local Hindu community and the majority Muslims. But in this outbreak of disorder it seemed that there was little they could do. Nazr offers what could be described as the sympathetic Muslim voice. However in explaining the changes which made the attack on the Hindus possible he emphasizes the growth in general criminality, reluctant to consider whether the violence might also be associated with a growth in religiosity.

“People’s mindset has changed. They have become more criminal. The government’s writ has weakened. If people thought that a criminal would be punished they would think twice before offending. But this is not the case.

The reason is that the people totally disregard the police. The police are frightened of criminals rather than the other way round. Local police have the most reason to fear criminals as criminals can come after them.

There are some logistical differences between 1996 and 2011. For starters in 1996
the roads were not blocked. And the police community was in place. 

The criminals have no religion or humanity. 

The looting was started by professional criminals. They are the ones who were equipped to break open locks and take away all the best stuff on day one. Then the poor, non-criminal element joined in too. They were just thinking of their stom-achs.

The police picked up the poorest among the looters. The Hindus know the names of the real people who orchestrated the looting but they will not take their names out of fear. These are influential people. 

In terms of tribe, one of the tribes most involved was the Ogai. They live outside the town and tend to be uneducated, doing farm labour, tending animals and engaged in petty crime. They have a plentiful supply of weapons. Although the Ogai are basically a criminal tribe, they do have a few links to the local deobandis. There is a religious element. 

For example on another occasion the SHO picked up a couple of the Ogai. Within two hours their tribe had surrounded the thana. They broke into the place and rescued their men from the lock up.

The Ogai have plenty of practice in confronting the Hindu shopkeepers. They simply walk into a shop and do something like pick up a pair of shoes. When the Hindu shopkeeper asks them for money they ask “Who are you to demand my money?” Honest people, after this experience of the floods, have to think of moving elsewhere.

Since the floods the Hindus have restarted their businesses but they have deliberately held back from investing on the same level as previously. They have to consider their options for moving elsewhere.”

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5.4 Controversies around the breaches

Flood management at the local level is highly politicized. Decisions on where the water should go – whether embankments should be reinforced or breached – determine whose assets are destroyed and whose are protected. During the peak season, in August, in a series of instances, influential landowners were accused of dictating to the Irrigation Department where they should make breaches, so as to protect their land. For example in the flooding of Muzaffargarh, the Khosa clan was accused of ensuring the breach was made in such a way as to flood small holders’ land rather than their own. In the moves to protect Jacobabad, local MNA Ijaz Jakrani was accused of ensuring that a breach was made to deflect the flood water towards Baluchistan. In Sindh it was widely believed that there was a viable option to breach the Indus on the left bank at Ali Wahn and allow the excess flood water to pass safely through an old river course. The proponents of the Ali Wahn theory argue that the provincial leadership, to protect assets on the left bank, including agro-industry in Khairpur and the army cantonment in Pano Aqil...
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Since the floods the Hindus have restarted their businesses but they have deliberately held back from investing on the same level as previously. They have to consider their options for moving elsewhere.

decided against the Ali Wahn breach. This then precipitated the right bank breach which occurred at Tori Bund and proved so destructive.

In all prominent cases where political interference in breaching was alleged, the Irrigation Department countered with an alternative explanation, either that the breaching was unintended rather than deliberate, or that it was justified.

A main focus of the Supreme Court’s commission of inquiry into the floods was the issue of responsibility for major breaches. The commission visited the sites of the breaches, including Abbas Wala Bund at Taunsa and Tori Bund in Kashmore. The commission found that there had been more sins of omission than of commission in the breaching of the major embankments. It did not accept that either Abbas Bund or Tori Bund had been deliberately breached. However the commission found that that the irrigation personnel responsible for maintaining the failed bunds, both before and during the flood season, were culpable. Tori Bund had been allowed to deteriorate over the years to the point where it was below the required height and therefore vulnerable to being over-topped. The authorities in Thatta had ample time to reinforce their embankments before the arrival of the super flood. But their failure to do so led to the flooding of a whole taluka (Sujawal) and almost led to the flooding of Thatta City.

The flood inquiry commission convened by the Supreme Court represented a rare exercise in transparency and accountability with regard to the performance of institutions involved in flood management. However, it was unable to engage with the level of flood decision-making where the authorities actively manage the infrastructure. The commission found that the major breaches which occurred happened because of failure of the infrastructure rather than because of deliberate decisions to breach them. The commission therefore was spared the responsibility of assessing the decision making process for breaching. But flood affectees’ testimony provided multiple examples of the deliberate breaching of secondary infrastructure. Many of these breaches were prompted by the challenge of coping with the water introduced into pucca areas by the failure of the primary infrastructure. The Johi case study illustrates how the fate of small towns in the flood plain depends upon decisions taken regarding breaching of embankments in the surrounds. Dadu was a classic example of how the administration had to take successive breaching decisions to protect small towns such as Mehar and then to route the Manchar Lake water towards the Indus. The fate of much of Sehwan depended upon where and when the administration would breach Manchar.

Living with the consequences of multiple administration decisions about where to breach and where to reinforce was a fundamental part of the experience of floods as described by survivors in places such as Rajanpur, Kashmore and Dadu. The accounts cited in this report indicate that multiple actors were involved, both civilian and military and that affectees consid-
erected the decision-making process far from transparent. If the Supreme Court process had been able to probe one level deeper it would have found the kind of tension between “political” and “technical” flood management decisions implied by the commission’s terms of reference. As an illustration of how opaque decision making could become one can consider the case of the BHP multinational oil and gas project, located close to the MNV Drain in Dadu. Local activists in Dadu claimed, with an interesting set of supporting facts (but no conclusive proof), that the administration deliberately delayed breaching the MNV so as to increase the threat of flooding to the BHP camp and blackmail them into making a protection payment. An Executive Engineer, briefing on the flood management decisions in Sindh said that they had predominantly been taken on political rather than technical grounds and this had greatly increased the total damage done, while protecting certain favoured constituencies. There is a need to extend the transparency exercise launched by the Flood Commission to the management of the secondary infrastructure and the multiple breaching decisions.

5.5 The issue of flood plain management

The flood provided a classic example of the failure of planning and regulation, which manifest itself in different ways in the highlands and across the flood plain. Many of the losses in the flood occurred where people had settled in known high risk areas. In the flood plain the kacha areas are now densely settled, meaning that the population can expect to be flooded whenever the rivers rise. The traditional kacha communities cope with this by local mitigation measures. They use raised homestead as protection against normal floods but are prepared to shift themselves and livestock to high ground when facing a full flood. And they avoid invest-
In the flood plain the kacha areas are now densely settled, meaning that the population can expect to be flooded whenever the rivers rise.

able, to protect their investment.

In the highlands, such as in the Swat Valley, there is a far smaller natural flood plain and far less scope or pressure for developing full settlements inside the river banks. However the flood exposed a pattern of private (hotel) and public (bridges) development in vulnerable parts of the river. Massive damage was done where the river reclaimed the area that should never have been developed.

The extreme proposals on flood zoning have called for restriction on settlement within the flood plain. However the sheer volume of population which is now settled in the Punjab and Sindh kacha indicates that it is entirely unrealistic to plan for depopulation. Communities which have settled there have no realistic alternative to the livelihoods developed along the river. Any zoning should take account for the fact that people will continue to live in close proximity to the rivers. Instead zoning should penalize development which exacerbates flood risks faced by others. This suggests an end to zamindari bunds and commercial housing settlements. Instead flood zoning should reinforce traditional mitigation strategies such as establishment of local flood shelters and protection of riverine forests, and discourage the kind of reckless construction which was destroyed in Swat.

The development of public infrastructure in the flood plain also had a significant impact on the experience of floods. The design of the motorway embankments was a case in point. On the one hand there were claims that the embankments interrupted the natural flow of the water and raised the flood levels in areas adjoining the motorways. On the other hand road and rail embankments were the main source of high ground for temporary displacement in the low-lying areas. The implication is that design of road embankments should take into account their flood role as shelters, ensuring that they are accessible to riverine communities and their animals.

5.6 Understanding the causes of the floods

Numerous commentators tried to identify causes of the floods which could be addressed by preventive measures. One set of analyses focused on watershed management issues and the high rate of deforestation in catchment areas such as Hazara and Swat. The argument is that failure to protect forests has increased the run off rate from precipitation on the mountains. And an important secondary impact of the deforestation was the damage done to bridges from logs washed down by the rivers. Although there is a strong environmental case for addressing deforestation, no one was able to prove the case that even a healthy level of forest cover would have been sufficient to protect Pakistan from damage done by a flood of the intensity seen in 2010.

Another set of analyses blamed the fundamental riverine management system for the floods, suggesting that the network of storage reservoirs, barrages and embankments turned the flood hazard into a vulnerability. This argument went in two directions. One position argued that the problem was inadequate storage in the system, something which should be rectified by a new round of dam building. The controversial proposal for establishment of another large dam in Kalabagh was again raised in discussion of the floods. Given that Mangla and Tarbela were full to capacity soon after the initial flood surge, it was argued that an additional dam could have regulate the release of water into the lower reaches of the river system and thus reduced the downstream peak flow. The other and even more controversial direction of this argument suggested that the problem was the embankments – that the attempts to confine the rivers within embankments was doomed to failure and flood intensity could have been reduced by allowing the rivers to flow unimpeded through the flood plain. Although in principle a development plan
for the plains could be conceived without major flood works, it is unlikely that such a system could accommodate the level of human settlement and range of agricultural and industrial activity which is now located along the Sindh and Punjab rivers. The answer to the challenge of reducing flood vulnerabilities lies in improved management of the embankments and a sustained programme of developing storage capacity to replace that lost to sedimentation and silting.

The important conclusion drawn from the climate models is that global climate change is likely to increase the frequency of extreme flooding. The 2010 flood was referred to as a once in a century event. However climate change is likely to reduce the return time for such an event, meaning that there is a significantly increased risk of Pakistan experiencing floods on the scale of 2010. There is little alternative to improved preparedness and mitigation and an overhaul of the public infrastructure management to reduce the incidence of failures such as those experienced in Taunsa.

5.7 Political mobilisation by flood affectees

One of the recurrent themes which emerges from testimony of people who lived through the floods and from journalists and thinking aid workers is that many affectees refused to become simply victims or passive recipients of assistance. The impressive tales of how people responded to the disaster are those of active agency – in which people describe how they took care of their own rescue, how they organized their own flood defences, how they made their own temporary accommodation arrangements and how they got on with rebuilding their own houses, not allowing themselves to be overly swayed by the promises that someone else would pay for it or do it for them. Beyond the practical mutual self-help, flood affectees also seized the opportunity to agitate for their rights and hold the administration to account for promises made and not delivered. The ultimate manifestation of active agency among flood affectees came when they launched the Tehreek Bahalia Sailab Zadgan (TBSZ) – the Movement for Rehabilitation of Flood Afectees. This movement, most active in Muzaffargarh, Multan, Rajanpur and Layyah, articulated affectee demands and highlighted the failure of district and federal authorities in stewardship of the assistance programme.

The most concrete demand on which the Movement focused was that the government should proceed with second payment on the Watan Card scheme – the promised Rs.100,000 as compensation for damage to housing. Beyond this the Movement provided a platform for its members to air multiple grievances about their treatment during the flood, including complaints about political interference in relief distribution, inhuman conditions in government run IDP camps and government failure to provide transport or accommodation when giving evacuation orders. The Movement has also highlighted the issue of poor management of flood protection infrastructure and challenged official versions about how the breach floods occurred. Many members of the Movement have alleged that the main Muzaffargarh breach, at Abbas Wala Bund, was deliberate and that it was part of an attempt by the Khoso clan on the right bank to protect their estates. In addition to the flood specific agenda, the Movement clearly became a forum in which local activists could practice their political skills, experience interacting on a national stage and associate with other progressive causes.

Some of the active members of the Movement described how they were inspired by their encounters with one of Pakistan’s most dynamic labour organizers, Latif Ansari of the Labour Qoumi Movement. Ansari, in mentoring the TBSZ activists, drew upon his experience...
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Movement activists had a sense of conducting popular mobilization as an alternative to the quasi-feudal, patronage oriented politics, which they held responsible for their areas’ backwardness. This sense of empowerment should be seen in the context of the widespread sense of alienation with the traditional political class, as represented by the MPAs and MNAs.

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of mobilizing loom workers of Faisalabad against exploitative working practices and official harassment. Likewise, Muzaffargarh’s most famous woman and campaigner for women’s rights, Mukhtar Mai, attended Movement events and invited its membership to join forces in the struggle for social justice. Several of the conversations with local office bearers in Layyah and Muzaffargarh made it clear that they felt empowered by the experience of organizing the TBSZ. This empowerment should be seen in the context of the widespread sense of alienation with the traditional political class, as represented by the MPAs and MNAs.

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Iqbal of Layyah succinctly expresses the confidence that the Movement achieves real impact on how the government deals with the floods.

“We participated in a protest at the Prime Minister’s house. I travelled 15 hours to get there and thoroughly enjoyed the experience. The Prime Minister told us we would get our remaining Watan Card amount within the month but that promise is two months old now.”

Mureed Hussein the TBSZ Convener in Kot Addu provides a good example of the narrative that activists of the Movement have constructed to link the woes of the flood affected to the failures of the quasi-feudal elite ensconced in the political system.

“We led a good life before the floods, going about our own business without any worries. We do not know why but they destroyed us. My heart breaks to see the situation now. The feudal and politicians shifted their families and goods out to Multan and Islamabad 15 days before the flood hit. They did not warn us of the danger. They built embankments to protect...
their crops and they shifted their property to safety. We were left without transport to extricate our goods from the flood. All we could do when the flood came was to pick up our children and run. We had to abandon our dowries and even today we are left empty-handed.

What could we do other than cry? We were left to drink water. Civil society did provide some assistance. But the politicians have not so much as asked after us. They diverted ration trucks intended for the poor.

There were two factors motivating us to launch our movement – hunger and oppression. Now that the movement is underway we are all workers. We are the people who shout in the ears of the feudal. Until now they had not so much as asked us what happened to our crop. We are now able to stand on our own feet. We have learnt how to demand our rights. We staged a protest at the Prime Minister’s residence. We have undertaken a hunger strike. As a result of our efforts they are expanding the coverage of the Watan Card and gearing up to pay the second instalment.

But the feudals still steal food from our children. And we are still living in tents. Only three days ago the latest storm flattened our tents and some of our children were injured when the Turkish prefabricated shelters disintegrated in the high winds.

The shameless rulers have done nothing to respond to the situation. We also complain at the NGOs who seem so reluctant to leave the roads along which they plant their project boards. People here eat once a day and the rest of the time just survive.

This is the situation in our sub-district. What I would really love to do is to drag our rulers out of their palaces and to throw them into a flood. However, at least our movement has now been launched and we are still alive.”

Iqbal of Sabzujat in Muzaffargarh is one of the classic local organizers for the Movement. He was already engaged in petitioning on behalf of other residents of Sabzujat when he encountered the Pattan team which was providing support in the establishment of the TBSZ. Iqbal was soon convinced to join forces. He gives the most eloquent account of how mobilizing flood affectees to assert their right to be treated as full citizens is the route from despair to restoration of hope.

“After our strike we bumped into Fareed of Pattan in the park in Multan and he discussed our problems and introduced us to Sarwar Bari. Bari rang Khalid Sherdil Director General PDMA Punjab and referred our case back to them. After this when we approached the DCO he eventually agreed to consider what we were saying.

Next we launched our movement. We did a hunger strike in Islamabad, where we were equipped with the names of many women who had been deprived of Watan Cards although they were fully deserving. I followed this up by sending our applications to all the political leaders. The DCO resisted the demands of our movement although he offered a Watan Card for me

The pivotal moment for many members was when TBSZ gathered 2,000 affectees to protest outside the Prime Minister’s residence on 10th April 2011 in Multan City.
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Mohammad Saleem from Muzaffargarh provides the most down to earth account of the rally at the Prime Minister’s house and the realities of popular protest. He affirms that amidst the chaos and hardship, people really feel empowered by the experience.

“Our movement seemed unstoppable. In our discussions people said that we had to make some gesture of standing up for our rights. We decided to go to Multan to stage a protest. Everyone involved had such high spirits. The energy and emotions in our members were palpable. They were speaking as if within days the missing Watan Cards would be issued and the long promised instalment would be released.

We set off from our village at 8am. It was 10 am by the time that we reached Mahmoodkot. But it took forever for people to assemble there and it was 4pm before all the other contingents arrived at Mahmoodkot. We got to Multan by maghreb, dusk.

We assembled in front of the PM’s house and did our protest. We were confident that some powerful person would take the
trouble to come and speak to us. No one even bothered to come over to us. Meanwhile it started to rain on us. The women and children who were with us started to complain that they had not had food or drink. By midnight I too was hungry. I went off to Nishtar Hospital looking for a cup of tea. By the time I got back to the protest site there was no one there. I had no idea about this decision to disperse. I had no vehicle and so got in touch with Waris who told me that the vehicles had left. I told him that I would find a mosque to sleep in. My relatives were angry with him for losing me. But then I bumped into a tractor driver from Layyah. He said he would take me with him. I set off with the tractor wala. But it turned into rather a chaotic journey. First he got lost. After an hour of driving around we found ourselves back at the same point and by then it was 3 am. Then when we got him back on the right road his tractor got a puncture. It was the time of morning prayers when we reached the office in Kot Addu. There were lots of women and children also camping out there. I got some sort of sleep. To get transport home we had to retrace our steps to the DGK Road. It was 11 am the next day before I finally got to my house.

My mother was waiting for me and complained that she had always thought I was a respectable person.

Even if the powerful did not step forward there were plenty of ordinary people to witness our protest. We raised lots of slogans against the landlords. The Commissioner and the DCO were present. We shouted some choice insults according to our conscience. The police tried to get us to disperse by telling us that there was a bomb warning and we would all be blown up. We answered that as far as we were concerned they could poison the lot of us but we would not disperse.

We were impressed to see his house. We had thought that maybe it would be made of gold. The walls have been built so high that we joked even the birds could barely fly over them. Then we decided that they resembled the walls of Central Jail and after all he is used to living in jail. This is a new development – his house never had such high walls before. Despite all the hardships the protest was definitely worth it.”

Case study: a woman community activist – Rani Waheeda Malik

Rani presides over a small office in Kot Addu, Muzaffargarh, which is plastered with every available awareness-raising poster about social justice and women’s issues. That rightly visualizes the way that Rani envisages her work on the flood aftermath. She has been elected as a woman leader of the TBSZ and is immersed in the business of organizing local chapters and preparing for future protests. However she clearly locates this work in a broader struggle to challenge poverty and injustice. She is articulate and confident and seized upon the challenge of organizing flood affectees as an opportunity to build her own credentials as a local leader. It is a continuation of her previous work as an elected Union Councillor in the local government system. In her role as councillor she could pull rank with the district administration, in lobbying on behalf of her constituents. Her position had been abolished by the time the floods came. However her monitoring and lobbying work during the flood provides an insight into the kind of role that all elected councillors might have played if the local bodies had been operating when the floods hit.

“People who receive Nadra cards have difficulty describing the humiliation and inconvenience they have to go through to receive them. It seems that police violence is just for the poor.

Women find it difficult to keep their CNICs on their person. Many of them kept them “safely” in trunks in their houses. After
the flood women ran to the NADRA field office to get their cards reissued. There were such long queues that they had to stay there day and night so as not to lose their place.

If the poor do not vote for the feudal they suffer for it all their lives. The District Revenue Officers made Watan Cards for places which had not been flooded. The police used to lathi charge the poor people in the queue so as to make room for those favoured by the feudal to slip into the office.

Our people have had to sell their jewellery and animals to survive, because of the lack of government assistance. NADRA announced the criteria for who would get the Watan Cards and for the favoured beneficiaries they sit them down and treat them with honour and respect. The rest of the people have to run round the Union Council Secretary, the District Revenue Officer, the NADRA office, the DCO office. The patwaris make lists of beneficiaries but demand money to include people’s names on the lists. Union Council Secretaries demand Rs.500 to issue a death certificate. Widows have found it most impossible to obtain their cards because officers always reassure them but do nothing.

The flooding in our area of Muzaffargarh was no natural phenomenon. It was entirely caused by the breaching of Abbas Bund. If at Taunsa they had breached on the other side of the Barrage, the whole of Kot Addu tehsil could have been saved.

The Watan Card scheme has also become a story of broken promises. Initially they said that they would give Rs.100,000 per affected family. But they only disbursed Rs.20,000 to the Watan Card holders. They took almost as much as this back in electricity bills. People received Rs.15,000 electricity bills and had to sell their jewellery, even though the meter had been out of action for three months.

In the relief camps officials demanded bribes for the distribution tokens—Rs.2,500 for a tent token, Rs.500 to Rs.1,000 for a ration token. When I reported this to the DCO he used to take note and do nothing.”
# Timeline of the Tehreek Bahalia Sailab Zadgan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>September 2010</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09</td>
<td>Latif Ansari, Sarwar Bari and William left Islamabad to spend Eid with flood affectees in Mianwali, Bhakkar, Layyah and Muzaffargarh.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>The team paid visit to and extended solidarity with flood affectees, observing their situation and listening to their opinions. The people were enraged at their MPs and everyone complained about political partisanship in relief distribution. Devastation was beyond any ones imagination. It needed a social response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>The team discussed and debated about what should be done to channelize the anger of the people through a peaceful democratic manner and to expedite their rehabilitation. The team agreed to build a platform for flood affectees in order to articulate their needs. The idea was discussed with the people. Tehreek Bahalia Sailabzadgan was born and its first leaflet was printed and distributed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October 2010</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-27</td>
<td>Latif Ansari continued mobilisation of flood affected communities across south Punjab. This helped create new leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>First convention of flood affectees took place in Muzaffargarh. More than 3,000 flood-affected people from all over the country participated. The convention set the direction, approved the formation of the Tehreek, passed resolutions and demands for rehabilitation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>November 2010</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>14-15</td>
<td>The formation of TBSZ was mentioned at the Pakistan Development Forum, Islamabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Ms. Lyse Doucet and camera crew of BBC came to cover a public meeting of TBSZ at head Bakaini district Muzaffargarh. Later BBC telecasted the documentary “The Return of Floods”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>December 2010</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lahore: The Tehreek was invited to participate in a nationwide consultation meeting of the NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Multan: TBSZ and civil society organisations held a press conference and urged the government to release of the second instalment of the Watan Card. At the conference the Tehreek representatives stated that if the instalment was not released by 31 December 2010 they would hold a protest on 1 January 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-29</td>
<td>Opinion poll of flood affectees was held at all the tehsils of Muzaffargarh to gauge their perception.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>January 2011</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Multan: Protest rally held outside the Press Club to draw the attention of the Prime Minister and Chief Minister of Punjab to the issues afflicting the flood affectees. Children were an overwhelming presence at this protest holding placards demanding that their futures not be jeopardized and wasted. The rally ended with a sit-in in front of the PM house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>February 2011</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Muzaffargarh: Naveed-e-Inquilab conference was held at basti Ghareebabad, union council Thatta Ghurmani. Dr. Farzana Bari participated in the event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>Islamabad: A five-day long hunger strike was held in front of Islamabad Press Club for the issuance of second instalment of Watan Card. Thirty women and men participated.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Breach of trust: People’s experiences of the Pakistan floods

15 Sarwar Bari appeared and gave statement to Commission of Enquiry on Floods of the Supreme Court. He took members of TBSZ along with him. He took Nasir – a man without hands and activist of TBSZ and Rani Waheeda to the commission. This made a significant impact on the commission.

15 Islamabad: TBSZ enthusiastically participated in a national conference and protest rally on flood rehabilitation.

March 2011

2 Islamabad: TBSZ actively participated in the national consultation workshop on flood rehabilitation.

13 Insan-Dost-Fikr conference was held in Head Bakaini. A large number of flood affectees, Sarwar Bari, Latif Ansari and Mukhtaran Mai participated in the event. She urged the people to stand up against violence and unjust customs and the tyrants.

23 Public meeting was held in union council Patal Gharbi, Kot Addu. Latif Ansari, William Pervez, Rani Waheeda and Sarwar Bari participated in the meeting. A large number of affected women and men attended the event.

23 Musical evening and poetry recitation event is held in basti Saat Marla Scheme, union council Sheikh Umer, Muzaffargarh

April 2011

1-9 Large conferences were held in four union councils Manha, Sanawan, Budh and Aluraid of Muzaffargarh to mobilise people and discuss the issue of Watan Card

10 Protest and sit-in initiated in front of PM house in Multan with 2000 people participating. The protest was for demanding the release of the second instalment of the Watan Card

17 TBSZ was able to protest in front of the Judicial Flood Commission and get their statements recorded about how dykes had been purposefully breached and how the relief distribution process had been unfair.

June 2011

4 TBSZ meeting held in Pattan office, Muzaffargarh. The meeting took place after one month of the wheat harvest. Membership was furthered and funds were collected

5-10 Meetings held in villages of union council Kotla Haji Shah of Layyah and in union councils Budh, Thatta Gurmani, Sheikh Umer, Uttra Sandheela. Manha and Head Bakaini of Muzaffargarh. The primary focus was to initiate new members into TBSZ and discuss the future direction of the Tehreek

July 2011

15-29 In order to mobilise people for the Awami Sailab Conference Convenor of Tehreek, Latif Ansari covered 4200 km bare feet in the scorching heat reaching out to bastis in 8 districts of Multan, Rajanpur, DG Khan, Muzaffargarh, Layyah, Toba Tek Singh, Jhang and Faisalabad. In this time TBSZ also supported the brick kiln workers in Layyah who had been rendered jobless. The youth remained a prominent part of the preparations working round the clock.

25 For broader publicity of the Awami Sailab Conference leaders of the Tehreek addressed a press conference at Press Club Multan.

30 Awami Sailab Conference was held at Chenab Park, river Chenab, Multan Road, Muzaffargarh marking the 1st anniversary of the devastating 2010 floods. About 6,000 women and men from all over south Punjab participated. The event was filled with revolutionary poetry, plays, tableau and speeches. Prominent personalities who participated were: Dr. Farzana Bari, Mukhtaran Mai, Mian Qayyum, Jamil Omar, Sarwar Bari, Qadir Ranther, Latif Ansari convener TBSZ led the proceedings.
Economic impact of the floods
In narratives gathered from across the country flood survivors made it clear that the floods had posed a threat to their livelihoods and that from the first day they had struggled to preserve their assets and ensure that, as waters receded they would be in a position to continue feeding themselves. However despite the myriad strategies survivors employed to be able to resume working and planting, the flood has pushed many thousands back into poverty. One of the slogans adopted by the assistance community in the recovery phase was “build back better”. The lasting economic impact on the poor suggests that a parallel slogan in recovery work should be “give back fairer”.

Along with the massive effort to rescue and provide relief to the twenty million flood affectees, the Government of Pakistan launched an effort to document and quantify the damage done by the floods. This exercise provided an essential basis for the planning of the recovery and reconstruction stage. Two top level exercises collated the information on flood damage and its likely longer term impact on the population. The International Finance Institutions (World Bank and Asian Development Bank) worked with the government to produce the “Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment” (DNA) as a concise statement of the economic impact of the floods. The United Nations agencies worked with the Government to produce the “Impact of Floods on Millennium Development Goals Analysis” (FIMA). This report identified the implications of the floods for the set of poverty-reduction goals to which Pakistan is committed.

This section explains the nature and sig-
The significance of the impact documented in the DNA and FIMA. The DNA is replete with clear proposals on how to ensure that the needs of the poor are addressed in the recovery and reconstruction phase. Many of the losses documented in the DNA have little or no relevance to the livelihoods systems of the poor. The DNA thus potentially provided the empirical basis for investment in a recovery and reconstruction phase which is significantly less focused on the needs of the poor than was the case in the relief phase.

The DNA estimated the damage (value of what was lost) and reconstruction cost (cost of replacing damaged infrastructure) across a range of social and economic sectors. It produced estimates of the distribution of the damage and reconstruction costs between Pakistan’s main administrative areas.

The headline results of the DNA were:

Firstly, the greatest economic loss to Pakistan from the floods occurred in the agricultural sector, with damage estimated at $5.045 billion, equivalent to over 50% of the total direct and indirect damage across the economy. The damage to agriculture mainly consisted of loss to the standing crops including cotton and sugarcane.

Secondly, the next most costly loss was the damage to housing, which amounted to $1.588 billion.

Thirdly, although other kinds of damage featured fairly prominently in the images of the flood broadcast at the time, the damage to all the other sectors, including health, education, irrigation, transport and communications, industries, the banks, government and the environment, together only amounted to about one third of total damage.

Fourthly, reconstruction costs were likely to be apportioned rather differently from the damage. Reconstruction of the transport and communications infrastructure was presented as the biggest item in reconstruction ($2.356 billion, or 35% of the total cost). Housing was the next biggest item in the reconstruction bill, at $1.483 billion, or 22% of the total. The DNA anticipated reconstruction costs in agriculture far lower than what had been lost through the destroyed crops, amounting to under 4% of the total reconstruction costs. The loss of the standing crop was treated as a one-time shock.

Fifthly, the damage done by the flood was heavily concentrated in the lower parts of the Indus River Basin. Sindh province alone accounted for $4.38 billion of the damage sustained, equivalent to 49% of damage. Conversely, despite the intensity of local destruction along the mountain rivers, the lack of extensive agriculture or civil infrastructure in the highlands meant that damage in the predominantly mountainous administrative units (Azad Jammu and Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan and FATA), at 2% of the total, was far less than that in

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1 Exact proportions varied between the three different options presented in the DNA. Figures given here are based on “reconstruction option 1”

2 Calculated as percentage of damage attributed to specific areas. $4.38bn Sindh (49%), $2.58bn Punjab (29%), $1.172bn K-P (13%), $0.62bn Baluchistan (7%), $0.209bn other areas (2%).
Sixthly, reconstruction costs were also highest in Sindh (47%). But because of the replacement costs of housing and public infrastructure, KP faced 22% of the reconstruction costs, ahead of Punjab’s 19%.

The damage to agriculture included destruction of 2.1 million hectares of standing Kharif crops, including cotton, rice, sugarcane and vegetables. Where floods hit suddenly, in the upland flash flood areas and in some of the breach floods, livestock were washed away. But even in the flood plain areas where people had more warning, not all were able to protect all their animals and they faced losses to disease and distress sales. Thus livestock losses were counted as 11% of total dam-

3 DNA p31
Economic impact of the floods

Age in agriculture. The losses of livestock had a disproportionate impact on the rural poor because it is this group which depends most upon income from livestock rearing. Pakistan’s rural poor survive by small scale livestock keeping, frequently involving just two or three milch cows, to supplement what they can earn from wage labour and farming, if they have access to land. In contrast the richest households are more dependent on cropping and less on livestock-rearing but in any case have access to other sources of income, notably remittances. For landless households or those with only a marginal landholding, their livestock were the most valuable productive asset they owned. For these households, to lose a cow to the floodwater or even to be forced to sell off one or two animals at the rock-bottom prices which prevailed during the floods was to lose both the household savings and an important income source. The table below illustrates how the poorest Pakistani households depend for their livelihoods more on livestock and wage labour than do the better off households.

Table 23: Sources of income for the richest 20% and poorest 20% of the rural population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Sources</th>
<th>Income Earned (PAK Rs.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poorest 20% of Households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average monthly income</td>
<td>Rs.7,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of income from crop production</td>
<td>17.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of income from livestock</td>
<td>12.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of income from wages and salaries</td>
<td>42.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of income from other sources</td>
<td>27.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The loss of the standing crops also impacted on the poor, although they have less direct income from their own cultivation. Instead, agricultural labouring is an important source of income for the rural poor. In Southern Punjab and rural Sindh, the main annual source of wage income for poor women is cotton picking. The loss of this crop in the riverine area temporarily closed off access to this important livelihood opportunity.

The DNA estimated that 913,307 houses were destroyed and 694,878 were partially damaged in the flood. The destroyed houses were predominantly kacha (847,455) and the greatest number of affected houses was in Sindh (880,000, equivalent to 55% of all houses affected). This damage was estimated to be equivalent to $1.588 billion.

Of all assets the damage to housing impacted most directly on the poor because of the high proportion of home ownership, even among the rural population (92% owner occupancy in rural areas, according to 2008-09 PSLM).

The immediate need for shelter meant that even the poorest households were obliged to start reconstruction almost as soon as flood waters receded and they returned to their home areas from temporary displacement. In the absence of timely availability of government assistance for house rebuilding, flood affectees were obliged to dispose of assets or borrow a process which several of them described in the flood narratives.

The DNA estimated the damage (value of what was lost) and reconstruction cost (cost of replacing damaged infrastructure) across a range of social and economic sectors. It produced estimates of the distribution of the damage and reconstruction costs between Pakistan’s main administrative areas.

5 DNA p91. A series of assumptions is required to arrive at the cost estimate. They provided for a range of indirect costs, as well making assumptions about the average costs of kacha and pucca houses.

Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 2007-08, table 11.
Pakistan’s post-flood blues

Survivors still struggling to rebuild their lives, lack of job opportunities leaves victims starved

No stranger to destruction

The ‘River King’ has taken a lot of lives. Even this year’s floods have been devastating.

Badin has sunk and no one knows on the outside world

The speaker slams disaster management authorities for not doing their job.

Memories of 2010 keep the fear alive

Gilgit-Baltistan government had estimated losses worth Rs12 billion.

Nullah Daik

Badin situation

Fehmida pleads for WFP help

The speaker slams disaster management authorities for not doing their job.

Over a million people in six districts affected by flood: CM

1.1 million people had fallen victim to the rains in the interior Sindh. “We will not rest until all of them are back in their own homes,” he said.

Sindh, which was one of the worst-affected provinces in last year’s flooding, is still trying to rehabilitate flood survivors. According to the provincial disaster management authority, 7.2 million people were affected in the 2010 floods and, as of now, 1.8 million people remain in relief camps.

With little progress, thousands remain in relief camps

Government says only immediate problems have been addressed.

Flood-hit people present ‘charter of demands’

Even after one year of the disaster, participants of the National Disaster Management Act 2010 for its strict implementation, against the terrorists and militants.

Flood warning causes panic in low-lying areas

This is not just a humanitarian crisis, it is an economic and social catastrophe.
7.1 Summary

While the government is considered massively responsible for the exacerbation of the hugely disastrous consequences of a natural calamity, due to its corruption, its mismanagement and criminal neglect of water resources, dams, bunds, canals, population growth, deforestation, the timber mafia, and quite simply because of its inefficiency, incompetence, its dysfunctionality and poor leadership - at the same time the press was almost equally outraged by the foreign junkets and the Armani suits of our leaders.

While desperately demanding aid, there was resigned understanding of why any donor was hesitant to commit funds to such a notorious government and cynicism too about the motives of foreign aid.

There was huge discussion of the role of militant organizations in relief, most condemning the fact that they are allowed this disguise. Comment on the role of the army in relief was more ambiguous, by a small margin more favourable.

Many writers equated the human crisis with partition and warned of the dangers of anger, militancy, revolution and anarchy.

Actual concrete suggestions were largely lacking, although there was a huge amount of rhetorical advice as well as practical suggestions at a micro level. There was opinion in favour of the Clean Commission. There was demand for agricultural inputs as aid, and a general consensus as to the uselessness of the NDMA. This was a golden opportunity for Land Reform and also gender role engineering, suggested some writers. Other suggestions were to revisit the budget, restructure trade, and strengthen local government.

There were also suggestions for research, and many suggestions to improve management of water and other environmental resources.

7.2 Content analysis of English dailies

All Pakistan media had extensive coverage of the floods. This study drew upon a database compiled from the main English language dailies:
- Dawn
- The News

![Figure 12: Frequency of Issues Highlighted](chart.png)
The following is a content analysis based on 197 opinion articles taken from the English language press from 1 August 2010 up to October 7th 2010.

The first article is dated August 1st 2010. The first two issues mentioned in this article are the incompetence of the government in the relief efforts and even the fumbling of the army, and the presence of various guises of banned militant organizations on the relief effort.

In the subsequent almost 10 weeks of the 197 articles reviewed, the actual damage, the losses that will become more visible in the future and the mechanics of the failures of the government are dealt with in detail. But the three major issues highlighted in these 197 articles are first and foremost, weaknesses of the government, Mr. Zardari’s European tour, and the role of the banned militant organizations.

7.2.1 European junket

The single issue dealt with by the largest number of articles mentioning or devoting themselves to it, was the fact of Mr. Zardari’s European junket

There was one justification, in an article by a government servant, which flew in the face of all the other press coverage, by stating that the Pakistan government was doing a fine job, and foreign aid was flowing in at a good rate. Other than this article, the discussion of Mr. Zardari’s visit ranged between the virulent to the disgusted, and not much else. There were 30 specific mentions of Mr. Zardari’s visit in the 197 articles, which continued throughout the 10 weeks. It was interesting that there was only one mention of the fact that Maulana Fazlur Rahman was also away during the initial stages of the flood, but doing Umrah. The presence of elected representatives actually being there on the ground was dealt with in detail in two articles.

7.2.2 Weaknesses of the government

NDMA

The next most mentioned issue was criticism of the NDMA specifically, with 27 mentions. This was separate to the additional three specific references, two well substantiated from technical and academic papers, that the government had ignored early warnings which should have led it to be better prepared.

A further single reference mentioned the fact that there was not enough early warning to the population to vacate. But another three referred to the slowness of the government machinery to react to the emergency, and also the slowness of international aid.

All these added up to a total of 33 articles.

Corruption, poor and dysfunctional government, poor leadership, inefficiency

But if one added poor governance, actual corruption, poor leadership, inefficiency, and incompetence, this goes up to 74 mentions.

Mismanagement of canal drainage, and de-silting

If one adds specific mismanagement issues of canal drainage, de-silting, and criminal neglect, we add another 12 mentions, that is 86 mentions.

Management of water resources, dams, bunds, the kucha, population growth, deforestation, the timber mafia

If we look further at again issues of management and neglect which include deforestation and the timber mafia, mismanagement and corruption over dams and bunds, agriculture in the kacha, unchecked population growth, these go up by a further 24 mentions. Of these 24, 4 also highlight the example of the government’s total neglect of the Hunza issue of the massive landslide which has created
an unstable artificial lake. Again of the 24, 10 particularly deal with the issue of bunds being breached at certain particular points to benefit the politically powerful, rather than at points which would be more rational in protecting the largest populations. A further 3 mention the rumors that one of the bunds was breached to protect the American base near Jacobabad.

While almost none of the articles holds any of the above manmade mismanagement issues as actually causing the flood, almost all reflect that these have exacerbated the affects of the flood to a greater or lesser degree. 32 deal with actual issues of mismanagement and neglect which directly impact of the flood and its course or its ferocity. That is a total of 110 articles citing manmade reasons as aggravating the flood.

As opposed to this there were 7 references to the issues of global warming and climate change as part of the reason or the main reason for the floods.

By and large the floods seem to be accepted as a natural phenomenon, further increased by manmade climate change, yet further exacerbated at a local level by mismanagement and corruption of water, land and timber resources and yet further aggravated by the criminal policies and neglect by the government of social and economic issues. But then the relief efforts are hampered again by corruption, mismanagement and poor preparedness and again criminal neglect, and willfully inegalitarian and careless social and economic policies.

**Discrimination**

Tragically in such a situation there were 3 detailed references to discrimination against Ahmadis, Hindus and Christians in the distribution of flood relief.

**Foreign aid**

There are also at least 6 references to the right of the flood affectees to aid and foreign aid on a humanitarian basis, but of these 6, 1 is written by a European columnist based in Islamabad who writes locally, 5 are written by Pakistanis. There are 7 mentions praising foreign aid, and the foreign donors in particular, the US, The UK, and Saudi Arabia, a number raising the issue as to why the US is so unpopular despite the fact that it is the largest donor. Almost as many mentions (5) are simply cynical about foreign aid, some from the point of view of the donor, some from the point of view of the fact that it will be wasted, and that donors are aware of this. Two influential articles suggest that no foreign aid should be taken because internal resources are insufficient to deal
with the problem if they are to be properly utilized and carry no strings. 2 articles also suggest the writing off of Pakistan’s debt at this time, given the huge setback to Pakistan’s economy the effect of which will be felt for decades.

Another two suggest strongly preferential treatment in trade rather than aid. 4 articles are rampantly anti-American, despite mentioning the aid, although some refer to the slowness and smallness of the aid. There are also 6 mentions of the Indian donation, 4 of these against the donation and 2 in favour.

7.2.4 Militant organizations

There are 26 references to the work of the militant organizations. Of these 20 are strongly opposed and 6 are either in favour or at any rate not opposed. Of these 4 are of the view that they should be allowed to work in relief, given the gap in the relief from the government and the enormity of the need.

7.2.5 The army role in relief

At the opposite end of the spectrum was the opinion of the army’s role in relief. There were 20 mentions of which 15 praised the army, and 6 opposed the role that the army was playing or being forced to play in the relief operation, saying that such a role was dangerous, given the army’s previous role in Pakistani politics.

7.2.6 Revolution, anarchy, militancy

12 of the articles refer to the plight of the IDPs equating it with Partition, many mentioning that there were 15 to 20 times more people displaced than during Partition.

In the same vein, 6 articles mentioned the Bhola cyclone in 1970 (*), 8 further articles mentioned the potential in the situation for anger leading to anarchy, violence, and bloody revolution, a further article mentioned secession in particular, and 5 articles specially highlighted how the unequal social structures in Pakistan always lead to the poor being disproportionately affected by such disasters. Similarly 3 other articles mentioned how the disaffection all over the country with corruption and mismanagement of flood relief, and the resultant poverty will lead to an attitude that will benefit the militants all over the country but most particularly in KP and southern Punjab.

7.2.7 Suggestions for the future

Few articles actually laid down concrete suggestions for the government to pursue in order to deal with the aftermath of the flood. While there were many articles, in fact almost every one, suggesting all sorts of measures for relief, ranging from the stratospheric to the most mundane, only 7 articles actually mention issues of livestock, food stocks, agricultural land, land boundaries, including destroyed patwari and land records, business stocks, businesses. A further 2 articles advocate this as a ripe moment for land reforms, and a further single article refers to the massive infrastructure demands of the future.

Solutions

General solutions ranged from “good governance” and “concentrating on the poorest”, “starting with the grassroots”, “putting aside political egos”, “finding a political system suited to us”, “involving civil society”, “better leadership”, “austerity cuts”, cutting ministries and non-development expenditure, to strengthening NDMA, galvanizing the international community, the diaspora, Pakistanis, equity in relief services, redress of small farmers, tradesmen and shopkeepers, to improving river management and not allowing profiteers and hoarders to misuse this opportunity.

Reforms, land reforms, declaring a financial emergency, structural change for revision of current fiscal policy concentrating more on trade than aid, are also advised, as well as access to US and European markets for our textiles, and opportunity zones for trade as promised by the US.

Access of the poor to housing, transport,
employment, other resources and to social justice must be improved. Budget and priorities must be drastically revised otherwise there will be growing militancy and ethnic conflict all over the country leading to chaos and breakup.

The issue of the trust and image deficit also has to be tackled.

Mechanisms and institutions to assess needs, implement and monitor relief and rehabilitation programmes and set up a flood fighting order, and also to disseminate flood warning, and to rebuild the infrastructure are also recommended.

A detailed list of the general suggestions is attached as appendix 1.

**Particular short term suggestions**

These suggestions have been divided into 4 main categories

**Major suggestions**

- Set up the Clean Commission
- Full scale inquiry into the flooding and the real reasons for the unnatural course taken by the river
- Ascertain whether breaches were intentional so that the natural flooding pattern can be accurately mapped
- Gather accurate info for future planning
- Need to identify seed availability sources, procurement points
- Government must distribute seeds and fertilizer 2 and pesticide 1
- Abolish NDMA
- Pass retrospective law so that NDMA and NDMC can function as legal entities (only 1 such suggestion)
- Vest the NDMC and NDMA with enough financial and human resources (only 1 such suggestion)

**General suggestions about the flood**

- Medical professionals especially those in the US should brainstorm as to how to provide continued assistance
- Punish landlords who acted selfishly
- Poor farmers should not be given grants and forced to build houses on land that doesn’t belong to them
- Voluntary business and consumer contribution are an “innovative” means of mobilizing resources!
- Partnership fund to coordinate foreign aid
- Embassies should be alerted and asked to pursue remittances from donor countries without delay

**Dramatic/Rhetorical suggestions**

- Zardari and Sharrif donate larger amounts of money towards relief and rehabilitation
- Politicians/Leaders get down from helicopters and 4x4s and walk in the mud
- Slash budgets of President and PM houses, declare them one-dish zones
- Cut army of ministers and advisors down to 20
- Reduce perks and privileges of parliamentarians to 50%
- Ban foreign tours by government officials
- Recover politically motivated bank loans
- Ministers should pay for tea served in the cabinet meetings
- Wages of industrial workers should be doubled

**Practical micro-level suggestions**

- Ready to eat food packets
- Web site to coordinate relief
- Major construction companies pool all their resources and lend their personnel and machinery for temporary repairs to bridges and roads
- Such people can be given tax relief as an incentive
- Daily wage earners be employed for relief works and rebuilding at half
wages

- Short term measures to facilitate rescue with public private cooperation
- Flying clubs and pilots associations can help fly relief operations
- Hotel owners can donate cooked food packages
- Students can participate in nationwide relief effort including door to door collection and distribution of perishable food
- Transport associations can donate free vehicles
- Oil companies can donate fuel
- Physicians can form mobile clinics
- Pharmaceutical companies can donate medicines
- Nurses and doctors, locals and expatriates, can donate time
- Including nurses and doctors in final year
- Pakistani missions should have drop boxes for donations
- Bank account for donations should be well advertised
- Urgently need to evacuate, rescue and feed millions of stranded people, so short term relief
- The holding of classes in tents
- Rescind the Jacobabad lease to the US Army
- Renegotiate terms allowing US to use our soil as a jumping ground for Afghanistan
- Relief should be culturally and climatically appropriate
- Relief should be sorted
- Don’t donate clothing
- Distribution model needs revamping, instead of funnel model should be box model
- Must have more helicopters
- Message to affectees: maintain personal hygiene

- Disinfect water supply
- Disinfect critical food preparation surface
- Cash for work projects
- Preventive medicine against waterborne diseases

**Particular long term**

- Tax the rich, increase/collect taxes
- Introduce Vat
- Levy flood relief tax
- Tax more sectors
- EU should reduce tariffs on certain products to help the country grapple with the devastation caused by the floods, a waiver will be required from WTO
- No more foreign loans
- Foreign assistance required because devastation too enormous for Pak government to manage on its own
- Environment ministry should commission a study of the short term and long term effects of climate change in each of the 10 climatic zones in Pakistan
- Processing claims, which means money, compensation, goods, logistical and administrative help
- Extensive reforestation
- Repair and reconstruction of infrastructure
- Renewed focus on infrastructure through the public private route
- Psychosocial counseling
- Increase water storage capacity
- Storage and distribution outlets
- Better drainage
- Distribution of water should be better planned
- Better management of water resources
- More hospitals in KP
- More local hospitals
- Local health facilities
• Disaster hazard mapping as the bedrock of a workable disaster response system
• Potable water
• Better housing
• Literacy
• Assessments of damage to crops, orchards, roads, bridges, businesses, shops, markets, villages, houses, schools, hospitals, transmission lines, embankments, spurs, canals, and watercourses
• Multi dimensional rehabilitation programme encompassing the above
• Use the Kerry luger bill to rehabilitate the 100s of thousands from Muzaffargarh
• Generators
• Better immunization
• Sewerage treatment plant in Haroonabad
• Restore the KKH
• Restore infrastructure, small local roads, health and hygiene facilities
• Support families who have lost all means of livelihood
• Help communities plan safer settlements
• Work must go ahead on the Iran-Pak gas pipeline
• Rapid relief and rehabilitation
• Have in place a system of flood control and management and this should be done by integrating the management of water resource
• Developing water reservoirs
• Reforestation in river catchment areas
• Dealing with encroachment along river banks
• End extensive irrigation and the farming of lands along river boundaries
• Plant trees along the river beds
• Land reclamation
• Government Study international law on disaster management, upgrade its legal regime for greater aid transparency and management, and win the confidence of the donors
• Government should study latest technologies and evolve a method to dredge and reclaim dams on a continuous basis, and take advantage of high peak floods and water velocities
• Reconsider whether construction of Bhasha dam would be any use at all.
• Population planning is essential as disasters lead to higher fertility
• Land reform
• Land reform with upper limit 100 acres and enforced within 90 days
• Distribute state land to flood affected
• Employment generation in flooded areas making local communities responsible for reconstruction of physical infrastructure. Local people should work on and monitor projects to check corruption and ensure transparency
• Agriculture based industry set up in flooded areas for employment generation rather than dole outs of petty cash
• Punjab Food support programme/ sasti roti should be pulled together and be used for food for work programmes
• Any distribution of land houses and livestock must be given in joint names of husband and wives
• Revisit budget, cut defence, cut unnecessary expenses, raise revenue, flood tax.
• Stop payment of foreign debt
• Debt relief
• Revive agricultural and industrial output, rebuild infrastructure, support poor communities
• Revive local government
• Structures at the provincial and dis-
trict level to ensure that citizen voice and accountability are kept in view of the post relief phase

- Flood forecasting and warning system
- Stocks of ready to eat food, water, medicines
- Security measures at flood camps and affected areas
- Requisition suitable transport
- Orderly return of affectees
- Control of the vaderas over the hairs must be broken
- Compulsory for all civil and military to send children to government schools
- Official vehicles with drawn
- De-weaponization
- Arms licenses all withdrawn, no new ones
- Opportunity to build model public hospitals and clinics
- Construct Munda dam
- Flood and disaster observatory with a dynamic user-friendly web based portal/interface
- Water and power ministry should set up a commission to formulate a policy on management of water resources
- Food and agriculture ministry should commission a study management of canals and optimal use of water for irrigation
- Study of protective structures along rivers and canals should be strengthened and modernized
- Study of all public funded entities involved in disaster management to conserve and consolidate resources
- Preparation of elaborate plan of action down to locality level, involving community participation.
- Define settlement zones in urban and rural sectors as well as the river banks
- Basic health clinics
- Delegations to Arab world and to China to tell them that Pakistan is a willing proxy for these countries and you must help us out
- Government must not seek loan from any quarter

General suggestions

- Good governance
- Change the lives of the poor
- Concentrate on the poorest
- Start with the grassroots
- Deal with immediate needs
- NGOs and local communities join hands
- Pakistani political system suited to us
- Civil society must be involved
- Should ensure the strengthening of existing institutions like the NDMA
- Galvanize international community
- Galvanize Diaspora
- Leaders should put aside political ego
- Austerity cuts
- Leadership
- Profiteers and hoarders should not be allowed to misuse this opportunity
- Equity in relief services
- Quality in relief services
- Timeliness
- Human dignity
- Relief as a right
- Relief should be distributed to all, regardless, and the mechanics of this should be decided at a local level
- Private sector should set up matching grant and donation programmes and they should compete with each other to do so
- Government should move strongly into the lead
- The redress of immediate and longer term issues of small farmers, shopkeepers and tradesmen is extremely
important
- All political parties including ruling and opposition should forget about their power games
- Improve river management
- Government has to move strongly into the lead
- Profiteers and hoarders shouldn’t be allowed to misuse this opportunity
- Functional relationship between vertical and horizontal layers of government
- Deal with trust and image deficit
- Reform
- Declare a financial emergency
- Trade not aid
- Flood control infrastructure, warning mechanisms, response capabilities need to be developed
- Food and health consequences mitigated
- Sustain relief and emergency support for 20 million
- Assess damages, help population to return, build basic infrastructure
- Structural change for revision of current fiscal policy
- Mechanism for the implementation of relief and rehabilitation programmes
- Need to strengthen institutional monitoring and direction and oversee relief effort and set up a flood fighting order
- Integrate NGOs and charities in the overall plan for the relief and rescue operations
- Disseminating of flood warning, mentally prepare them for a timely and orderly evacuation
- Earmarking complications, medical facilities for every locality likely to be evacuated, timely setting up of camps with basic facilities to reduce panic
- Reverse class disparity should be referred
- Decent housing transport and health be assured to industrial workers
- Carry out damage limitation and rehabilitation simultaneously
- Be aware that since the prime lands of Southern Punjab are destroyed, these will be good breeding grounds for militancy. That has to be dealt with.
- There will be urbanization and migration of rural populations that will create law and order situations, that has to be dealt with
- Ethnic conflicts
- Money making opportunities, that’s why donors are wary
- Innovative means of revenue generation
- Increase access of poor to other productive resources
- Invest in human capital schemes
- Realize social justice by increasing accountability of public institutions
- Temporary employment generation in rebuilding and revival of flood affected areas
- Narrow the urban rural divide in Sindh

7.3 List of Op-Ed articles analysed

Total Articles: 97
Dates: 1st August 2010 – 7th October 2010
### 7.3.1 Articles List

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Conclusions and recommendations

- Disaggregating the floods
- The flood experience in a nutshell
- The Supreme Court’s commission of inquiry and the efforts to understand what happened
- The association of crime and social breakdown with disaster
- Infrastructure failure
- Institutionalised assistance and survival strategies
- Importance of community entrepreneurs
- The role for elected local government
- Human dignity in disaster response
- Recognition for service
- The critical state of disaffection from the political class
- Poverty and disasters
- Future vulnerability and the state of disaster preparedness
- Watan card as an embodiment of the political challenge in disaster response
The findings presented here draw on the survivors’ and community activists’ flood narratives and the small sample survey conducted for this analysis of the flood aftermath. The conclusions are therefore necessarily selective and the recommendations are only a subset of those which could be made in a more comprehensive review of Pakistan’s disaster management. However, the findings are intended as a contribution to the bottom-up analysis of disasters, as they draw directly on the insights of those most directly affected by the floods. For more comprehensive sets of conclusions and recommendations, readers should refer to formal assessments such as that conducted by OCHA or to the compilation of civil society learning points in the appendix below. The study set out to draw upon survivor and activist perspectives to document what actually happened in the floods and aftermath, why so much damage was done, how people coped, who helped them, what the lingering consequences are and what were the politics underlying the process.

**What happened in the floods and their aftermath**

1. **Disaggregating the floods**

The experience of flooding was essentially a local one, despite the fact that from late July to mid September 2010 citizens along the length of the country experienced some form of flood. To highlight the local nature of flood causes and effects, this study has disaggregated the disaster into eight distinct local floods, which together account for over 80% of the total people affected. The areas affected by these “local floods” ranged from the upland catchment areas of Swat-Malakand, devastated by torrential rain and flash floods in the last week of July, to Thatta District and the mouth of the Indus overwhelmed by the river bursting its banks at the end of August. In a normal year, anyone of these “local floods” could have been considered a serious humanitarian disaster, with close to one or two million people affected. The point of disaggregating and understanding the local floods is that the narratives of survivors in each of the local flood areas indicated much common experience, in terms of where the flood water came from, the timetable of the disaster and what they had to do to survive.

2. **The flood experience in a nutshell**

According to the Government of Pakistan and United Nations, over twenty million individuals were affected by the floods and some 1.67 million houses were damaged or destroyed. There was a common thread to the experience of these affectees, as described in their flood narratives. Affectees lived through individual and community level versions of what the humanitarian agencies labelled as the rescue, relief and recovery phases. First there were warnings, many of which were either poorly disseminated or little heeded. Then people struggled to save as many of their possessions as possible as the waters hit. Then came the process of displacement, as most people were forced to leave their homes, seeking shelter outside the flooded area. People sought out relatives, camped in open ground or made their way to flood relief camps. Surviving away from their villages, people sold off their assets such as livestock and jewellery, ran down their savings or borrowed money. A few managed to find work even while displaced but many busied themselves with the complex process of hunting for relief supplies. As waters receded the great majority of people returned to their home areas to rebuild houses and livelihoods. For rebuilding houses and starting work they relied on such resources as they could muster themselves and such external assistance as was available. One year after the floods the great majority of survivors had returned home and picked up the pieces of their lives. Many had a long list of ways in which the flood had left them worse off. But they were, as before the flood, primarily dependent for survival on their own efforts and scant resources.
worse off. But they were, as before the flood, primarily dependent for survival on their own efforts and scant resources.

3. The Supreme Court’s commission of inquiry and the efforts to understand what happened

A novel aspect of the 2010 floods was the constitution of a judicial commission which addressed several of the key questions around what happened in the floods and was able to take written and oral testimony and to conduct field visits to some of the key sites. As indicated by its terms of reference, the commission of inquiry mainly responded to concerns that local power brokers had used their influence to force the administration to breach embankments in such a way as to direct the flood away from their land holdings. The commission found little evidence to support these claims of direct interference in breaching. However it was highly critical of Irrigation Department performance in maintenance of the flood embankments and concluded that the failure to conduct essential maintenance was a major contributory factor in the disaster.

The commission of inquiry provides a useful model for transparent assessment of a disaster and the performance of public bodies charged with responding to it. To achieve its full potential in terms of collating lessons which could be applied in future disasters, such an exercise would require a broader terms of reference and the ability to commission or draw upon multiple sub-studies.

4. The association of crime and social break down with disaster

One recurrent theme in survivor descriptions of how events unfolded after the flood hit, which deserves to be highlighted, is the widespread incidence of crime in flood-affected areas. This amounted, in worst-cases such as Ghauspur, to social break down. Concern for security of property was one of the factors which determined how people responded to evacuation calls – there was widespread fear that temporarily abandoned houses would be looted. The systematic looting of Hindu businesses and houses in Ghauspur was a product of the gradual break down in the rule of law, weakening of community solidarity and heightened religious prejudice. Although most incidences of flood-related looting were less dramatic than the Ghauspur case, the factors which combined in Ghauspur were far from unique to that town and the experience should be taken as a warning of the risks of social break down.

Why the 2010 floods were so destructive

5. Infrastructure failure

The single most important avoidable cause of flood devastation was negligence in the management of the flood and irrigation infrastructure by the responsible public authorities. Given the population density in the hilly areas and the riverine kacha, the intense and sustained monsoon rain in the Indus catchment area was bound to cause flooding in these areas. However the damage done by the flood was greatly exacerbated by catastrophic failures of embankments which could have been averted if adequate maintenance had been carried out. The most destructive infrastructure failures were the breach of the Abbas Wala Bund on the left bank of the Taunsa barrage, the breach of the Tori Bund on the right bank of the Indus in Kashmore District and the breach of the Molchand-Surjani bund in Thatta. 7.75 million people were displaced or otherwise affected in the districts close to these major infrastructure failures. Much of the displacement in these areas was as a direct result of this avoidable infrastructure failure, as confirmed in the descriptive accounts given by survivors. One level below the main barrages

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Breach of trust: People’s experiences of the Pakistan floods

and embankments, people’s fate was decided by the secondary infrastructure and management decisions taken by the administration during the floods. When towns like Janpur or Ghouspur were flooded, it was the end result of a cascade of breaches of canal embankments and loop bunds. Although in every area survivors have theories about whose negligence caused the defences to fail, reliably determining responsibility would require a forensic approach, far beyond what was practicable in this study.

There is a need for an overhaul in the approach to managing and maintaining the barrages, embankments and secondary infrastructure to avoid repetition of the 2010 catastrophe. Departments responsible for maintaining structures should be accountable for completion of the work before the flood season. A key element of infrastructure management overhaul should be enhanced transparency, with regard to pre-flood maintenance, with regard to the planning for breaches and with regard to the decisions taken on managing the flood water during the season. Not only should it be possible to avoid much of the kind of destruction people experienced in 2010, enhanced transparency should reduce the number of rumours about political breaches and interference of local power-brokers.

7. Importance of community entrepreneurs

One type of actor which cropped up frequently in the flood narratives was the community entrepreneur. These were flood affectees who took the initiative in contacting the administration or NGOs, mobilizing external assistance for their communities, articulating their communities’ entitlements and facilitating rationally targeted distributions. Survivors made a distinction between this community entrepreneur role, which they generally saw as positive, and the role of traditional power-brokers in trying to capture assistance. As lack of local knowledge and organizing skills has been a key constraint to so many humanitarian initiatives, the success of community entrepreneurs suggests that local administrations or NGOs preparing for future disaster response should identify and strengthen those who emerged during the 2010 experience, developing them as a resource for the future.
8. The role for elected local government

The floods hit at a time when local government in Pakistan was essentially moribund because the provincial governments allowed the Musharraf-era elected bodies to lapse and have delayed legislating for their replacements and holding elections. This meant that at the time of the floods the members of the provincial assemblies were the lowest tier of elected representative. Although some of the members of provincial and national assemblies were active in articulating the needs of their constituents, feedback from the sample survey suggested that most affectees considered them inaccessible and engaged in manipulative patronage politics. Union Councilors, elected to represent the village cluster, are generally accessible and insufficiently powerful to build patronage relations. The most effective way in which disaster response capacity could be built in Pakistan would be to restore local government. The Union Councilors should be enabled to step into the community entrepreneur role, which proved so important during the floods, and to act as an accountable intermediary between affected communities and responsible government institutions and NGOs.

9. Human dignity in disaster response

There were recurrent complaints from flood survivors of humiliating treatment by public officials and numerous people associated with the aid effort. This is reminiscent of complaints about chaotic aid activities in the 1992 floods undermining people’s dignity. There is an ongoing need for training and orientation of officials and volunteers likely to be involved in aid administration, to prepare them for respecting people’s dignity while conducting distributions or running camps.

10. Recognition for service

It was clear from flood survivors’ tales of the disaster that many of the people who helped their fellow citizens survive were volunteers with no official capacity and no recognition. The tales of unrecognized heroism contrast sharply with the low level of confidence in conventional politicians or senior officials. As a timely antidote to the cynicism regarding the role of public bodies in the flood, the government and media could give public recognition for extraordinary acts of bravery or charity during the rescue and relief stages of the flood.

The lingering impact of the 2010 floods

11. The critical state of disaffection from the political class

The distrust expressed in public representatives and formal institutions, both in the sample survey and in flood narrative interviews, indicates a crisis of popular confidence in the political class. There are numerous possible implications of such a crisis of confidence. Not least there is little chance of securing public cooperation with any form of disaster mitigation measures as long as there is so little trust in the motives of public servants. One measure which could go some way to addressing this malaise would be a restoration of elected local government, reintroducing at least one category of elected representative who is accessible and accountable to the rural population.

12. Poverty and disasters

The floods took a heavy toll on the productive assets of the poor, especially through loss of livestock in sudden floods (for example in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and where prolonged displacement forced people into distress sales of their animals. Although a year after the floods most survivors were again economically active,
narratives indicated that they struggled to survive and had been pushed back into poverty. The lingering economic effect suggested an ongoing need for pro-poor assistance.

Indeed, the most important broad initiative which can help “flood-proof” national development programmes is poverty-reduction in the flood prone areas. The best way to ensure that the population along the banks of the Indus and its tributaries is able to cope with future floods is to ensure that that population is healthy, educated, has reasonable holdings of household assets, well-built houses and a steady income from farming, livestock and off-farm activities. For the moment, the trend seems to be towards impoverishment rather than poverty reduction, given that the areas worst affected by flooding in 2010 already lagged behind Pakistan norms for human development and it is the people themselves who have had to pick up most of the costs of recovering from the flood.

13. Future vulnerability and the state of disaster preparedness

All the factors which caused the 2010 disaster are still present. Pakistan can expect further extreme weather events. Although projects were rapidly approved for plugging the gaps in embankments, there has been no fundamental overhaul of the institutions which were responsible for the poor state of the infrastructure or any real rethink of the way that the district administrations are to assist the population in time of crisis. There is an ongoing need for disaster preparedness and mitigation measures to help cope with the likely recurrence of variations on the theme of the 2010 floods.

Politics of flood impact and response

14. Watan card as an embodiment of the political challenge in disaster response

The Watan Card scheme for cash transfers to flood affectees was both the most successful of all disaster response measures and a prime example of the challenge of delivering good governance in the aftermath of a disaster. NADRA processed some 1,672,947 cards in the first phase of the scheme, roughly equal to the number of dwellings which were damaged or destroyed by the flood. The scheme thus achieved close to full coverage of households in the flood affected areas. Much of the disbursement was timely i.e. during the period when affectees needed cash to cope with the costs of displacement and early recovery. The amount of the relief payment, while unlikely to cover all household expenses, was at least a significant contribution. Despite the various teething problems, the Watan Card scheme worked and is an instrument which allows federal and provincial government efficiently to deliver assistance directly to the affectees.

The biggest political controversy surrounding the Watan Card scheme concerned the allocation of funds for its second phase. Survivors in all areas complained that the government had failed to deliver on the original promise that they would receive a Rs.1,00,000 grant through the Watan Card, enough to help in reconstruction. It took nearly a year for the Government of Pakistan to mobilise resources to launch a second phase of cash assistance, intended to address reconstruction needs. Meanwhile survivors returned to their villages and had to struggle to rebuild without external assistance. They held up the government’s failure to deliver on its promises of timely reconstruction assistance as a serious breach of trust, compounding the prevailing sentiment that the political class was unconcerned about the needs of the rural poor.

Despite the breach of trust, the Watan...
The biggest political controversy surrounding the Watan Card scheme concerned the allocation of funds for its second phase. The Card scheme showed significant potential for eliminating the kind of patronage based relief allocation which has dogged previous official responses. The approach requires continuing investment to ensure coverage of the marginalised members of the population, whose records are not up to date. Of all assistance schemes, this seemed to be the one that survivors most trusted to secure their entitlements as citizens, weakening the hold over them of traditional feudal politicians, who have so long sought to dominate relief distributions.
9.1 Resources

A rich range of information materials is available on the Pakistan floods, including media coverage, assessment reports, official documents, initial situation reports, evaluation reports, and humanitarian plans and programme documents.

Pakistan government organizations with responsibility for flood response

National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), http://ndma.gov.pk
National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), basic statistics on the Watan Card scheme http://watancard.nadra.gov.pk/reporting.jsp

Landmark reports on the floods and humanitarian response, programme documents


“Inter-agency real-time evaluation of the humanitarian response to Pakistan’s 2010 flood crisis”, Riccardo Polastro, March 2011 (commissioned by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee and funded by OCHA)

“The 2010 Flood Disaster: report of a commission of inquiry constituted by the Supreme Court of Pakistan”, Supreme Court, Islamabad, June 2011


Web resources on humanitarian response, maps and statistics


Independent website compiling information from humanitarian agencies working in Pakistan, Relief Web, http://reliefweb.int

Examples of assessments and humanitarian reports


“Six months into the floods: resetting Pakistan’s priorities through reconstruction”, OXFAM, OXFAM briefing paper 144, www.oxfam.org, 26 January 2011

“Pakistan at risk: challenges and opportunities after the flood”, Jinnah Institute, September-October 2010

(Dozens of other reports are available on http://floods2010.pakresponse.info/)

Background and reference

“The politics of flood relief in Badin”, report by Pattan Development Organisation, 2005


“FAQs on the Watan Card”, prepared by NADRA and IOM, October 2010
9.2 Findings and Recommendations from Civil Society Experience-Sharing on the Floods

CITIZENS’ CHARTER FOR SUSTAINABLE REHABILITATION OF FLOOD AFFECTEES

Sarwar Bari

Adopted by National Humanitarian Network & Representatives of Flood Affected in a Round Table Conference 15 February 2011, Islamabad Hotel.

Progressive civil society organizations formed a caucus to share experiences from the 2010 floods. They held several consultation exercises to explain the flood disaster and its impact and to develop strategies for disaster mitigation. The observations and charter of twenty-two recommendations below are drawn from the communiqué agreed among participating organizations and provide a succinct overview of flood issues.

Deforestation:

Failure to adopt realistic policies or to pursue existing policy on land use has resulted in Pakistan being badly denuded. In the last two decades Pakistan has lost a quarter of its natural forest cover and currently the deforestation rate is 2 percent a year — one of the highest in the world. Between 1990 and 2005 the country lost 24.7 percent of its forest and now is left with about 4 million hectares of forest. This is equivalent to 4.8 percent of the total land area of the country, while the global average of forest cover is around 27 percent for developed and 26 percent for the developing countries. Feudal politicians have grabbed more than 2 million hectares of land in the riverine kacha areas of Sindh and south Punjab. This encroachment has violated state policies, pushed population into the active riverbed and contributed to deforestation in the riverine belt.

Poor Quality Designing, Planning and Construction of Physical Infrastructure:

There are multiple examples where inadequate risk assessment has led to major items of national infrastructure exacerbating risks in flood prone areas. The M2 Motorway created havoc in the wake of 1997 flooding in Sargodha district by disrupting the natural flow of the rivers Jhelum and Chenab. Similarly, the new M1 Motorway helped to funnel the flood waters of the heavy downpour in the catchment areas of river Kabul on 29th July 2010. It contributed to destruction of bridges and settlements and loss of life in the Charsadda area. In Swat and Malakand over 50 bridges and hotels built in the active riverbed of the river Swat were destroyed. The high levels of damage to public infrastructure echo the pattern of the 2005 earthquake, in which shoddily constructed public buildings collapsed with heavy loss of life in areas where privately constructed buildings survived.

Maintenance and the Politics of Dykes:

The Department of Irrigation is responsible for the maintenance of dykes and embankments. Funding is allocated for this purpose in annual provincial budgets. Due to corruption in the department maintenance work tends to be superficial. Department officials have connived in the illegal felling of trees planted along the dykes and embankments and have failed to organise replanting. This makes
the dykes vulnerable. Consequently when floodwater hits the dykes, they collapse at these weak-points. There is a long history of links between irrigation department officials and the big landlord-politicians. These politicians use their influence in number of ways. At many locations along the rivers these landlords have influenced the placement and design of dykes in order to protect their lands over others. In August 2010, when rivers swelled, some feudal politicians succeeded in diverting the floodwater in order to save their own land. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has constituted a committee to investigate the causes of breaches and the mismanagement of floodwater. We appeal to the Supreme Court to instruct this committee to hold a series of public hearings in the areas where these breaches occurred.

**Marginalisation and Pauperisation:**

The failure of public policy on poverty alleviation is one of the most profound ways in which government action has helped leave people vulnerable. Most of the worst hit districts are at the bottom of various economic, social, political indices. For instance, Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan, Jaffarabad, Larkana, Kashmore, Shikarpur, Jacobabad and Rajanpur all fall at the bottom of Human Development Index. Interestingly, all these districts are ruled by feudal chieftains. It is no wonder that the populations of these districts also have a very high rate of deprivation. Furthermore, data sets of 1998 Census show that on average as high as 80% housing units in these districts were kacha and they could not withstand to floodwater. According to some estimates nearly 80 percent of all housing structures in the affected areas have been completely damaged or have become uninhabitable.

**Disaster Cycle:**

There has been little improvement in the coordination of government action despite the establishment of National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). The central and provincial governments obstructed NDMA and its provincial counterpart PDMA from performing their prescribed roles. According to NDMA Annual Report 2009, the central government withheld a total of 300 million Pak-Rupees which had been allocated to NDMA. Secondly, the government failed to establish required coordination structures at district and community levels. Thirdly, the civilian government in the provinces rolled back local councils whose role was envisaged as pivotal in the NDMA Disaster Management Plan 2010.

**The Politics of Disaster:**

As in the past, the ruling parties capitalised on the flood disaster 2010 as an opportunity rather than a humanitarian crisis. Politicians sought to consolidate their vote bank through relief assistance. Elected officials appropriated assistance for their own voters regardless of whether they met entitlement criteria. Communities have been deprived of or granted Watan Cards for cash assistance based on their proximity to local politicians. Politicising humanitarian assistance is a clear violation of UN-Guiding Principles on Displaced Persons, Sphere standards, and the Constitution of Pakistan, as all of them guarantee relief assistance without any discrimination.

**Women and Watan Card:**

The issuance policy of the Watan Card to the head of household was flawed as it provided for only men as head of household. This immediately excluded all women headed households and children without parents. A growing number of woman-headed households is a part of contemporary Pakistani reality and they tend to be poorer than the average male-headed household. The issuance policy...
also excluded hundreds of thousands of women and men who had migrated to flood affected areas before the floods and still possessed CNICs from other districts.

The Farmers’ Package:
The decision to support farmers with wheat seed and fertilizers was positive. However the effectiveness of the planned assistance was compromised by poor implementation and information dissemination. Eligibility and entitlement were inadequately publicised. Many farmers complained about the poor quality of the wheat seed. Inefficiency in distribution resulted in farmers having to pay a number of visits to collect seed and fertilizers from distant centres.

Construction of Model Villages:
Government plans to support the construction of “model villages” have had unintended adverse consequences. It has slowed down spontaneous reconstruction, while affectees wait to see if they will receive model village status, although a relatively small percentage of affectees will actually benefit from the programme.

Issuance of 2nd Tranche of Watan Card:
There has been a delay in disbursement of the second tranche of the Watan Card scheme, at a time when there is about 6 billion Pak-Rupees balance in the Prime Minister and Chief Ministers’ relief funds. Furthermore the governments of UK and USA have already given GBP 60 million and USD190 million respectively for the 2nd instalment of Watan card. This amount is enough to start paying the 2nd tranche of the Watan card. This unnecessary delay has killed resilience of many homeless families to reconstruct their houses as they are afraid of being deprived of the 2nd instalment of the Watan card.

Impact on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs):
We are extremely concerned about poor performance of the successive government on MDGs. There have been hardly any gains. The 2010 disaster has further plunged the country in deeper crisis. The UNDP report distributed in the Pakistan Development Forum 2010, states that floods have caused a reduction of 1% to 3% of progress towards most MDGs.

Political uncertainty and recovery:
The ongoing power-struggles among the national political and military leadership, at a time when 20 million Pakistani are without proper shelter and the national economy is disintegrating indicates a disturbing lack of vision. The focus of the national and provincial governments on their political survival distracts them from focus on the real priority which is that of assuring the population’s physical survival.

Reform Agenda and Post Flood Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

1. As both the successive military and civilian governments have failed the public in so many ways and the current disaster has profoundly exposed the failings of the ruling elite and the state, we hereby strive to make those parties accountable and simultaneously seek to broaden the political base of our democracy in order to improve governance in this country.

2. We urge social movements and CSOs to join hands for the implementation of the article 38 of the Constitution of Pakistan which not only prohibits the monopoly of a few families over the means of productive resources but also guarantees housing, employment, and social services to the people without any discrimination.

3. Civil society members note with concern that social and regional disparities already existing have worsened due to the floods. Civil society is of the strong opinion that these deepening gaps should be bridged by the state through a new social contract with the citizens that highlights the rights and entitlements of its citizens.
and the responsibilities of the state. Civil society members demand that the state revisit its exclusionary national policies that lie at the root of the existing social and economic gaps, the burden of which has been borne by the poor and deprived of Pakistan. The country’s social, economic, commercial, foreign, and national security policies are all exclusionary in nature and need to be redeveloped through incorporating a pro-people agenda of development and progress.

4. We are extremely concerned that the state-run relief response is flawed and partisan.

5. We note with concern that the over-centralized disaster management structures and dismantling of the local government bodies worsened the damage caused by floods. The state needs to restore these structures and decentralize disaster management to enable a quick state response to disasters.

6. We demand the immediate implementation of senate resolution on debt write off. Rather than continuing with its unproductive spending, the state should introduce public austerity measures and control defence spending.

7. We also express our displeasure with the UN mechanism for disaster response, which was ill-conceived and slow in implementation and failed to use local capacity.

8. The amount promised by the state under the Watan Cards system should be released immediately. The state must announce a date by which time the second instalment of the Watan Cards is released.

9. The criterion for issuing of Watan Card is highly exclusionary and riddled with systemic flaws. It blatantly excludes people with no ID cards and widowed women by way of the provision for ‘head of the family’. The state should redevelop the criteria for issuing the CCNIC for flood affectees. They should either be given temporary ID cards or be issued new ID cards based on community evidence and other flexible criteria.

10. The current administration regulating Watan Cards is inadequate. In many parts of the country, the ATM machines are not operating. The government should set up mobile ATMs for the Watan Cards. Moreover, there should be a complaint centre to deal with the issues relating to Watan Cards.

11. There is substantial information gap with regards to the Farmers Package, its content and the mechanism concerning its distribution. Due to lack of information, farmers are unable to access the package. The state should address the issue of duplication of channels of distribution for the Farmers package as currently, the FAO, PRSP and the Punjab Government all are simultaneously implementing the Farmers Package.

12. The quality of fertilizers and seeds in the Farmers Package were highly compromised. The government should not give inappropriate hybrid and poor quality seeds in the Farmer’s Package.

13. Schools and health units destroyed should be immediately reconstructed. The new reconstructed structures should be accessible to women.

14. State land should be distributed among flood affectees, especially women.

15. Flood affectees should be registered for social security without delay. Workers who have lost their livelihood during the course of floods must be immediately provided unemployment allowance. The means of communication destroyed during the
course of floods must be restored and their construction quality and design should incorporate disk reduction.

16. The state should make the rehabilitation plan public and invite broader consultation for rehabilitation.

17. The damage caused by floods in vulnerable areas such as Swat, Kohistan, Dir and Jaffarabad which have been the target of recent military operations has aggravated the situation of people already facing economic and social marginalization and deprivation. These areas should be paid special attention for relief operations while their rehabilitation should also incorporate a broad-based agenda of improving the economies, social service delivery and rebuilding state society relations in these areas.

18. The donor agencies’ reluctance to work with local non-governmental bodies is highly objectionable since local NGOs, are in a better position to identify needy communities and deliver assistance than external agencies. The donor agencies should work with local NGOs and the government can also make this as a condition for international donors to work in Pakistan.

19. Relief camps should not be dismantled for population of areas still directly affected by floodwaters. Winter needs for clothing, bedding and shelter should be provided immediately. The state should also provide transportation for returning displaced persons.

20. In order to reduce damages in the future, the government must make disaster risk reduction an integral part of development planning and implementation.

21. All humanitarian interventions should incorporate UN-Guiding Principles, the Sphere Standards and the relevant articles of the Constitution of Pakistan.

22. Elected local councils provide the best structures to cope with any disaster. All over the world local councils are responsible for disaster management. The NDMA Disaster Management Plan 2010 is also heavily dependent on elected local councillors. Therefore, we demand immediate reinstatement of the local councils.
9.3 Terms of Reference of the Supreme Court Commission of Inquiry

These TORs were laid down in the form of formulations/questions by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its aforesaid order as under:-

1) “Whether embankment breaches during the period of high floods in Indus River are subject to any procedure to be followed by the authorities at the relevant time, if so, what is the manner of exercising of such powers and by whom and under what circumstances?

2) Whether in the floods in River Indus in the months of July and August, 2010, procedure for embankment breaches was followed judiciously?

3) Whether before ordering embankment breaches at different places, particularly at Ali Wahn and Tori Bund, no procedure was followed, if so, who is responsible for the same?

4) Whether before embankment breaches at different places, precautionary measures were adopted, particularly in view of warnings issued from time to time by the meteorological department of Pakistan?

5) Whether the beneficiaries, if any, responsible for embankment breaches to save their properties/crops etc, are also responsible for the losses sustained by the affectees?

6) What is the approximate volume of losses sustained by the affectees and Government during the floods?

7) Whether relief was extended to the flood affectees on war footings or not?

8) Jacobabad Airport was available for flood relief operations, if so then why the relief goods were not sent to affectees on urgent basis?

9) What is the pace of rehabilitation in the flood devastated areas?

10) Whether flood affectees are entitled for damages and compensation from the Government of Pakistan or from the persons who were benefited from the embankment breaches?

11) Whether administrations of the Provincial Governments in private and official capacity are responsible for failing to manage affairs of flood affectees justly or properly, if so, what action is suggested against them?

12) Whether embankment of River Indus was being maintained annually, if not so, who is responsible for the same?

13) Who was responsible for breaches that took place at Thori Bund and Ali Wahn Bund?”
9.4 Pattan Mentioned in the Judicial Flood Commission Report

The Judicial Flood Commission was formed to investigate the diversion of the flood water and mismanagement of relief operations. The report of the Commission, recently released carries a noteworthy mention of Mr. Sarwar Bari, National Coordinator of Pattan. They highlighted that he maintained the role of an advocate during the flood as well as after it for the millions of voices that have been severely affected by the flood. He has raised issues regarding the fact that the extent of damages in districts was not being weighed in during the relief distribution process and the problems faced by the affectees in the Watan Card issuance as well as cashing them in. Most importantly, he has brought to light the plight of the women especially single ladies not legally separated from their husbands in the flood affected areas. He also brought to notice that the restoration of the local governments is imperative as its absence furthered people’s misery.

Another issue that deserves attention is that among the list of people from the flood affected regions who recorded their statements with the Commission regarding the diversion of the flood water and mismanagement in relief operations the majority were from the Muzaffargarh district. This is a reflection of the mobilisation efforts that Pattan made with the people of this district while initiating and working with the Tehreek Bahalia Sailab Zadgan. This district has also been one of the locations where Pattan with UNDP initiated its Cash for Work Programme for the flood affectees. Pattan instilled in the affectees the confidence and self-belief to stand up against what is wrong and the realisation that it is their turn to talk and no longer the turn of feudal lords and politicians. Below you will find the excerpt from the Supreme Court Judicial Flood Commission Report that covers the aforementioned points:

Excerpt from Judicial Flood Commission Report

Role of NGOs

Page 8. The Commission also benefited from the depositions of 82 witnesses/officials examined by the Sindh Judicial Commission that included a local MNA and an MPA from the affected areas, Advocates (2), Media personnel (4), Office-bearers from local Zakat Committees (2), Abadgars Social Welfare Boards (2), Zamindars (15), Farmers/villagers (28), concerned public officials (22), Irrigation officials /experts (10) and revenue staff (2). The 150 witnesses examined by the Punjab Judicial Commission included locals/affectees (50), mostly from Muzaffargarh District and a few from Mianwali, High Court Advocates (9), Provincial officials (48), including Departmental Secretaries/senior officials (25) and Irrigation officials (23), Senior Federal officials (17), Subject Specialists/Experts (13), District Administrations (7), Media (2) and three from NGOs. Provinces/ administrations of Balochistan and KP or FATA did not hold or report any significant probe or inquiry.

SECTION-1 GIST OF PUBLIC GRIEVANCES

Page 13 Mr. Sarwar Bari, a social activist and political analyst attached to an NGO, and a columnist gave an overview of his organization’s work in flood management and disaster mitigation since 1992 and shared his observations and findings after field visits during 2010 floods, based on exhaustive review of media reports and analytical reviews on the subject. These had been reported in a detailed column published in the Daily News in February 2011. He deposed that early warnings were not issued to the affectees in the southern Punjab to prepare them to move out to safety, to reduce damage to life and property. He compared the extent of damages in some areas in Muzaffar-
garh District with reference to numbers to substantiate his observations by asserting that out of 608,822 Watan Cards in the Province, 242,392 (40%) were issued in Kot Addu alone which showed extent of localized damage induced by unauthorized breaches; that many genuine affectees were left out in the process for various reasons was supported by a classical case of person without both hands but denied Watan Card for not being able to put his thumb impression or signatures. Hardships of single ladies not legally separated from husbands were also pointed out and flagged by his associate activists, to urge a fair resolution of complaints against what were alleged to be graft-seeking field staff. Mr. Bari vehemently asserted that disbursement of relief and rehabilitation grants suffered neglect, inefficiency or unchecked corrupt practices amongst Federal and Provincial government’s field staff. Extended distances between residences of the affectees to the ATM machines (11-50 miles) had exposed them to extra hazards. It appeared to him that the rehabilitation plan and program had not been unfolded fully and transparently. Retention of Rs. 6 billion, allegedly lying idle in the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund was not seen as healthy. He presented his mixed bag of findings from responses obtained from flood affectees in Thatta/Badin in Sindh and Muzaffargarh in the Punjab that revealed varying perceptions and reactions regarding degrees of effectiveness of different departments, officials and nonofficial agencies and existence of corruption, the sole exception was the Punjab Health Department that scored 10/10 for its work in the affected areas and the case was used to infer that affectees awareness about ground realities was not superfluous. He strongly pleaded for early restoration of elected local governments as its absence had contributed towards compounding of people’s miseries. Analysis of 112 articles published in various national dailies on the issue of flood losses that attributed most of the responsibility to Government’s failure to forecast and take timely precautions that further aggravated poorer ‘Human Development Index’ (HDI) in poorest districts of southern Punjab. The research conducted by M/s Jamal Khan Toor and Malik of PIDE in its Pakistan Development Review, Issue No.42/2 Summer 2003: ‘Mapping the Special Deprivation in Pakistan’ established deprivation among poorer southern Punjab districts like Muzaffargarh, Layyha and D.G.Khan were at the top, was cited as these were the worst hit districts. He sounded a caution: Unless remedial steps were taken without delay, hunger strike or long-march to Islamabad may be planned by the affectees, as a last resort!
GLOSSARY

ACs: Air Conditions
Ajdar: A type of snake
AJK: Azad Jammu and Kashmir
AK47: Automatic rifle
Arbabs: Influential figure in a village
ARY: A Pakistani television channel
ATM: Automated Teller Machine
Banderbant: A monkeys’ circus
Banya: Hindu trader/money lender
Basti: Hamlet
Bedari-e-Millat: Awakening of the nation
Beldars: Labourer assigned for embankment maintenance
BHP: A British oil and gas company
Bibi: A word to address females
Biraderi: Clan
Bund: Embankment
CCI: Council of Common Interests
Chaddar aour Chardwari: Privacy (Veil and four walls)
Charpouys: Traditional bed
CNIC: Computerized National Identity Cards
Col.: Colonel
Computer Wala: A person who operates computer
FFW: Flash Flood Warning
CRDO: Community Research and Development Organisation
Dakbanglow: Rest House
DCO: District Coordination Officer
Deg: Great cauldrons of food
Deobandi: A sub sect of Sunni Muslims
DGK: Dera Ghazi Khan
DNA: Damage and Needs Assessment
Doaba: Area situated between two rivers
DPO: District Police Officer
Eid: A Muslim festival
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization
FATA: Federally Administrative Tribal Areas
Fatwa: Religious verdict declared by Muslim clergy
GB: Gilgitand Baltistan
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geo</td>
<td>A television channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GT Road</td>
<td>Grand Trunk Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GuddiNishin</td>
<td>Custodian of a shrine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBIS</td>
<td>Indus Basin Irrigation System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs</td>
<td>International Nongovernment Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jahez</td>
<td>Dowry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jatoi</td>
<td>A caste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kacha</td>
<td>Non-settled flood plains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karyana</td>
<td>Small grocery shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KBT</td>
<td>KacchhoBachao Tehreek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khairat</td>
<td>Charity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalay</td>
<td>Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharif crops</td>
<td>The crops that are sown in the rainy season</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khosa</td>
<td>A caste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>Khyber-Pahtunkhwa province formerly known as NWFP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Langar</td>
<td>Alm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lathi charge</td>
<td>Baton charge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lathi</td>
<td>Baton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBOD</td>
<td>Left Bank Outfall Drain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leghari</td>
<td>A caste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M1</td>
<td>Motorway runs between Lahore and Islamabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M2</td>
<td>Motorway runs between Islamabad and Peshawar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magrheb</td>
<td>West or Sunset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandir</td>
<td>Temple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masjid</td>
<td>Mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehman</td>
<td>Guest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirani</td>
<td>A Caste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNA</td>
<td>Member National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNV Drain</td>
<td>Main Nara Valley Drain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moaza</td>
<td>Rural administrative unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohalla</td>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Member Provincial Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADRA</td>
<td>National Database and Registration Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namaz</td>
<td>Prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashaibi</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazim</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDMA</td>
<td>National Disaster Management Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Government Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICs</td>
<td>National Identity Cards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRSP:</td>
<td>National Rural Support Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numberdar:</td>
<td>Head of village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogai:</td>
<td>A tribe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patwari:</td>
<td>Land revenue officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDMA:</td>
<td>Provincial Disaster Management Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesh Imam:</td>
<td>Prayer leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM:</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSP:</td>
<td>Pakistan Rural Support Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSLM:</td>
<td>Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pucca:</td>
<td>Non flooded settled area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qasba:</td>
<td>Town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabi:</td>
<td>Winter crops harvested in the spring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBOD:</td>
<td>Right Bank Outfall Drain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rishvat:</td>
<td>Bribe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roti:</td>
<td>Bread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rs:</td>
<td>Rupees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFWCO:</td>
<td>Sindh Agricultural and Forestry Workers Coordinating Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seth:</td>
<td>Rich businessman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHO:</td>
<td>Station House Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subedar:</td>
<td>Non commissioned army officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPARCO:</td>
<td>Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syed:</td>
<td>A caste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talpur:</td>
<td>A caste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taulka:</td>
<td>Sub-district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBSZ:</td>
<td>Tehrik Bahalia Sailab Zadgan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehsil:</td>
<td>Sub district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thana:</td>
<td>Police station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tilavat:</td>
<td>Recitation of the Holy Quran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRDP:</td>
<td>Thardeep Rural Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP:</td>
<td>Tehreek-e-Talban Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UC:</td>
<td>Union council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF:</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCHA:</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAPADA:</td>
<td>Water and Power Development Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASH:</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WC:</td>
<td>Watan Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP:</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>